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Preface 
Agricultural product markets are receiving much attention from 
economists. The industrialization of food processing in the past 50 
years has aroused mixed emotions in the minds of many thoughtful 
citizens. On the one hand, it has been welcomed as a source of 
employment and economic growth, and of labor saving in the home. 
On the other hand, the dwindling number and expanded size of 
firms that process and market most food products has been viewed 
as a potential threat to the public interest in competitive, efficient 
food markets. 
Private and public research agencies, including the u.s. Depart-
ment of Agriculture and universities, are examining this situation. 
The Marketing Economics Division of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture is conducting a study of the economic conse-
quences of consolidation, integration, and merger among agricul-
tural product marketing firms. Studies are being conducted in 
Washington and in universities on a cooperatively sponsored 
basis. This book presents the findings of a recently completed 
inquiry into the baking industry-the structure, conduct, and per-
formance of bread markets. Funds for this research were authorized 
by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, under a contract 
initiated in July, 1957, between the Department of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Nebraska, and the Economics Research 
Service of the U.S.D.A. 
The authors are grateful for the assistance of many individuals 
and groups in the development of this study. Dr. Paul E. Nelson, 
Jr., Head, Market Structure and Practices, U.S.D.A., was particularly 
helpful in planning and initiating the research. Drs. Winn Finner 
and Allen B. Paul contributed as U.S.D.A. representatives. Dr. 
Charles C. Slater, Economist, Arthur D. Little, Inc., formerly with 
the baking industry, acted as a continuing consultant to the study. 
Much of the work would have been impossible without the gen-
erous cooperation of many individuals and firms in the baking 
industry. We are also indebted to Eleanor M. Birch and to Drs. 
J. B. Hassler, H. W. Ottoson, and C. J. Miller, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska, for their valuable 
advice and critical comments. These and many others have contrib-
uted to the original design of the study, to the collection of data, 
and to the analysis and findings presented here. The authors express 
their appreciation to all and willingly share with them whatever 
credit the study may earn. We reserve for ourselves, however, any 
debits that may be charged against it owing to possible errors of 
fact or inference. 
R. G. WALSH 
B. M. EVANS 
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1/ Introduction 
Baking is one of the largest industries in the United States. 
Its sales, which exceed $4 billion annually, rank it third among the 
food processing industries, and thirteenth among all manufacturing 
industries. Bakery products account for nearly $1 out of every $10 
spent by American consumers for food. Almost half of the domestic 
consumption of wheat flour is in the form of bread, rolls, cake, 
pie, doughnuts, sweet goods, and other perishable bakery products. 
While this study encompasses the perishable bakery products indus-
try as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, it focuses primarily on 
wholesale markets for white bread.1 
Since World War II, important changes have occurred in the 
bread baking industry. A decline in the per capita demand for 
bread products coupled with changes in technology and costs has 
affected the relationships between baking companies, their market 
behavior, and the resulting level of efficiency and price performance. 
In an industrial economy, the farming, milling, baking, retailing, 
and consuming functions are integrally related. Changes in the 
organization and practices in one may induce changes in others. 
The baking industry occupies a strategic position2 in this process, 
1. As shown in Table 1, the U.S. Census Bureau defines the industry to 
include plants producing bread and related perishable bakery products, pri-
marily for sale off the premises. Plants producing crackers and related semi-
perishable products are not included. Nor are retail bake shops with baking on 
the premises. Bakery product markets segment into sub-groups along distribu-
tive channels such as direct home service, multi-unit retail, wholesale, and 
integrated grocery chain. Distribution wholesale to grocery stores is by far the 
most important. Table 9 shows that white bread accounts for more than half 
of the total bakery product. Individual bread markets are primarily in large 
cities with a 100-150 mile rural fringe, where the cross elasticity of demand 
among sellers' products is economically significant. Willard Cochrane, "The 
Market as a Unit of Inquiry in Agricultural Economic Reseach," Journal of 
Farm Economics (February, 1957), p. 23. 
2_ In 1958, the function of wholesale baking received 58 percent of the 
19.11 cent average retail price per pound of white bread, as compared with 
16 percent paid the retail grocer, 11 percent paid the miller, 15.5 percent paid 
the farmer, and slightly over 7 percent paid for other functions in the process 
of wheat marketing. Marketing Margins in White Bread, Miscellaneous Bulletin 
712, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (WaShington, 
D.C., 1959). 
1 
2 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
and as a result, consumers, farmers, millers, and retailers, as well as 
bakers themselves, have a vital interest in the way the baking 
industry performs. 
Changes in market structure and firm behavior in the baking 
industry have been the subject of study and concern by several 
interested individuals and groups. The U.S. Department of Agri-
culture has followed with increased concern the widening of the 
market margin and the declining farmer share of consumer bread 
prices.s The Senate Agricultural Committee has completed a study 
of average cost and returns of bakery operations.4 The Federal 
Trade Commission has followed the pricing practices of many bak-
ing companies with frequent cease and desist orders. I> The Justice 
Department, through periodic prosecutions, has kept baking firms 
aware of the limitation imposed by the antitrust laws.6 The Senate 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly has studied the impact 
of "discriminatory pricing" by large baking companies on small 
independent bakers.7 The industry has encouraged economic study 
of the historic development of baking and changes in market 
organization and practices.s Most recently, the F.T.C. studied buyer 
concentration and the integration of retail grocery organizations 
into baking and other food processing industries.9 
This study describes and analyzes: (1) the changes in the market 
structure and organization of the bread industry, primarily since 
1946; (2) the principal technological-cost factors associated with 
combination-integration; (3) the related changes in price and non-
3. Ibid. 
4. Cost and Margin Trends in the Baking Industry, 85th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957). 
5. For example: In the matter of Ward Baking Co., Docket No. 6833, 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, December 30, 1958. 
6. U.S. vs. Continental Baking Co., American Baking Co., Colonial Baking 
Co. (a subsidiary of Campbell-Taggart Associated Bakeries), Hart's Bakery, et aI., 
Dec. 18, 1958, Trade Regulation Report (New York: Commerce Clearing House, 
1959), pars. 66, 345. 
7. Administered Prices Bread Hearings, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Mono-
poly, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1959), hereafter referred to as Hearings; Administered Prices Bread Report, 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), hereafter referred to as Report. 
8. William G. Panschar, Baking in America, Vol. 1, EconomIc Development 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1956); Charles C. Slater, Baking in 
America, Vol. 2, Market Organization and Competition (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1956); Charles C. Slater, Economic Changes in the Baking 
Industry, (Chicago: American Bakers Association, 1958). 
9. Federal Trade Commission, Economic Inquiry into Food Marketing, Part 
I, Concentration and Integration in Retailing (Washington, D.C., 1960). 
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price behavior patterns of firms, and; (4) the impact of these changes 
on industrial performance, particularly production, distribution, 
and selling costs. 
Theoretical Bases for the Analysis 
Market structure10 refers to characteristics of market organiza-
tion considered important in determining firm conduct and indus-
trial performance. Market structural variables measured in this 
study include the number and size of buyers and sellers operating 
within the relevant markets, the extent to which firms sell identical 
or differentiated products, the height of barriers to entry of firms, 
and the role of mergers in structural change. 
Market conduct refers to patterns of behavior that enterprises 
follow in relation to their markets. Market conduct variables meas-
ured in this study include the methods employed by groups of firms 
in determining price and output, sales promotion policy, product 
variation policy, and various predatory and exclusionary tactics. 
Market performance refers to the important economic results 
of market structure and conduct patterns relative to the public 
interest. Market performance variables measured in this study 
include the relative efficiency of production and distribution as 
influenced by technological advances, the size of operations and 
the extent of excess capacity, the amount and type of sales promo-
tion costs, the improvement in quality of product, the price level 
in large city and in outlying market areas relative to costs, and 
the level of profits. 
Market structure analysis is less concerned with the private 
interest in the maximization of individual bakery firm profit levels 
than with the public interest in greater per capita production, 
more optimum distribution of resources, freedom of opportunity, 
and the like. Other industry studies are currently under way to 
analyze the impact of various economic changes on the individual 
bakery firm profits. l1 
The need for further and continued research is evident from 
10. Stephen H. Sosnich, "A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (August, 1958), pp. 380-423. Joe S. Bain, 
Industrial Organization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), p. 9. More 
recently, Robert L. Clodius and Willard F. Mueller, "Market Structure Analysis 
As An Orientation for Research In Agricultural Economics," Journal of Farm 
Economics (August, 1961), pp. 513-553. 
II. See, for example, Distribution: The Challenge of the Sixties, Report to 
the American Bakers Association, (Arthur D. Little, Inc.: Cambridge, December, 
1960). 
4 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
the findings of this study. One such area is the study of implications 
for antitrust policy, and for other possible remedies which may 
help achieve either adequate or optimum performance of the baking 
industry. This study analyzes the costs to society of some strategic 
deficiencies in the performance of bread markets, but it does not 
"suggest for what purpose antitrust and other legislation might be 
enacted, how it might be interpreted, where cases might be selected 
for administrative and judicial action, what remedies might be 
applied, and how the success of public policy might be judged."12 
Specific policy recommendations would require extended investiga-
tion and analysis. There are no complete or final answers to all 
the relevant economic and noneconomic questions, nor any solution 
in the sense of a guaranteed long-run optimum performance of the 
baking industry. This study should be viewed as a partial and first 
approximation to be verified or rejected by further study. 
The market structure framework outlined above permits inclu-
sion and use of the rich literature and theory recently developed 
which relates to the explanation of changes in market structure 
and behavior. Measurement of change in bread market conditions 
is based on comparisons between variables at the beginning and at 
the end of the time period under study. Explanation of the dynamic 
factors underlying changes in bread markets relies, in large part, 
on the many questions raised by oligopoly theory. 
Oligopoly refers to an industry characterized by fewness of 
sellers, and to the interdependent market behavior among them. 
An oligopolistic market structure characterizes most bread markets. 
Markets are served by a few large bread producers, with a fringe of 
many small sellers some of which produce a specialty product or 
provide a special service function. Entry into bread baking on a 
significant scale is largely foreclosed except to certain established 
retail grocery firms. With modifications appropriate to the baking 
industry as subsequently outlined, oligopoly theory identifies impor-
tant factors that may be associated empirically with changes in 
bakery markets. 
Fellner suggests that oligo polis tic markets may develop and 
change because of changes in cost factors and because of changes 
in the market power of participant firms.13 These two possible bases 
for changes in market conditions are examined in this report: 
First, that a dynamic variable tending to bring about economic 
12. Sosnick, op. cit., p. 414. 
13. William Fellner, Competition Among the Few (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1949), pp. 44-47. 
Introduction / 5 
change in bakery markets is technical advance in bakery equipment, 
in the transport and handling of bakery products, and in food 
merchandising in general. The technological force is transferred 
largely through its cumulative effect on cost economies in the pro-
duction and distribution of bakery products. 
Second, the market power relationship between firms in bakery 
markets as manifest in the interdependent practices of enterprises 
with respect to pricing policies, nonprice practices and plant utiliza-
tion. Changes in market power between firms and segments of the 
industry may have an important impact on several performance 
dimensions, as for example, the maintenance of price stability and 
profit goals; or the increase in price sufficient to cover the increased 
costs of excess capacity and non price competition (advertising, prod-
uct variation, and services). 
A further advantage of the market structure approach is that 
it opens the door to some of the new special theory applicable to 
imperfect markets. Modifications of the general theory of oligopoly 
will be discussed: (I) Most oligopoly theory has dealt largely with the 
relation between oligopolists as a concentrated group of large firms. 
Vatter has explored the possibility of extending oligopoly theory to 
deal with group inter-relations between the dominant few and the 
small firm periphery.14 This study considers both, and explores the 
possible impact of oligopolistic behavior by the dominant few on the 
number and size of the small firm fringe in bakery markets. (2) The 
small-firm fringe may affect the stability goal of the oligopoly core 
through their lack of knowledge and/or rational economic behavior. 
Also, knowledge within the oligipoly core may differ significantly, 
thereby giving rise to independent behavior in place of the interde-
pendent type posited by general oligopoly theory. (3) Oligopoly 
theory assumes enterprises have identical cost curves and, therefore, 
is modified in this study to deal with changes in market positions 
arising from secular changes (both shifts and shapes) in the cost 
curves of interdependent firms as reflected in policies of capital 
equipment adoption. (4) Aggregate demand for bread products is 
exceptionally stable. Thus it is the extreme case in oligopoly theory 
with respect to elasticity of demand, i.e., market price adjustment 
may have practically no effect upon total quantity purchased. (5) 
Market behavior of a bakery oligopoly may be modified from with-
out through its vertical relation with a group of large grocery chains. 
14. Harold G. Vatter, Small Enterprise and Oligopoly, Studies in Economics 
No.4, Oregon State College (Corvallis. 1955). p. 4. 
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The relationship may take the form of bilateral oligopoly or vertical 
integration. In the case of bilateral oligopoly, grocery chains have a 
position of strength by virtue of their control and allocation of retail 
shelf space. Thus, the behavior of an oligopolistic baking group may 
be influenced more by the behavior of an oligopsonistic retail groc-
ery group than by the behavior of consumers. For consumer prefer-
ence is modified by its reflection through a retail grocery group. Ordi-
narily, an oligopolist participating in a market would be a processor, 
wholesaler, retailer or otherwise in a specific category. In this case, 
however, many corporate and voluntary grocery chains integrate 
vertically into bread baking, and thus compete directly with the 
wholesale baker. The largest corporate and voluntary chains in retail 
food markets may substitute a private label bread for that of whole-
saler brands while at the same time representing a bilateral force 
of concentrated buyers from without. This combined relationship 
may have important implications for economic stability and change 
in bakery markets. 
Sources and Method 
Much of the work on this project has been assembling and 
developing data bearing on changes in market structure and behav-
ior in the baking industry and interpreting these data within the 
general theoretical framework outlined above. The sources fall into 
three main categories: (1) published material including investment 
manuals, trade journals, annual reports of firms, studies by federal 
agencies, congressional investigations, and industry studies by indi-
viduals; (2) direct interviews and questionnaires from a selected 
sample of firms; and (3) engineering studies of optimum plant 
operations and labor time estimates on delivery routes. 
Published material is largely from two sources. The U.S. Census 
of Manufactures for 1947, 1954, and 1958 provides bench marks 
from which to measure the changes in number and size of firms, 
the type of products produced, and the marketing channels utilized. 
The transcript of Hearings in 1959 and subsequent Report in 1960 
by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly pro-
vides much previously unpublished information on market struc-
ture and behavior in the baking industry. Both sources provide 
reliable economic data. The Census provides aggregative industrial 
and sub-industrial data, and the congressional committee, not 
bound by the disclosure rule and armed with the power of sub-
poena, provides historic information on the market behavior of 
individual firms. Both micro and macro data are available for the 
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baking industry of a quality and quantity not often available to 
the research economist. 
Data available from published sources were insufficient for the 
entire analysis. To estimate some of the effects of structural and 
behavior change in the baking industry, it was necessary to develop 
primary data bearing on cost-volume relationships in bread produc-
tion and distribution. No adequate empirical data for the analysis 
of economies of scale or levels of plant utilization were available in 
published material. One of the first steps was a lengthy survey of 
wholesale bakery plant operations to provide the authors with a 
general orientation into its characteristics. This 20-plant sample 
provided an empirical basis for estimating under-capacity plant 
utilization at three relevant levels-station (machine), cyclical 
(within the week), and secular (average annual). 
Independently, additional observations were taken on 23 whole-
sale and five house-to-house routes to illustrate the effect of volume 
on per unit costs of driver-salesman distribution. When allowance is 
made for changing volumes and factor costs these route observations 
do not differ substantially from average cost data previously pub-
lished. Neither set of survey data, however, fully reflects optimum 
operation at minimum cost levels. This is a limitation of the survey 
technique in industrial studies in general. 
The engineering economic approach is an alternative method for 
establishing cost-volume relationships reflecting minimum cost levels 
to analyze the effects of structural and behavioral change in food 
processing industries,15 It provides an empirical basis for economies 
of scale in bread production. Engineering measures of machine per-
formance, labor time, and physical input capabilities were prepared 
by bakery equipment manufacturers. These were combined with 
accounting costs from published sources to synthesize cost budgets 
for model bread plants of small, medium, and large size, with auto-
mated-batch and with continuous-mix equipment. 
15. See, for example, L. L. Sammet, "Structural Trends and Economies of 
of Scale in Agricultural Marketing and Processing," Proceedings of the Western 
Farm Economics Association (August 13-15, 1958), pp. 187-201. 
2 / Structural Characteristics of 
the Industry 
This chapter deals with changes in the market structure or 
market environment in which the production and distribution of 
bread products occurs. Because the baking industry traditionally 
has been considered one of America's least concentrated industries, 
it is important to consider recent changes in market structure 
variables: the degree of seller and buyer concentration, of product 
differentiation, and barriers to entry.1 The transformation of an 
industry from low to relatively high concentration, product differ-
entiation, and/or net barriers to entry may affect market conduct 
and performance more than any other factors in individual capi-
talistic markets. Measurement of market structure variables in this 
chapter provides a partial basis for subsequent explanation of 
market conduct in Chapter 5 and market performance in Chapter 6. 
Concentration in the Bakery Industry 1947-58 
Measurement of market concentration requires that a definition 
of the relevant market be specified. In the baking industry, firms 
buy flour and other inputs in regional or national markets but sell 
bread products in essentially local market areas. Thus no single 
measure of market concentration serves all purposes. Selection of 
the various measures used here is based on the assumption that 
baking companies buy in national markets and sell in a number 
of local markets defined by the states and large cities in which 
plants are located. Moreover, bakery markets are segmented into 
several distinct channels of distribution. The primary market for 
bread products is via wholesale distribution through grocery stores, 
and some is distributed wholesale to restaurants, hotels, and institu-
tions (Table I). Also, grocery chains have integrated vertically into 
1. Bain, op. cit., p. 211. 
8 
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the baking industry, and compete directly with baking companies 
distributing wholesale to grocery stores. Some baking companies 
have integrated vertically forward into retail marketing through 
chains of retail bake shops and through home delivery service. 
Measurement of market concentration here is at the aggregate indus-
trial, wholesale segment, and bread plant levels. 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF EsTABLISHMENTS, TOTAL VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, VALUE OF SHIPMENTS 
PER ESTABLISHMENr, PERISHABLE BAKERY PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 
1954, AND 1958 
Number of Total 
Average 
Value of 
Bakery Segment Establish- Value of Shipments per 
ments Shipments Establishment ($I,OOOs) ($I,OOOs) 
Wholesale 
1947 5,019 $1,764,968 $ 351.7 
1954 5,426 2,385,721 439.6 
1958 5,199 2,807,650 540.0 
Vertically integrated grocery chain 
1947 90 $ 150,174 $1,668.6 
1954 142 265,851 1,872.2 
1958 178 371,941 2,089.6 
Home service 
1947 624 $ 281,937 $ 451.8 
1954 217 297,551 1,371.2 
1958 361 363,937 1,008.1 
Retail multi-unit 
1947 1,064 $ 219,812 $ 206.6 
1954 318 117,892 370.7 
1958 247 155,945 631.4 
Total bread product industry 
1947 6,796 $2,404,000 $ 353.7 
1954 6,103 3,067,000 502.5 
1958 5,985 3,699,473 618.1 
SoURCE: 1947, 1954, and 1958 Census of Manufactures, Bakery Products, Bureau of the 
Census, Department of Commerce (Washin"ton, D. C.). 
NOTE: Excludes products purchased and resold without further processin". Also, excludes 
11,901 retail bakeries in 1958 and 12,611 in 1954 which were covered in the Census of Busi-
ness, Retail Trade. In current dollars, they had annual sales of $649.4 million in 1958 and 
$581.9 million in 1954. While output may have increased sli"htly, the number of retail 
bakeries declined by 710, or about 6 percent in this recent four Jear period. Also excluded 
from the above tabulations are bakery product stores with no pai employees. In 1958 there 
were 4,752 such stores with sales of $79.3 million compared to 3,932 stores in 1954 with sales 
of $59.7 million, both in current dollars. Combined, these small retail bakeries account for 
about 16.5 percent of the estimated total bakery product sales of $4,428.1 million in 1958, a 
decrease from 17.3 percent of the total of $3,708.6 million in 1954, and about 19 percent of 
the total of $2,966.4 million in 1947. 
Decreasing Number of Bakeries 
The overall trend in the agricultural processing industries is 
one of declining numbers of rival firms. The most dramatic change 
in recent years has been a decline in the number of bakeries. 
Between 1947 and 1954, the number of bakeries going out of busi-
ness was at a rate two-and-one-half times the rate for all food proces-
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sors. More than half of the postwar decline in total number of 
processors in the 30 major food industries occurred in the bread 
product industry.2 The number of food processing plants as a 
whole has decreased at an average annual rate of about 0.5 percent 
a year, while the number of bakeries has decreased at an average 
annual rate of about 1.25 percent. For the nation as a whole, 
the number of bakeries decreased from 6,796 in 1947 to 6,103 in 
1954-slightly over 100 bakeries per year. This trend is continuing 
although at a less rapid rate. The number of bakeries declined to 
5,985 in 1958-approximately 30 fewer bakeries per year in the 
most recent period for which data are available. 
There have been important shifts within the bakery industry. 
Some segments contained more bakeries in 1958 than in 1947. Table 
1 shows that vertically integrated bakeries owned by chain stores 
doubled in number from 90 in 1947 to 178 in 1958. The number of 
wholesale bakeries increased from 5,019 in 1947 to 5,426 in 1954, 
or by about 50 bakeries per year, but in more recent years decreased 
at about the same rate to 5,199 in 1958. But the number of house-
to-house bakeries fell sharply from 624 in 1947 to 217 in 1954, 
though they increased to 361 by 1958. Multi-unit retail bakeries also 
declined in number from 1,064 in 1947 to 318 in 1954 and to 247 
in 1958. In addition to firms going out of business, these divergent 
trends reflect shifts in distribution patterns that result in reclassi-
fication by segment. According to Census procedure, a bakery is 
classified in a particular segment if its distribution by the primary 
channels of that segment exceeds in value its distribution by the 
channels of any other segment. Many small bakeries that formerly 
delivered primarily via high-cost house-to-house routes shifted to 
restaurant and grocery store delivery and are now classified as 
wholesale bakeries. Also, a change in Census definition of retail 
multi-unit bakeries may account for part of the decline in numbers 
of these bakeries between 1947 and 1954. Multi-unit bakeries pro-
ducing baked goods at each location for sale through a retail out-
let at the same location were included in the 1947 Census but 
excluded in 1954 and 1958. Thus, a trend toward operation of multi-
unit bakeries, producing baked goods at each location, in super-
markets of grocery chains, not counted in the bakery industry in 
1954 and 1958, would seem to account for some of the decrease in 
number of multi-unit bakeries noted. For by 1959, some 38 percent 
2. Forest E. Scott, "The Food Marketing Industries-Recent Changes and 
Prospects," The Marketing and Transportation Situation, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (Washington, D.C., November, 1957), p. 21. 
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of all supermarkets ($1 million sales and over) had in-store bakeries, 
and nearly half were operated by concessionaires.3 
Increased Size of Those Remaining 
Accompanying the decrease in numbers of bakeries is an increase 
in the average size of those remaining. Table 1 illustrates this 
trend for each of the four types of baking plants and for the indus-
try as a whole, as measured by current value of sales. When the 38 
percent increase in the transfer price of bakery products from 
1947-58 is removed, the real increase in average bakery plant sales 
is $130,000 or an increase of 37 percent. 
Industrial segments that experience the highest attrition rates 
also have the largest average increase in size of plants remaining. 
This relationship shows that bakeries going out of business are 
usually the smaller producers. When all baking plants are classified 
by size of employment and the number of plants within each size 
group noted for each of the Census years, this tendency is readily 
apparent. Table 2 shows that plants with 1-19 employees and aver-
age sales of $75,650 in 1958 declined in number by 656, or 15 per-
cent, from 1947-58. Likewise, the number of plants with 20-99 
employees and average sales of $686,070 in 1958 decreased by 207 
plants, or 13 percent. On the other hand, plants with 100-249 
employees and average sales of $2,757,050 in 1958 increased by 97 
plants, or 23 percent. Large baking plants with over 250 employees 
and average sales of $7,447,770 in 1958, increased by 46 percent in 
the postwar years, to 184 plants in 1958. Census year comparisons 
TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF BAKERY PLANTS BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND AVERAGE VALUE 
OF SHIPMENTS PER PLANT, BREAD PRODUcrS INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, 
AND 1958 
Number of Employees 
Year 1 • 19 26·99 100·249 250 or 
more 
1947 4,492 
number of plants 
1,648 426 126 
1954 4,079 1,371 474 179 
1958 3,836 1,441 523 185 
1958 $75,650 
(average value of shi~ments per plant) 
$686,070 $2, 57,050 $7,447,770 
SOURCE: Census of Manufactures, Bakery Products, op. cit., p. 10. 
NOTE: The 1958 Census shows that 708 plants, or 12 percent of all bakeries, had 100 or 
more employees with averall"e sales of about $4 million, and accounted for $2.8 billion or 
about 70 percent of total bakery sale. of $4.1 billion (includes resales and miscellaneous reo 
ceipts of $0.5 billion). 
3. Annual Report, 1959, Super Market Institute (Chicago, 1959), p. 9. 
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(not shown) reveal that all of the increase in number of large plants 
is in two segments of the industry, the wholesale and vertically inte-
grated grocery chain plants, while some 80-90 percent of the decrease 
in number of small plants is in the home service and multi-outlet 
retail segments-and the remaining decrease in small plants is in the 
wholesale segment. 
Share of Sales by Largest Companies 
While the bakery industry as a whole has experienced a high 
casualty rate, the largest companies have captured an increasingly 
larger share of the industry'S sales. Table 3 shows that between 
1947 and 1958 the share of all bakery business done by the four 
largest companies increased regularly-from 16 percent in 1947 and 
1950 to 20 percent in 1954, and to approximately 23 percent in 1958. 
The four largest companies do a 50 percent greater share of the 
business today than they did in 1947. Moreover, while the industry 
grew at an annual rate of about 1 percent per year, the four 
largest wholesale baking companies grew at an annual rate of 
about 5 percent per year. As a result the total growth of the four 
largest companies during the 11 year period accounted for all the 
industry'S growth. These comparisons are made after correcting for 
the 38 percent increase in transfer price of bakery products from 
1947 to 1958. 
While the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that white bread 
prices at retail increased 54 percent during this period, the 38 per-
cent figure is more appropriate for this industrial comparison; it 
was obtained by dividing total pounds produced into total value 
of sales of all bakery products, as reported by the Census of Manu-
factures for these years. 
The baking industry, as a buyer of flour and other ingredients in 
regional and national markets, exhibits a medium to high degree of 
concentration. Kaysen and Turner classify an industry as concen-
trated (Type II Oligopoly) if the eight largest firms account for 
33 percent or more of total industrial shipments and the 20 largest 
firms account for 75 percent or more.4 The eight largest baking 
companies purchase about 32 percent of the total flour and other 
ingredients utilized by the industry (Table 3), and it can be shown 
that the 20 largest buyer groups purchase about 60 percent. Added 
to the eight largest wholesale baking companies are the eight largest 
integrated grocery chain baking divisions buying 8-9 percent of 
4. Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 80. 
TABLE II 
CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION AMONG THE EIGHT LARGEST BAKERIES AND COMPARISONS OF THE SALES OF THE EIGHT LARGEST BAKERIES WITH 
TOTAL SALES OF THE PERISHABLE BAKERY PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, AND 1958 
1947 1954 1958 
Total Total Percent Total 
Bakery Percent Percent of Bakery of 8 Percent of Bakery Percent Percent of 
Bakery Sales' of 8 All Bakery Sales' Bakeries All Bakery Sales' of 8 All Bakery 
Group (million Bakeries Sales (million (percent) Sales (million Bakeries Sales 
dollars) (percent) (percent) dollars) (percent) dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Sales of top 
two bakeriesb 25l1.7 40.6 10.6 lI46.6 lI6.5 Il.!1 506.2" 44.5 14.1 
Sales of top 
four bakeries· lI84.6 61.6 16.0 61!1.4 64.5 20.0 820.7 72.2 22.9 
Sales of next 
four bakeries 240.4 lI8.4 10.0 lI37.3 35.5 11.0 lI15.9 27.8 8.8 
Sales of eight 
largest bakeriesd 624.9 100.0 26.0 950.7 100.0 31.0 1,lll6.6 100.0 lI1.7 
Total industrial 
sales 2,403.6 100.0 !I,067.0 100.0 lI,579.0 100.0 
SoURCE: Concentration in American Industry, Report of Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957); Census of Manu-factures, op. cit., p. 4; Moody's Industrials. 
• Industry value shipments, bread and related products: does not include products sold but not produced. Excludes non-bakery sales. 
b Continental Baking Co. and General Baking Co. in 1947: Continental Baking Co. and American Baking Co. in 1954 and 1958. Moody's Industrials. 
• Add to b above, Campbell Taggert and American Baking Companies in 1947: Campbell Taggert Baking Co. and General Baking Co. in 1954 and 
1958. Moody's Industrials. 
d Includes in addition to the foregoing, Ward, Interstate, Langendorf, and Purity Bakeries in 1947: Ward, Interstate, Langendorf, and Omar in 1954: 
Interstate, Ward, LanKendorf, and Southern in 1958. Moody's Industrials. 
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total bakery supplies, and the 258 independent baking companies 
buying about 16 percent of total bakery supplies through three 
purchasing cooperatives. This leaves unaccounted for only one of 
the largest 20 organizations buying bakery supplies. 
Another relevant consideration is the level of concentration in 
wholesale baking, the largest and most important segment of the 
industry, as Table I shows. While the eight largest baking companies 
account for about 32 percent of all bakery industry sales, they 
share about 42 percent of all wholesale bakery business. It is true 
that smaller independent bakeries still do more than half (58 per-
cent) of the wholesale bakery business, but many of these have 
become affiliated with management cooperative groups to achieve 
some of the advantages of buying (as noted above) and merchandis-
ing available to the largest companies.5 Although such organizations 
date from 1922, they have become increasingly important in recent 
years, until in 1958 around $570 million or more than 36 percent 
of the sales of the smaller wholesale baking companies are made 
by the 258 members of three cooperative groups. These organizations 
rival in size the largest wholesale baking companies. For example, 
the 120 members of Quality Bakers of America, the largest of the 
bakery cooperatives, have combined sales of over $280 million. If 
the annual sales of the eight largest wholesale baking companies are 
added to the sales of the 258 bakeries affiliated with the three man-
agement cooperatives, these II large organizations combined account 
for approximately half of all sales by the baking industry and for 
two-thirds of total wholesale bakery sales. 
Significant changes have also taken place in the multi-market 
organization of wholesale baking. In the postwar years, there were 
seven wholesale baking campanies that owned 20 or more plants 
each. Generally speaking, each of the seven companies operated in 
20 or more markets. In 1947, they operated a total of 203 bakeries. 
By 1954, they had increased this to 260 bakeries, and they expanded 
further to approximately 300 bakeries in 1958.6 Comparing these 
findings with Census data reveals that the smaller companies owning 
5. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6035 If. Affiliations of independent bakers provide 
small business members with advice and guidance comparable to that available 
to the largest baking companies in the following areas: accounting and cost serv-
ice, advertising, dealer relations, insurance analysis, laboratory, engineering, 
management, personnel, production, sales promotion, sanitation, supplies pur-
chasing, transportation, and brand franchise. Average sales of affiliated bakeries 
are $2.2 million as compared with average sales of $3.2 million by the 351 plants 
of the largest eight baking companies, and average sales of $0.6 million for 
all bakeries. 
6. Moody's Industrials. 
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two or more bakeries declined sharply from 141 in 1947 to 98 in 
1954, to 78 in 1958, and the number of plants they owned declined 
from 753 in 1947, to 479 in 1954, to 380 in 1958. Not only is the 
number of multi-plant companies declining, but also the largest 
wholesale baking companies have expanded their operations hori-
zontally into more and more markets. This increased horizontal 
integration brings under unified control bakeries operating very 
similar production and marketing functions in an increasing num-
ber of bakery markets. 
TABLE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF BREAD PLANTS BY CAPACITY PER HOUR AND OWNERSHIP, UNITED 
STATES, 1958 
Next 
4 Largest 4 Largest 8 Grocery 
Plant Capacity Wholesale Wholesale Chain All Total 
Companies Companies Companies Other U.S. 
2,000 pounds per hour 
(from 1,000 to 2,999) 
16 12 14 814 856 Number 
Percent 8 17 17 82 63 
4,000 pounds per hour 
(from 3,000 to 4,999) 
125 37 49 113 324 Number 
Percent 62 51 59 11 24 
6,000 pounds per hour 
(from 5,000 to 6,999) 
45 19 13 54 131 Number 
Percent 22 26 16 6 10 
8,000 pounds per hour 
(7,000 and above) 
17 4 7 14 Number 42 
Percent 8 6 8 1 3 
Total bread plants 
203 72 Number 83 995 1,353" 
Percent 100 100 100 100 100 
Median plant capacity 
(pounds) 4,800 4,800 4,000 2,500 
Annual capacityb 
Million pounds 7,016 2,788 2,390 17,910 30,104 
Percent 23 9 8 60 100 
SoURCE: Calculated from data [resented in Report, op. cit., p. 105; and 1958 Cens ..... of 
Manufactures, op. cit., pp. 10 an 18. 
"Baking plants with 90 percent or more specialization in bread and bread type rolls. 
Practically all of these plants (1,234) are wholesale bakeries. These 1,353 plants had sales 
of $1.5 billion in 1958. An additional 1,114 baking plants had 51-89 percent specialization 
in bread and bread type rolls, and sales of $1.5 billion in 1958. Estimated total sales of 
bread and bread type rolls in 1958 were $3.3 billion, slightly more than half of which was 
produced in plants with less than 90 percent specialization in bread and bread type rolls, 
and not shown in this table. 
b Takes into account allowance for breakdowns. holidays, etc., which decreases the number 
of three·shift operatinl( days to 300 annually. Bakeries of approximately 2,000 founds per 
hour capacity had total annual capacity of 12.500 million pounds or 41 percent 0 total U.S. 
bread plant capacity. Bakeries of approximately 4,000 pounds per hour capacity had total 
annual capacity of 9.300 million pounds or 31 percent of total U.S. bread plant capacity. 
Bakeries of approximately 6,000 pounds per hour capacity had total annual capacity of 5,700 
million pounds or 19 percent of total U. S. bread plant capacity. Bakeries of approximately 
8,000 pounds per hour capacity had total annual capacity of 2,600 million pounds or 9 per-
cent of total U. S. bread plant capacity. 
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Another consideration relevant to this study is measurement of 
the bread plant capacity owned by the largest baking companies, 
and the distribution of that capacity by size or scale of plant. The 
1958 Census shows that 1,353 baking plants specialized 90 percent 
or more in the production of bread and bread type rolls with an 
estimated annual capacity of 30 billion pounds. The tabulation of 
bread plant capacities in Table 4 shows that the largest eight whole-
sale baking companies own about 32 percent of the estimated annual 
capacity of bread plants. This is very close to their share of total 
bakery sales. But the largest four and largest eight wholesale com-
panies operate a disproportionately greater share of the larger capac-
ity plants, as do the eight largest bakery divisions of integrated 
grocery chains. It is true that many smaller companies operate 
medium and large bread plants, but fully 82 percent of the 995 
bread plants owned by the smaller companies have productive capac-
ities of less than 3,000 pounds per hour, while this is the case for 
only about 12 percent of the large wholesale and grocery chain com-
panies. These findings as to size of bread plants have important 
implications for production costs of large baking companies as 
compared with their smaller competitors, to be discussed in Chap-
ters 3 and 5. 
Seller Concentration in Bakery Markets 
The industry may be further classified according to the geo-
graphic extent of market areas in which bread products are sold. 
Despite a freight absorption system of pricing, high transportation 
costs combined with perishability and bulk of the product necessi-
tate 80 to 100 separate and semi-independent bakery markets.7 The 
radius of market areas has widened from an estimated 50-100 miles 
in 1946 to about 150-300 miles in 1958. This development has not 
altered the fact that bread markets consist, typically, of a metro-
politan area and a rural-urban fringe. 
It is true that a small percentage of variety breads, cakes, sweet 
goods, and other bakery products of higher value to bulk ratios are 
frozen and transported longer distances than white bread. But only 
within rather strict limits may market cross-over be accomplished 
even with these higher value products. Roughly, transportation costs 
are increased one-half cent per pound for every 50 mile extension 
of the market area. 
Most bread is distributed within 50 miles of its production point, 
in keeping with the concentration of population in metropolitan 
7. Arthur D. Little, Inc., op cit., p. 73. 
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centers. It is not unreasonable to accept the individual market as 
the . logically and empirically relevant unit for consideration of 
economic organization, conduct, and performance in the bakery 
industry. Each market constitutes a group of rival sellers supplying 
close-substitute outputs to common buyers, where there is little or 
no inter-penetration of markets. 
Consequently, even though the industry is composed of more 
than 5,000 firms, its anatomy does not conform to the structural 
assumption of the usual competitive model, but has many oIigopo-
TABLE 5 
MARKET SHARES OF THE SEVEN LARGEST WHOLESALE BAKING COMPANIES AND 
MAJOR GROCERY CHAINS INTEGRATED INTO THE BAKING INDUSTRY, 27 SELECI'ED 
METROPOLITAN MARKET AREAS 
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lis tic characteristics. Although individual companies are of insig-
nificant size in terms of the nation's total bakery business, they may 
be very important in the markets in which they operate. For exam-
ple, whereas Continental, the country's largest baking company, 
does only 9.3 percent of the industry's total bakery business, it 
does more than one-third of the bread business in many of the 
markets in which it operates (Table 4). Typically, the largest bakery 
in a bread market does more than 30 percent of the business, the 
two largest bakeries about 50 percent, and the four largest over 65 
percent (ranges from 46 to 92 percent). 
These general estimates are based on tabulations by the authors 
of newspaper surveys of consumer bread purchases in 27 large city 
markets located throughout the country. Cities selected are shown 
in Table 5. Reliability of these estimates is considered good; sample 
size ranges from 1,200 to 6,000 households per city, and samples 
were drawn on a probability basis. 
Another measure that reflects more closely than national figures 
the level of concentration in the industry's market areas is a special 
tabulation of concentration on a state basis. It can be demonstrated 
by the use of Census data that concentration in states is considerably 
higher than for the nation as a whole (Table 6). In 1954, in three 
states the four largest companies did over 80 percent of the total 
bakery business; in nine states the four largest companies did more 
than 70 percent of the bakery business; in 16 states the four largest 
companies did over 60 percent; and in 23 states, the four largest 
companies did over 50 percent. In only three states did the four 
largest companies account for less than 30 percent of the bakery 
business. This tabulation, however, generally understates the con-
centration in bread markets since the geographic extent of bread 
markets does not typically correspond to state lines and the area of 
the state is nearly always greater than the actual market areas 
within the state. 
The identity of the four largest baking companies in each state 
can be deduced from industrial directories and consumer preference 
studies.8 They reveal that large firms tend to dominate bakery 
markets in most sections of the country. Sellers in practically all 
markets are composed of a concentrated core of a few dominant 
companies and a fringe consisting of a large number of small firms. 
The dominant core usually includes one to three of the largest 
multi-plant wholesale companies plus one or two locally owned 
8. Baking Industry Bluebook (Chicago: Baking Industry Magazine, 1958); 
see also footnote to Table 5. 
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TABLE 6 
VALUE OF SHIPMENTS BY THE FOUR LARGEST BAKING COMPANIES AS A PROPORTION 
OF TOTAL VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, BY STATES, BREAD PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, AND TOTAL 
BAKERY PRODUCTS, 1951" 
Percent Percent 
of Value of Value 
of Ship· All of Ship· 
ments of Bakeries ments of 
Manufac· Including All 
4 Largest All Manu· turing Retail Bakeries 
Region and State Baking facturing Bakeries Bakeries Accounted 
Companies Bakeries Accounted (2051 and for by 4 
(2051) (2051) for by 4 5462) Largest 
(thousand (thousand Largest (thousand Baking 
dollars) dollars) Companies dollars) Companies 
United States 613,403 3,067,017 20.0 3,711,299 16.5 
New England: 
16,687 27,136 61.5 (b) (b) Maine 
New Hampshire 5,170 7,592 68.l (b) (b) 
Vermont 3,989 5,205 76.6 (b) (b) 
Massachusetts 39,726 119,410 33.3 147,714 26.9 
Rhode Island 14,182 24,902 57.0 29,499 48.l 
Connecticut 21,706 45,119 48.1 59,261 36.6 
Middle Atlantic: 
New York 81,040 370,808 21.9 510,718 15.9 
New Jersey 41,840 106,986 39.l 150,872 27.7 
Pennsylvania 82,119 270,286 30.4 317,271 25.9 
East north central: 
Ohio 61,022 208,433 29.3 252,653 24.2 
Indiana 23,468 74,862 31.3 86,814 27.0 
Illinois 55,410 194,745 28.5 253,498 21.9 
Michigan 49,499 151,579 32.7 176,258 28.1 
Wisconsin 20,312 58,441 34.8 80,119 25.4 
West north central: 
Minnesota 19,052 48,365 39.4 65,162 29.2 
Iowa 18,306 46,230 39.6 53,436 34.3 
Missouri 44,724 103,090 43.4 114,626 39.0 
North Dakota 5,275 6,813 77.4 (b) (b) 
South Dakota 5,788 8,144 71.1 (b) (b) 
Nebraska 17,583 26,773 65.7 31,295 56.2 
Kansas 12,072 26,165 46.1 29,184 4l.4 
South Atlantic: 
Delaware 4,855 5,167 94.0 (b) (b) 
Maryland 23,371 55,849 41.8 66,431 35.2 
District of Columbia 20,190 27,329 73.8 (b) (b) 
Virginia 20,345 47,785 42.6 54,132 37.6 
West Virginia 11,418 33,550 34.0 35,059 32.6 
North Carolina 27,217 59,386 45.8 63,165 43.1 
South Carolina 16,724 20,503 81.6 22,237 75.2 
Georgia 27,521 52,751 52.2 56,642 48.6 
Florida 24,530 54,504 45.0 65,688 37.3 
SOURCE: 1954 Census of Manufactures; (Unpublished data, December 1958) U.S. De~art. 
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as _summarized in, Hearin~s, Ope cit., p. 61 4. 
" The larllest companies in each state were determined from the value of shipments of the 
manufacturing establishments (S.LC. 2051) operated by the companies. The sales of retail 
bakeries with bakinll at each location (S.l.C. 5462) were reviewed and found not large 
enough to include any of those companies among the four largest in any state. A few of the 
"four larllest" companies also operated some retail shops with baking on premises, but the 
value of sales at su('h localions was relatively small in all cases and did not affect the pro-
portion of total sales accounted for by the company by more than '/to of I percent. 
b Data withheld to avoid disclosinlt fillures for individual companies. 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Percent Percent 
of Value of Value 
of Ship- All of Ship-
ments of Bakeries ments of 
Manufac- Including All 
Region and State 4 Largest All Manu- turing Retail Bakeries 
Baking facturing Bakeries Bakeries Accounted 
Companies Bakeries Accounted (2051 and for by 4 
(2051) (2051) for by 4 5462) Largest 
(thousand (thousand Largest (thousand Baking 
dollars) dollars) Companies dollars) Companies 
East south central: 
Kentucky 18,656 34,605 53.9 39,353 47.4 
Tennessee 29,579 58,092 50.9 61,179 48.3 
Alabama 17,013 31,678 53.7 35,335 48.1 
Mississippi 9,630 15,392 62.6 16,218 59.4 
West south central: 
Arkansas 10,901 19,378 56.3 (b) (b) 
Louisiana 15,070 49,772 30.3 54,663 27.6 
Oklahoma 16,137 30,331 53.3 32,618 49.5 
Texas 61,970 132,412 46.8 143,359 43.2 
Mountain: 
Montana 6,075 9,071 66.9 10,895 55.7 
Idaho 3,793 5,839 64.9 6,575 57.6 
Wyoming 1,033 2,476 41.7 3,112 33.1 
Colorado 12,767 26.186 48.7 29,234 43.6 
New Mexico 4,106 6,422 63.9 8,163 50.3 
Arizona 10,475 13,262 78.9 15,163 69.0 
Utah 9,697 13,596 71.3 15,564 62.3 
Nevada 1,846 2,260 81.6 3,034 60.8 
Pacific: 
Washington 18,615 42,015 44.3 49,598 37.5 
Oregon 12,994 29,795 43.6 34,956 37.1 
California 112,445 256,527 43.8 308,517 36.4 
b Data withheld to avoid disclosing figures for individual companies. 
independent companies that have grown large in terms of their 
relevant market_ Vertically integrated bakeries owned by grocery 
chain companies usually have not been one of the largest four com-
panies in bread markets_ The number and size of bakeries com-
prising the fringe of small companies usually depends on their 
ability: (1) to cut out a specialty product market-variety bread, 
cookies, sweet goods and so forth; or (2) to disaggregate markets 
into several distinct segments-restaurant, hotel, institution, house-
to-house, and retail with a more secure market position than whole-
sale grocery store sales. As a result, the fringe of small companies 
often is not strictly competitive with the large wholesale companies 
distributing primarily at wholesale through grocery stores. 
Buyer Concentration in Wholesale Bread Markets 
1948-58 
Perhaps the most important change in the structure and organ-
ization of bread markets since World War II is the increased con-
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centration on the buyer side of these markets brought about by the 
increased size and buying power of food retailers. Whereas, in the 
1930's and early 1940's, wholesale bakeries dealt primarily with inde-
pendent grocers, today the bulk of their bread sales is through 
corporate and voluntary grocery chains. Moreover, an increasing 
number of retail grocery organizations are able to integrate verti-
cally into the baking industry when this is more profitable than 
buying from existing wholesale bakery companies. This places 
baking companies under probably the most severe economic pres-
sure of their history. Grocery chains control the terms under which 
outlets for most bread products are made available and possess the 
added leverage of actual and potential vertical integration. Grocery 
chains have become highly concentrated buyers as well as vertical 
integrators into the industry. 
Since World War II, the number of retail food outlets for bread 
products has decreased rapidly. In 15 food markets surveyed by 
the Federal Trade Commission, the number of food stores decreased 
from 12,466 in 1948 to 8,742 in 1958, or 30 percent (Table 7). There 
has been a similar decline for the nation as a whole. Census of 
Business reports show a 27 percent decline in number of food stores 
between 1948 and 1958. 
Practically all of this decline reflects the failure and liquidation 
of unaffiliated food stores. It has been associated with increasing 
numbers of corporate, cooperative, and voluntary food chain stores. 
Even more important, it is related to the increase in size of chain 
TABLE 7 
NUMBER OF STORES AND AVERAGE SHARE OF GROCERY STORE SALES BY CORPORATE 
CHAINS, COOPERATIVE AND VOLUNTARY CHAINS, AND UNAFFILIATED INDEPEN-
DENTS IN 15 METRoPoLirAN AREAS OF THE UNITED SrATEs, 1948, 1954, AND 1958" 
NUMBER OF STORES AND PERCENT OF TOTAL GROCERY STORE SALES 
Store 1948 1954 1958 
Groups Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Corporate chain 627 29.2 548 36.8 663 43.8 
Cooperative and 
1,762 voluntary chains 1,264 12.3 22.7 2,134 30.8 
U naffilia ted 
independents 8,832 58.5 6,525 40.5 5,749 25.4 
Totalb 12,466 100.0 9,844 100.0 8,742 100.0 
SoURCE: Federal Trade Commission, Economic Inquiry into Food Marketing, Par. I, Con-
centration and Integration in Retailing (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1960), pp. 241 and 245. 
a Cities surveyed were Altoona, Atlanta, Bridgeport, Denver, Des Moines, Fort Smith, 
Indianapolis, Lubbock, Manchester, Peoria, Phoenix, Roanoke, Spokane, Stockton and Utica. 
Total food sales were $989 million in 1948, $1,348 million in 1954, and $1.697 million in 
1958. Total population was 5.6 million in 1959. Chains were defined as companies with 11 
or more stores, either corporate, cooperative, or voluntary. 
b Total stores is greater than the sum of the parts due to unavailability of some data. 
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stores. Corporate chains, in the F.T.C. study cited in Table 7, 
had only a 6 percent increase in number of stores as compared with 
a one-third increase in market share from 1948 to 1958. Cooperative 
and voluntary chains had a 70 percent increase in number of 
affiliated stores, and more than twice as great (150 percent) an 
increase in market share for the same period. Table 7 shows that in 
sample markets the share of corporate chains increased from 29 
percent in 1948 to about 44 percent in 1958, while that of coopera-
tive and voluntary chains increased from 12 percent to about 31 
percent during the same period. Meanwhile, market share of 
unaffiliated independent grocers declined from about 59 percent 
in 1948 to 25 percent in 1958. This comparison based on sample 
markets tends to understate the extent of increased concentration 
of grocery store sales by voluntary and cooperative chains. Mueller 
and Garoian reported national data for 1958 showing the following: 
corporate chains, 43 percent of total grocery sales; voluntary and 
cooperative chains, 41.6 percent; and unaffiliated independent stores, 
15.4 percent of total grocery sales.9 These tabulations compare 
closely with national data from the F.T.C. survey. 
An important implication for the wholesale segment of the 
baking industry is the development of bilateral oligopoly. A 
greater share of total food sales, including bread products, is now 
channeled through large corporate, cooperative and voluntary chains 
than ever before. This results in a changing balance of power 
between wholesale baking companies as sellers and retailers as 
buyers. In typical U.S. cities, the structural features of the retail 
grocery market for bread products include a concentrated core 
of a few grocery chains (corporate, cooperative, and voluntary), 
and a fringe consisting of a large number of small unaffiliated 
independents. 
Typically, stores of the largest grocery chain account for 30 
percent (ranges from 14-49 percent) of the total retail food sales, 
stores of the four largest chains account for 63 percent (ranges from 
39-90 percent),l0 the rest being distributed through a large number 
of smaller firms essentially in different economic markets owing to 
convenience of location or specialization of function. Indeed, by 
9. Willard F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure of 
Grocery Retailing, 1940-58 Research Report No.5, Agricultural Experiment 
Station, University of Wisconsin (Madison, April, 1960), p. 7. 
10. The Federal Trade Commission studied concentration in the 15 urban 
markets shown in Table 7. Federal Trade Commission, op. cit., p. 248. Mueller 
and Garoian found very nearly the same concentration levels in 133 U.S. cities in 
1957. Willard F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure 
of Grocery Retailing (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 35-36. 
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1958 market concentration on the buyer (retail grocery) side of 
wholesale bread markets was very high, yet, it should be noted, 
not appreciably higher than on the seller side, among wholesale 
baking companies supplying bread to food retailers. 
Another development affecting wholesalers is the increasing 
number of retail groups now able to enter baking when this is more 
profitable than buying from existing bakery companies. The poten-
tial integration of retail groups into the baking industry is more 
significant than existing levels of integration would indicate. 
While the 1958 Census of Manufacturers shows that retail grocery 
groups produce only about 10 percent of the total U.S. output of 
bread products, corporate grocery chains produce approximately 39 
percent of all bread products sold in their own stores. l1 Moreover, 
trade sources suggest that 38 percent of the supermarkets ($1 million 
sales or more annually) in 1959 had bake shops on their store 
premises, half of which were owned by the retail food firm.12 
On the other hand, the best available data indicate that the 
existing level of integration by voluntary and cooperative chains 
was much less. For example, voluntary chains reporting to the 
1958 F.T.C. survey owned only four bakery plants producing only 
$3 million worth of bread products. lS While voluntary and coopera-
tive chain stores purchased about 44 percent of their total food 
requirements through their affiliated group,14 they undoubtedly 
purchased less of their bread this way. 
Garoian reported that bread products were supplied to affiliated 
stores by only 23.6 percent of the voluntary chains in 1957.15 It will 
be shown later in this report that most of this was private label 
bread produced under contract with wholesale baking companies. 
Thus, organized buying and baking of bread products by retail 
grocery groups would appear to be potentially more significant 
than existing levels would indicate. 
Role of Mergers in Structural Change 
Growth of individual baking companies occurs both internally, 
by building additional plants or expansion of existing plants, and 
externally by acquisition or merger. Merger as used here includes 
ll. Calculated from sales data in Report, op. cit., p. 103; and, Federal Trade 
Commission, op. cit., p. 30. 
12. Annual Report, 1959. Super Market Institute, Chicago, 1959, p. 19. 
13. Federal Trade Commission, op. cit., p. 295. 
14. Mueller and Garoian, op. cit., p. 7. 
15. Leon Garoian, "Changes in the Market Structure of Food Retailing, 
1940-1957," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1959), 
p. 304. 
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acquisitions, combinations, or consolidations; it implies the integra-
tion of previously independent businesses under a single ownership 
unit.16 The most important vehicle for the development of large 
corporations in the baking industry has been merger. Mergers 
explain much and perhaps most of the differential growth among 
large firms. They explain most of the increased share of total bakery 
sales of the eight largest baking companies. The 1946-58 merger 
movement seems to have been largely motivated by the desire to: 
(I) achieve economies of scale through better utilization of existing 
plant, equipment, and personnel, or (2) lessen the impact of risk and 
uncertainty by expanding market share and by diversifying into new 
geographic areas, distribution channels, or types of product. 
Medium and large baking companies have been using mergers 
to grow since 1907. The movement gained in momentum until 
the mid-twenties when several of the giants in the industry were 
formed.17 Prior to that time the industry was characterized by 
relatively small single-plant firms distributing in local market areas 
or single cities. In 1924, Continental Baking Corporation was 
formed, and by 1925 had combined approximately 80 bakeries. 
General Baking Corporation was formed in 1925, and by 1926 
owned 42 bakeries located in 32 cities. Through these and other 
consolidations, the multi-plant structure of a few large bakery 
corporations emerged and remained relatively stable until after 
World War IllS when mergers again began to have an important 
effect on concentration in the bakery industry. 
Types of Bakery Mergers 
Bakery mergers have been of four types: (1) horizontal inte-
gration of baking companies performing the same production and 
16. See J. Fred Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large Firms 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 3. 
17. Carl L. Alsberg, Combination in the American Bread-Baking Industry 
With Some Observations on the Mergers of 1924-25, Miscellaneous Publication 
No_ 3, Food Research Institute, Stanford University (California, 1926), pp. 146-7. 
18. The early merger movement was temporarily halted in 1926 when the 
Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with Ward, Continental 
and General, the defendants agreeing to dissolve the Ward Food Products Cor-
poration, a holding company whose purpose was to consolidate the three com-
panies with 160 baking plants and approximately 20 percent of the total baking 
business in the United States. Federal Trade Commission, Bakery Combines and 
Profits, 69th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1927), p. 47_ The one major exception to relative structural stability from 
1926-1946 is the formation of the Campbell Taggart holding company in 1927. 
By 1929, it had acquired 16 plants, and by 1939, had added 22 more. Report, 
op. cit., p. 135. 
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distribution function, (2) forward vertical integration of wholesale 
baking companies with firms performing production and distribu-
tion functions in different segments of the baking industry, (3) 
backward vertical integration primarily of grocery retailers, into the 
baking industry, and (4) conglomerate integration of baking com-
panies into other industries. Most but not all of the recent merger 
activity of baking companies has been horizontal integration. The 
most notable example is the merger of firms in the wholesale seg-
ment of the industry. These were approximately 55 percent of the 
bakery mergers reported in the years 1952-58.19 But an additional 
16 percent of the reported acquisitions resulted in the vertical inte-
gration of different distribution levels within the bakery industry. 
Examples are the acquisition by large wholesale baking companies 
of house-to-house and multi-unit retail baking firms. Moreover, for 
the first time in the history of the industry, almost one-third (29 
percent) of the mergers reported by baking companies were the 
conglomerate type such as diversification into frozen foods, candy, 
and potato chip manufacturing. No backward vertical integration 
into flour milling or bakery equipment manufacturing via merger 
was reported in the years 1952-58; in fact, Omar, the only producer 
of perishable bakery products owning a flour mill in the post 
World War II period, disposed of its milling division with assets 
of $1 miIlion.20 
In addition to types of mergers in which a baking company is 
the principal acquirer, there has been considerable backward verti-
cal integration through acquisition of baking companies by retail 
grocery chains since World War II. Food retail organizations have 
entered bread production through acquisition since the 1920's when 
67 bakeries were added to the 18 bakeries operated by food retailers 
in 1920.21 From 1930 to 1947, vertical integration by food retailers 
into bread production stabilized with the addition of only five 
bakeries during the 17 year period. Since 1947, vertical integra-
tion into bread production again proceeded at a rapid rate until, 
in 1958, food retailers operated 88 more bakeries for a total of 
178 plants, and produced about 10 percent of all bakery products 
consumed in the United States. 
19. Paul E. Nelson and Allen B. Paul, Ownership Changes By Purchase and 
Merger in Selected Food Industries, Report No. 369, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., October, 1959). 
20. Moody's Industrials. 
21. Leon Garoian, "Changes in the Market Structure of Food Retailing 
1940-1957," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1959), 
p. 171. 
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With the rapidly increasing size of many grocery chains and 
independents affiliated with buying groups, more and more food 
retail organizations have achieved sufficient size to integrate into 
bread production. Whereas during World War II only 11 of the top 
20 chains were integrated into baking, and only three more were 
large enough to be potential integrators, by 1957, 19 of the top 20 
chains were integrated into baking, and all of the top 40 chains 
were large enough to be potential integrators.22 They have devel-
oped "private labels" that are acceptable to consumers; they have 
access to substantial financial resources, and, by buying out operat-
ing bakeries while retaining the previous owner as manager, they 
can overcome the lack of technical and business know-how in the 
bakery field. Moreover, they can often obtain bakeries in distressed 
economic condition at bargain prices, far below new construc-
tion costs. 
Much, if not most, of the recent vertical integration by food 
retailers into bread production has been through merger. In 1958, 
all of the 10 largest food chains were integrated into bread produc-
tion operating 83 bakeries. Moreover, their combined value of 
bakery shipments had increased from $247 million in 1954 to $321 
million in 1958, or a 30 percent growth, only about half due to an 
increase in bread prices.23 Much of this expansion in the production 
of bakery products was the result of acquisitions. For example, all 
of the National Tea bakery growth resulted from the acquisition 
of Miller Supermarkets which operated its own bakery in Denver. 
Kroger's Houston bakery plant was acquired in 1955 with the pur-
chase of the Henke and Pillot chain. Colonial Stores became a 
bakery operator in Ohio when the company purchased Albers 
Supermarkets in Cincinnati in 1955. Colonial, through its Albers 
division, acquired the Pennington Brothers Bakery in Norwood, 
a suburb of Cincinnati, in 1958.24 Much of Winn-Dixie's bakery 
growth can be traced to the 1955 merger of Winn-Lovett with Dixie 
Home Stores. Smaller chains, too, have acquired baking companies. 
Examples are Red Owl25 of Minneapolis and Eberhard's Super-
markets of Grand Rapids, Michigan.26 Red Owl is the 18th largest 
22. Willard F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure 
ot Grocery Retailing, 1940-58, Research Report 5, Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1960), p. 16. 
23. Report, op. cit., p. 104. 
24. Bakers Weekly (March 17, 1958). 
25. Garoian, op. cit., p. 330. 
26. In 1959, Eberhard acquired the Polly Anna Pastry Kitchens, a multi-unit 
retail bakery with one plant and 16 retail bakery stores. Baking Industry Maga-
zine (October 31, 1959), p. 18. 
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grocery chain, while Eberhard's is a medium sized chain with about 
25 stores in Eastern Michigan. 
Dimensions of the Recent Merger Movement 
The external growth of large companies through merger has 
been fairly widespread and has increased in recent years. In the 
seven year period from 1952 to 1958, more than 30 of the 161 multi-
plant companies in the baking industry made one or more acquisi-
tions.27 This represents at least a 20 percent participation in the 
merger movement. However, most multi-plant companies failed to 
participate and, as will be shown subsequently, most non-partici-
pants were the smaller firms. 
Among acquiring firms, the degree of merging activity varied. 
Of a total of 104 acquisitions reported, no single company acquired 
more than 20 previously independent businesses, while two com-
panies made between 10 and 20 acquisitions. Seven companies 
acquired five or more firms each. Nineteen companies made two or 
more acquisitions, and 12 made one acquisition each. 
Large baking corporations made the greatest number of mergers 
and usually acquired the larger companies sold (Table 8). The few 
baking corporations with more than 5,000 employees made 42 
percent of the acquisitions reported from 1952-58 and, of the total 
TABLE 8 
NUMBER OF MULTI-PLANT BAKERY FIRMS WITH NUMBER AND SIZE OF ACQUISITIONS 
ARRAYED BY THE SIZE OF ACQUIRING COMPANIES, UNITED STATES, 1952-58 
Firm Size Total Number Total Number of Percent of Employ-
(Number of of Multi-Plant Firms Acquired ment in All Acquired 
Employee.) Firm., \954 1952-58 Companies 1952-58 
Number Percent Number Percent 
5,000 and over 9 5 44 42 77 
1,000-4,999 21 11 18 17 12 
500-999 27 15 22 21 5 
100-499 74 40 17 17 5 
0- 99 52 29 3 3 1 
Total 183 100 104 100 100 
SOURCE: Paul E. Nelson and Allen B. Paul, Ownership Changes By Purchase and Merger 
in Selected Food Industries. Report No. 369, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., October, 1959), pp. 20-21; and, unpublished tabu-
lation based upon the Company Statistics Report, 1954, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce (WashinKton. D.C.). 
27. Although 92 percent of all multi-plant baking companies were included 
in the U.S. Census survey, only about 70 percent of the companies with 100 
or more employees participated. The latter size group of firms accounted for 
99 percent of all reported mergers, thus the sample may tend to understate merger 
activity. Nelson and Paul, op. cit. 
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plant capacity transferred as measured by numbers of employees, 
they acquired a sizable 77 percent share. Companies with 500 to 
5,000 employees made 38 percent of the acquisitions reported, but 
they accounted for less than half as great a share of total plant ca-
pacity transferred. While about 70 percent of the multi-plant com-
panies were small (with less than 500 employees), they made only 
20 percent of the acquisitions reported. And the companies they 
acquired were small, representing in the aggregate only 6 percent 
of the total employment of all acquired companies. Thus, small 
baking companies experienced very little external growth in 
recent years. 
The number of mergers has increased in recent years. About 
two-thirds of all acquisitions reported in the seven year period 
between 1952-58 were made between 1956-58. The average size of 
acquired firms during the most recent years was considerably 
smaller than for the 1952-55 period. This suggests that increasing 
numbers of small companies have been absorbed into larger organ-
izations. About 10 percent of the companies acquired from 1952-58 
were large themselves with more than 1,000 employees, and were 
usually acquired by corporations with more than 5,000 employees. 
But more of the acquired firms were small at the time of acquisition. 
More than half had between 20 and 100 employees, while one-fifth 
had fewer than 20 employees. In addition, about one-fifth were 
medium-sized with 100-300 employees. 
Comparison of published sales figures for 1954 and 1958 reveals 
that the eight largest wholesale baking companies grew faster than 
the rest of the industry. Their sales, not corrected for inflation, 
increased by 32 percent while sales of the rest of the industry 
increased by only about 12 percent. Most of this increased concen-
tration among a few sellers has come about by external growth 
through merger. Mergers by the eight largest baking companies 
conservatively accounted for over half of their growth between 
1954 and 1958, and added more than $150 million in sales.28 Price 
rise accounted for another 12 percent of growth during this period, 
and internal expansion through better utilization of existing and 
construction of new plant and equipment accounted for approxi-
mately one-third of increased concentration at the eight firm level. 
Among the big eight companies, those with the largest or most 
frequent mergers grew the fastest. Six made mergers and two did 
28. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6039; and Annual Reports to Stockholders of these 
firms. 
Structural Characteristics of the Industry / 29 
not. Sales of the six merging companies grew by 35.5 percent and 
the non-merging by only 8 percent. From 1954 to 1958, the most 
active merging firm, Continental, grew by 76 percent, with an aver-
age increase in sales per year of about $40 million.29 These compari-
sons are of sales growth in terms of current dollars. When sales are 
adjusted for an increase in the index of bakery prices of 12 percent 
between 1954 and 1958, the divergent growth trends become even 
more pronounced. While the largest baking companies that merged 
grew an average of about 5 percent a year, the rest of the industry, 
with the exception of vertically integrated grocery chain bakeries, 
experienced declining real sales. It was evident that without mergers, 
several of the largest wholesale bakery corporations, too, would 
have experienced declining bakery sales. 
Bases for Merger 
Industrial experience in the American economy suggests several 
reasons why growth through merger may be a more profitable way 
for a firm to expand than internal growth. For the acquirer, mergers 
may be less expensive, quicker, or less uncertain; they may involve 
fewer competitive problems, be more easily financed, increase market 
power, and afford certain tax advantages.3o For the acquired, merg-
ing with a larger company may provide a tax advantage, may facili-
tate financing of plant expansion, and may lead to less economic un-
certainty as part of a multi-plant organization. This study did not 
attempt an exhaustive empirical analysis of all these reasons, but 
the information discussed below suggests their relative importance 
to the bakery industry. 
Individual mergers are motivated by a variety of reasons, depend-
ing, of course, on the circumstances of the economic environment 
and the goals of the participating firms. The economic environment 
of the bakery industry is unique in that it presents a special com-
bination of limiting conditions. These include: (1) significant econ-
omies of scale in production and distribution, (2) relatively stable 
and inelastic demand for the output of the industry, (3) relatively 
high barriers to entry, (4) homogeneity, bulk and perishability of 
product so that population density limits extent of the market, and 
(5) durability of specialized machinery in the industry.31 The pres-
29. Includes estimated sales of acquired companies in 1958. 
30. J. Fred Weston, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
31. These conditions are in contrast with those environmental conditions 
assumed by George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American 
Economic Review (May, 1950). 
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sure of these condtions in the past decade and a half ha,s intensified 
the drive to expand through merger on the part of wholesale 
baking companies. Two hypotheses to account for this recent merger 
movement will be explored here: (1) acquisition to gain share of 
existing markets to achieve sufficient market power, to stabilize 
oligopolistic behavior, and to realize economies of scale in pro-
duction and distribution; and (2) acquisition to diversify into the 
protective cover of new geographic markets, distributive channels, 
or specialty product areas. 
First, many baking companies have initiated mergers to enlarge 
the share of markets served by their existing plants. They have been 
primarily interested in the acquisition of functioning distribution 
systems rather than productive facilities, but have usually purchased 
the plants and equipment of the acquired company along with the 
rights to its distribution system. Frequently, the less efficient plant 
contingent to or within the acquiring firm's market areas has been 
discontinued, dismantled and sold piecemeal for scrap or to other 
lines of commerce. There is considerable evidence of this practice. 
Of companies reporting disposal methods in a U.S. Census pilot 
survey of 87 baking companies with 250 or more employees, 17 
sold 52 plants, and at least ten of these were liquidated piecemeal 
with baking operations discontinued.32 To give specific examples, 
published operating statements show that General acquired at 
least 18 plants since 1946 and discontinued operations in five. 
Continental acquired ten companies with a total of 14 plants 
since 1950, and discontinued operations in three of them.33 In many 
cases of discontinued operations of acquired plants, the acquired 
brands may be kept on the market in an attempt to hold all its 
former customers.34 All production is transferred to the usually 
larger, more efficient plant of the acquiring firm to realize economies 
of scale in production. 
There is another reason why baking firms try to increase their 
share of the market through mergers. They seek greater power to 
confine future competition for share to nonprice behavior as 
opposed to price competitive practices. Even if price competition 
were effective in gaining share, it would have serious implications 
for self-destruction because of the static and inelastic demand for 
32. Paul Nelson, "Ownership Changes Within Selected Food Industries-
A Progress Report," Marketing and Transportation Situation, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (Washington, D. C., April, 1958). 
33. Report, op. cit., pp. 135-136. 
M. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisi-
tions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. llO. 
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bread (see footnote 60 of this chapter). Each competitor in an 
oligopoly group has an incentive to gain market power so he can 
better influence the stability of pricing practices. The dominant firm 
that shares a market with few competitors is in a much better posi-
tion to influence price and non price methods of competition for 
its own benefit than one not so favored. 
In the second place, expanding bakery firms have entered new 
market areas in nearly all cases by merger rather than by construct-
ing new plant facilities. This has been equally true for all three 
forms of company diversification-geographic, distributive channel, 
and product. A typical case of geographic expansion through merger 
is the purchase of plants in high growth markets for bread products 
such as the West Coast and other areas where population is growing 
rapidly. Acquired plants frequently have been modernized with 
larger, more efficient equipment and operations continued. 
In 1956, General Baking Company (second largest) acquired a 
regional West Coast bakery and a Northwest bakery with annual 
sales of about 30 percent of total sales of the parent company. 
Largely as a result of these and two other recent mergers, General 
increased coverage of bakery markets in the East and Central states 
while operating for the first time west of the Rocky Mountains. 
General's management explained these acquisitions to its stock-
holders saying they wanted to offset the uncertainties of local market 
structure and behavior by a more balanced pattern of national 
distribution and at the same time expand operation to markets 
with high population growth. 
It is apparent that the primary basis for multi-plant and multi-
market operations in recent years has been to spread among many 
plants and markets the internal competitive risks of local markets 
such as price wars, active promotional campaigns of rivals, and 
bakery worker strikes that cut off a plant's earning capabilities. 
Large baking companies are aware that if oligopolistic price lead-
ership and the approved methods of nonprice competition are to 
work effectively in any particular market area, each of them must 
spread its influence nationally to nullify any disadvantage it may 
have among a single group on the local level. 
Slater found sound reasons, from the viewpoint of the expanding 
firm, for using mergers to get established in new markets: 36 
In order to achieve economies in production, it needs to 
enter a market on a substantial scale. A small plant would 
35. Slater, op. cit., p. 216. 
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not achieve low costs, and a large plant operated at part capa-
city would not be efficient either. But there are strong barriers 
to the quick building up of a large sales volume in a new 
market. Time is required to build a sales organization and 
(in the case of a wholesale baker) obtain a place on grocers' 
shelves. Furthermore, the gradual growth of market demand 
(tied to population changes) precludes the startling growth of 
one seller without a decline in the market share of other 
sellers. This would result in a sharp and costly competitive 
struggle. Mergers avoid such problems, for the company buys 
"market share" along with bricks and mortar of a plant. 
Moreover, the entry into new market areas may be smoother 
if accomplished through external expansion; it avoids the risk 
of antagonizing the local community which otherwise might 
result from driving out the existing firm and causing local 
unemployment.36 
Diversification into new channels of bread distribution is another 
factor that accounts for many of the recent bakery mergers. The 
usual case has been for primarily wholesale baking companies to 
integrate through merger into the home delivery or multi-unit 
retail channels. The integrating company has sought the protective 
environment of a high margin, direct contact, consumer market. 
For example, General, primarily a wholesaler baker, merged with 
Van de Kamp's, the largest multi-outlet retail baking company of 
California, in 1957. Estimated 1957 net earnings on sales of the 
acquired division were about twice that of the parent company 
in 1956.37 
Perhaps the most notable example is the acquisition by Conti-
nental Baking Company (largest wholesale baker in the nation) of 
Omar, Inc., Midwest home service company, in 1958, with annual 
sales representing more than 10 percent of the parent company. 
Continental also may have been motivated by desires other than 
further diversification into the home service channel of bread distri-
bution. Perhaps Omar was underpriced at $5.2 million (net worth 
was $8.6 million in 1957).38 There was an opportunity to trim some 
managerial overhead from the operating costs of Omar in subsidiary 
relationship to the parent company. Moreover, Omar was already 
36. Weston, op. cit., p. 75. 
37. Baking Industry Magazine Guly 13, 1957), p. 55. 
38. Moody's Industrials. Continental Baking Co. entered into a consent order 
with the Federal Trade Commission on April 2, 1962, to dispose of Omar, Inc., 
and was forbidden for ten years to acquire any bread company without permis-
sion of the F.T.C. 
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experimenting with diversification into the production of chain store 
and cooperative contract private label bread. It thus offered 
Continental the opportunity to enter this volatile market area 
under the protective cover of an organization separate from the 
wholesale division. 
Omar operated 81 retail stores for the sale of "day-old" surplus 
bakery products. While wholesale bakers seldom have an incentive 
to retail all of their own output, there are certain advantages in 
retailing some. For example, a baker may find that at 19 cents a 
loaf he can distribute only 20,000 loaves a day via driver-salesmen 
delivery to grocery stores. In order to get an additional 2,000 loaves 
sold through grocery stores, he would have to lower the price to 15 
cents a loaf under drop shipment delivery to a small chain. But 
to avoid alienating his regular grocery store customers, he would 
soon have to give the same price concession to all and sell his 
entire output of 22,000 loaves per day for 15 cents, rather than 
only the last 2,000. Thus, he may be better off selling the last 2,000 
loaves through his own surplus bakery product stores at day-old 
prices, even if retailing costs are somewhat higher than those of 
grocery stores. 
In recent years, diversification of product has become increas-
ingly important as a factor explaining the merger of large baking 
companies with other baking companies and with firms producing 
other than bread products. A large firm may thereby obtain a com-
petitive advantage over smaller competitors by lengthening its prod-
uct line to provide certain bakery products and sometimes non-
bakery products not previously supplied, but which were generally 
used by the acquiring company's present customers. Also, diversifica-
tion of product by major wholesale baking companies has fre-
quently been into unrelated product areas having more favorable 
demand prospects than bread. 
Fully 29 percent of the bakery mergers reported between 1952-58 
in a U.S. Census survey were of a conglomerate type.39 Since 1955, 
Continental, primarily a wholesale baking company, has diversified 
into the manufacture of potato chips, mayonnaise, snack items, 
frozen meat pies, frozen cakes, frozen TV dinners, and frozen bis-
cuits, all by merger.40 By 1958, about 10 percent of company sales 
were non-bakery products. In 1958, General, primarily a wholesale 
39. Nelson and Paul, op. cit., p. 21. 
40. Continental acquired Morton's Frozen Foods, Inc., and Stewart's, Inc. 
(potato chips, mayonnaise) in 1955, and Brownies Chip Co. of Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, in 1959. Moody's Industrials. 
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baking company, acquired two candy manufacturers.41 Other whole-
sale baking companies had diversified into non-baking products to 
a lesser extent or not at all, but a noticeable diversification trend 
was in evidence. Pepperidge Farms, a wholesale baking company 
with $40 million annual sales, first entered the frozen food field in 
1957 through merger.42 In 1959, Interstate, the fifth largest wholesale 
producer of bread products, diversified into cake production with 
the acquisition of Kingston Cake Company with annual sales of 
$6.5 million in Pennsylvania.43 In the same year, Ward, the sixth 
largest wholesale producer of bread products, diversified into frozen 
pies by acquiring the Johnston Pie Company of Los Angeles.44 
Product Differentiation 
Another dimension of market structure is product differentiation 
or the degree of consumer substitution between the output of 
competing sellers. Where product differentiation is present, con-
sumers have developed preferences for the output of certain sellers 
over others. Consumers will be willing to pay at least slightly more 
for a preferred brand, and/or grocery store outlets will be eager to 
stock it. Thus, product differentiation can have an important 
influence on the competitive relationships between bakery firms. 
The principal product of the bakery industry is white bread, 
to which we shall confine our attention in considering product 
differentiation. But the industry is not a single product group. It 
consists of bakeries primarily engaged in the· production of white 
bread, variety breads, rolls, cakes, sweet yeast goods, pastries, dough-
nuts, pies, cookies, and similar perishable bakery products chiefly 
for off-premise sale. White bread, however, accounts for about 56 
percent of total industrial output (in pounds). 
The common bases for product differentiation in most industries 
are: (1) the opportunity for producing significantly different designs 
and qualities of the goods, (2) the relative ignorance of buyers with 
respect to the merits of various alternative products, and (3) the 
susceptibility of buyers to persuasive appeals concerning the alleged 
superiority of the outputs of individual sellers.45 
As far as baking is concerned, the findings suggest that white 
41. General acquired Vernell's Buttermints and Thompson's Candy House, 
both of Seattle, Washington, in 1958. Moody's Industrials. 
42. Baking Industry Magazine (October 19, 1957). Pepperidge Farms was 
merged with Campbell Soup Co. in 1960. 
43. Baking Industry Magazine (October 31, 1959), p. 88. 
44. Report, op. cit., p. 137. 
45. Bain, op. cit., p. 219. 
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pan bread is a homogeneous product in physical quality, nutritive 
value and palatibility. The output of one firm is highly, if not 
completely, substitutable for the output of other firms in any given 
market area. Limitations in differentiating the physical quality of 
white bread are, however, partially offset by the consumer's lack 
of information with respect to the similarity of alternative bread 
products and his susceptibility to locational differentiation on the 
grocery shelf and to the persuasive appeals of bread advertising. 
Perhaps the leading factor making it increasingly difficult for 
bread bakers to differentiate the physical quality of their product 
from that of competitors is the widespread dissemination of techni-
cal and business know-how. Important ingredient and operational 
determinants of bread quality vary only slightly if at all between 
bread bakers in any given market area. General uniformity has been 
achieved in the quality of ingredients and formulas used in the 
cleanliness and timing of production and delivery operations, and in 
the enrichment and subsequent nutritive value of white bread.46 
Product specifications vary somewhat between regions of the 
country, but within any given region, product characteristics are 
generally homogeneous among bakery firms. There are a few excep-
tions. A development of small but growing significance is white 
bread made from stone-milled flour to save the vitamins lost in 
modern milling, as well as breads made from honey, molasses, 
natural-sugar syrup, whole milk and butter. Of course, most of the 
known vitamins of importance are added to all enriched white 
breads, but the nutrition and chemical additive scares of recent 
decades explain, in part, the ability of many small bakers and a few 
large ones (notably Pepperidge Farms and Brownberry) to sell a 
somewhat differentiated product as a special "old-fashioned" 
bread.47 
Another important aspect of bread quality is its perishability. 
Although "staling" is one of the major problems of the industry, 
its cause has not yet been fully determined or controlled. The wide-
spread addition of calcium propionate as a mold inhibitor and 
lecithin as an emulsifying agent, combined with rapid cooling and 
immediate wrapping are characteristic efforts to minimize bread 
staling. Despite these efforts, within two or three days after baking, 
46. See L. C. Taylor and M. C. Burk, Review of Cereal Food Enrichment in 
the United States, 1950-53, National Food Situation No. 69, Agricultural Market-
ing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1954), pp. 17-20. 
47. See for example, Chemicals in Food Products, Hearings, House of Repre-
sentatives, 81st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1951). 
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the crumb of all bakers' bread becomes dry and hard, the crust soft 
and leathery, and the flavor less desirable.48 Heroic attempts are 
made to overcome these factors since success would enable an indi-
vidual firm to differentiate its product and make its advertising 
more effective. 
Despite repeated bread purchases at short intervals, the typical 
consumer does not know enough about bread quality to make a 
reasoned and informed choice among alternative brands. Several 
consumer preference studies have demonstrated this lack. The most 
notable example is a 1955 study of the preferences of a representa-
tive sample of approximately 300 families in Rockford, Illinois.49 
Among five experimental white pan breads purposely made of dis-
tinctly different formulas, consumer discrimination powers were 
almost nil. Analysts used a ten-point scale expressing a range of 
preference from zero, "dislike extremely," to ten, "like extremely." 
The five breads varied as to specific volume, and contents of lard, 
sucrose, and nonfat milk solids, but the mean preference ratings 
were between 6.06 and 7.35. There was no statistically significant 
difference among the mean ratings for each of the quality char-
acteristics evaluated. 
It is a rare consumer, indeed, who, applying the usual tests of 
flavor, freshness (squeeze), texture and keeping quality, can dis-
criminate between the bread produced from distinct alternative 
formulas. Discriminating powers are considerably less in actual 
bread markets where the alternative seller brands are produced 
with essentially the same formula. 
Whatever basis there is today for product differentiation of 
white bread results primarily from the sales-promotion activities 
of sellers. Advertising is an obvious example. In addition to adver-
tising, efforts to make the bread output of the individual baker 
something special in the consumer's mind take various forms includ-
ing: attractiveness and convenience of the display, including size, 
location, and height above the floor; differential loaf size and/or 
weight; differentiation in wrapping material; driver courtesy; and 
other intangible factors sold along with the product itself. These 
factors will be considered again in Chapter 5. 
48. Bread Staling, Consumer Service Department, American Institute of 
Baking, (Chicago, 1954); as quoted in Bread Facts for Consumer Education, 
Agricultural Research Service, V.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 
1955), p. 19. 
49. Hugh P. Bell, Consumers' Preferences Among Bakers' White Breads of 
Different Formulas-A Survey in Rockford, Ill., Report No. 118, Agricultural 
Marketing Service, V.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., May, 1956). 
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A recent study showed that even consumers themselves realize 
that advertising plays a more significant role in shaping their prefer-
ences for bread than physical quality.50 In a sample of 500 house-
holds in a western city, advertising accounted for 60 to 80 percent 
of the reasons given for brand preference. Moreover, changes in 
brand loyalty stem from a sense of monotony with the staple article 
of diet and a desire for something new or different stimulated by 
persuasive advertising. Advertising of bread is aimed at creating 
product preferences for brands or company names through generally 
phrased praises of the attributes of a branded product or simply 
through dinning into the potential buyer's mind an awareness of 
the brand through endless repetition. Thus, the most important 
efforts to achieve bread differentiation are based primarily on a 
nonrational or emotional basis. The possibility of informational 
type advertising of bread, though consistent with the goal of an 
informed discriminating consumer, would be inconsistent with the 
short-run profit maximization goal of bakery firms. Informing the 
consumer of the physical uniformity of alternative breads may 
tend to destroy whatever consumer franchise is attached to particular 
brands, and thus reduce an important source of market power 
held by some bakery firms. 
Barriers to Entry 
Conditions of entry of potential new sellers into bakery product 
markets may be defined as the circumstances under which potential 
competition from new firms will or will not be realized.51 
Papandreou and Wheeler classify the common barriers to entry in 
most industries as: (I) terms under which technology is made avail-
able; (2) terms under which factors of production are made 
available; (3) terms under which outlets for the product are made 
available; (4) consumer allegiances based on product differentiation 
by existing firms, and (5) outright legal restrictions. 52 In the bakery 
industry, the importance of most of these factors is continually 
changing. Some barriers are becoming higher and others lower. Some 
apply to one segment of the industry and some to others. The 
important consideration is the net height of the barriers to entry 
in each bakery segment. 
There appear to be no outright legal restrictions or trade secrets 
50. Nathanael H. Engle, "Bread Buying Habits," Journal of Marketing (Octo-
ber, 1956), p. 193. 
51. Bain, op. cit., p. 3. 
52. A. G. Papandreou and J. T. Wheeler, Competition and its Regulation. 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 179. 
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to forestall entry into baking. Factors of production and techno-
logical know-how are freely available. Kaplan comments on these 
variables as follows: 53 "Competent bakers can be found anywhere 
in the country and little is required in the way of working capital 
with which to get started. Machinery and equipment can frequently 
be obtained on credit and financed by installment payments. Trucks 
can be leased. Raw material inventories are relatively low because 
of rapid turnover. Little or no finished-goods inventories exist 
because of perishability." 
Market Barriers to Entry into Wholesale Bread Markets 
These factors making it easier to enter the production of bread 
products are largely offset by higher market barriers. In recent years, 
the leading factors making it increasingly difficult to enter the whole-
sale segment of the industry are: (I) the implicit and explicit prefer-
ential shelf space agreements of many established firms with grocery 
outlets, (2) the penetration of one or another of the largest baking 
companies and grocery chains into virtually all markets in the 
country, (3) a uniform quality product giving rise to differentiation 
efforts such as large scale advertising which puts an entering com-
pany of limited size and resources at a disadvantage both with the 
grocer and the consumer, and (4) the existing and potential integra-
tion of grocery chains into baking. 
The existence of preferential agreements between owners of 
grocery outlets and established bakery firms is a substantial barrier 
to entry into wholesale bread distribution through grocery stores. 
In many cases, shelf space is not made available to newcomers on 
the same terms on which it is made available to firms already in 
the stores. Perhaps the most notable example is the provision of 
display cabinets by an established firm in return for dominant 
display space, position, and restriction of other brands. In this 
and other ways, potential entrants are often prevented from reach-
ing the final buyers of their products or from achieving minimum 
cost display scale. Shelf space control may take other forms, of 
course, and will be considered more fully in Chapter 5, as will other 
market barriers presented in this section. 
Until shortly after World War II, many companies sold in 
interior markets essentially isolated from the largest baking com-
panies and from chain store private label bread. These were the 
small cities and rural communities where chain stores had not 
53. David Kaplan, President, the Economics of Distribution Foundation, 
New York, testimony before, Hearings, op. cit., p. 6494. 
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penetrated. The main obstacles to the expansion of large baking 
companies with plants in metropolitan areas into rural fringe 
markets were distance and perishability of the product. Small and 
medium sized bakeries entered such environments and prospered 
until recently when two major displacements occurred. Either a 
major chain acquired a small local chain of stores and introduced 
private label bread, or a large city baking company set up a delivery 
system in the outlying community and launched a large scale 
advertising and promotional campaign which local companies 
were unable to match. 
Costwise, distance of market expansion by large city companies 
through drop shipment to outlying area depots and subsequent 
delivery to stores by driver-salesmen is limited by the relationship 
between the slope of the production cost curve and the increased 
costs of distribution due to increased outlying market area sales. 
Roughly estimated from data presented in Chapters 3 and 4, these 
balance at 150 miles. Distance of market expansion by grocery 
chains through common carrier delivery to store docks is limited 
by the relation between the slope of the production cost curve and 
increased common carrier costs to the outlying market area. Roughly 
estimated these balance at between 400 and 500 miles. 
The increased importance of regional and national brands often 
means that a small or medium sized company cannot compete 
effectively with the largest firms and cooperatively affiliated com-
panies in advertising. Ability to enter is partially dependent on 
large scale advertising to develop brand acceptance by consumers 
and retailers, as shown in Chapter 5. It has been demonstrated that 
white bread is essentially the same product in every quality charac-
teristic, thus more significance is attached to who defines the product 
than to how it is defined. Insufficient volume to justify the costs of 
large scale advertising forces many potential entrants to abandon 
the contest before it begins. This is also a factor which contributes 
to the discontinuance of many existing small and medium sized 
firms. Under increased selling competition many firms bid for pri-
vate label contract accounts and experience complete loss of con-
sumer franchise. 
Perhaps the most significant single barrier to entry into 
wholesale baking is that an increasing number of grocery chains 
(corporate, cooperative and voluntary) have become large enough 
to bake their own products if they so choose. Widespread acceptance 
of retailer labels by consumers has enabled grocery chains to inte-
grate into many lines of food processing, the most extensive of 
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which has been baking. 54 Moreover, preferential display of a store's 
own brand of bread restricts the shelf space available for wholesaler 
brands, reduces their volume of sales, and increases their per unit 
costs of delivery. This forces some wholesalers to abandon the outlet. 
Also, some chains have limited the number of wholesaler brands 
allowed in the store. Thus, vertical integration by already estab-
lished grocery chains makes it increasingly difficult for newcomers 
to enter wholesale baking. 
The above barriers to entry apply primarily to wholesale bak-
eries. Although other segments of the industry may not share these 
particular barriers, they have others. For example, home delivery 
and multi-outlet retail bakeries have a higher selling cost barrier. 
A primary barrier to chain store entry into baking bread is owner-
ship of a sufficient number of grocery outlets to take all of the output 
of a minimum optimum-sized bakery plant. However, because of the 
economies of private label bread distribution, the entry of grocery 
chains into bread production may occur via a smaller sized, higher 
unit cost baking plant; the chain may still achieve lower total unit 
costs than the potential wholesale baking entrant who will exper-
ience much higher unit costs of driver-salesman distribution. Evi-
dence for this is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Inelastic Demand with Respect to Price and Income 
The baking industry as a whole has experienced a paucity of 
market expansion since World 'Var II. Under almost static demand 
conditions, the successful entry of a new producer requires almost 
equal displacement of output by established producers. Total con-
sumption of the industry'S products has increased at an average 
annual rate of about 0.7-0.8 percent since 1947, or about half of the 
annual population growth of 1.8 percent. This annual growth rate 
is hardly sufficient to encourage the entry of new firms into most 
bakery product markets. This was not always true. Prior to 1947, 
entry into the baking industry had been eased by the substitution 
of commercially produced bread for home baking. This was in spite 
of the steady decline in per capita consumption of bread from an 
estimated 130 pounds in 1920 to about 75 pounds in 1955.55 Hence, 
54. In 1958, the total value of shipment by food manufacturing plants owned 
by chains (with 11 or more stores) was $1,303.6 million, about 30 percent of which 
was bread products. Of the $228.6 million increase in the product of chain food 
plants from 1954-58, about 40 percent was bread products. Federal Trade Com-
mission, op. cit., p. 30. 
55. How American Buying Habits Change, U.S. Department of Labor 
(Washington, D.C., 1959). 
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lack of demand did not present a serious barrier to entry. By the 
end of World War II, however, this substitution was largely com-
plete. In a recent year, for example, only 5 percent of U.S. house-
holds baked bread in the home. 56 
Table 9 shows per capita consumption of the industry's pro-
ducts for the Census of 1947, 1954, and 1958. Per capita consump-
tion of standard bread products (white, wheat, and rye breads) has 
declined regularly since 1947, from 72 pounds per person to 62 
pounds in 1958. This was partially offset by increased output of 
TABLE 9 
ANNUAL PElI. CAPITA SALES OF PERISHABLE BAKERY PRODUCTS, UNITED STATES, 1947, 
1954 AND 1958 
YEAR 
Product' 1947 1954 1958 (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) 
White han bread 59.4 55.2 54.1 
White earth bread 2.1 1.6 1.4 
Wheat breads 6.2 6.1 3.9 
Rye 4.3 3.8 2.8 
Standard breads, total 72.0 66.7 62.2 
Raisin and other specialty breads 
(diet, protein, buttermilk) 1.3 2.0 3.6 
Rolls, bread type 
(including brown-and·serve) 6.6 9.2 9.5 
Specialty breads and rolls, total --.:r:g If.2 If.l 
Sweet yeast goods 4.3 3.9 4.5 
Cakes 8.4 6.5 6.2 
Pies 4.2 4.5 4.0 
Cookies .6 .4 .4 
Doughnuts, cake, type 2.2 2.3 2.0 
Sweet goods, total ""19.7 l7.6 17.l 
Bakery products, total 99.6 95.5 92.4 
SoURCE: 1947, 1954, and 1958 Census of Manufactures, Baker)! Products, op. cit., p. 12 . 
• Omits for all years small amounts of miscellaneous bakery products not specified by 
kind, but does include for white pan bread about 14 percent in 1958 and 4 percent in 1954 
reported as "not specified by kind." Excludes retail bake shops. . 
specialty breads and rolls from about eight pounds per capita in 
1947 to 13 in 1958. Per capita consumption of sweet goods dipped 
sharply in the middle fifties, and leveled off by 1958 to 17 pounds 
per person. In total, it appears that per capita consumption of the 
industry's products declined by approximately 7.2 pounds between 
1947 and 1958. 
Thus, the overall demand picture for bread is less than encour-
aging. The slight increase the industry has experienced since World 
56. Home Baking by Households in the United States by Region, 1955, 
Report No. 13, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 2. 
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War II cannot be attributed to the general rise in consumer incomes. 
In fact, many investigators have found that income is inversely 
associated with bread and flour consumption, which suggests a nega-
tive income elasticity. Using 1929-53 data, Juree found that a 1 
percent increase in income is associated with a 0.27 percent decrease 
in per capita consumption of wheat flour products as a whole. 57 
More recent data suggest there has been a continued negative rela-
tionship between per capita income and per capita bread consump-
tion. A U.S. Department of Agriculture study shows that as incomes 
rise from very low levels to the national average, per capita con-
sumption increases somewhat, but incomes above the national 
average are associated with declining bread consumption. 58 Further 
estimates based on the U.S.D.A. survey suggest that had per capita 
income increased $1,000 above the actual level, cereal consumption 
including bread would have declined by 4.6 percent. 59 
Moreover, there is general agreement among competent analysts 
that the response of bread consumption to changes in price are 
insignificant. Using 1923-47 data, Meinken found that a 1 percent 
change in price is associated with a -0.06 percent change in per 
capita consumption of bread, rolls and coffee cakes.6o Using earlier 
data (1921-34), Schultz estimated a price elasticity coefficient of 
between -0.17 and -0.25 for total domestic demand for wheat.61 
Malenbaum summarizes the relationship by observing that a price 
elasticity of demand of zero, or no consumption response to price 
changes, is a reasonably close conclusion.62 This has an important 
implication for entry. Lower bread prices resulting from potential 
cost-reducing innovations by entering firms have little potential for 
measurably increasing per capita consumption, and thus successful 
entry by new firms requires an almost equal loss of sales by exist-
ing companies. 
57. L. Juree, "Long-run Trends in Food Consumption: A Multi-Country 
Study," Econometrics (Volume 24, 1958), pp. 1-21. 
58. Household Food Consumption Survey, 1955, Reports 1-10, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1956). 
59. john R. Wetmore, Martin E. Abel, Elmer W. Learn, and Willard W. 
Cochrane, Policies for Expanding the Demand for Farm Food Products in the 
United States, Agricultural Experiment Station Technical Bulletin 231, Univer-
sity of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1959). 
60. Kenneth W. Meinken, The Demand and Price Structure for Wheat, Tech-
nical Bulletin No. 1136, U.S. Department of Agriculture, (Washington, D.C., 
1955), p. 21. 
61. Henry Schultz, The Theory and Measurement Of Demand (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 397. 
62. Wilfred Melenbaum, The World Wheat Economy, 1885-1939 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 72. 
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Economies of Scale in Bread Plants 
Under conditions of static demand, all potential entrants face 
a scale efficiency barrier with respect to plant and distribution 
systems (see Chapters 3 and 4). Entry at the optimum scale of pro-
duction and distribution is essentially foreclosed, except to already 
existing grocery chains that own a sufficient number of retail outlets 
to take all of the output of a minimum optimum-sized bread plant. 
A grocery chain serving about 360,000 people in a 150-mile 
radius could enter bread production and distribution at near opti-
mum scale with an investment of about $1.1 million. As shown in 
Chapter 3, a 6,000 pound per hour automatic bread plant operating 
at about three-fourths of capacity 24 hours per day, six days per 
week, at minimum rated machine capacity, with allowance for break-
downs, could approach within 10 percent of least cost operation. 
Average total costs of production would be about 7 cents per pound 
and, as shown in Chapter 4, average costs of distribution to grocery 
stores would be about 1.5 cents per pound. Weekly output would 
be about 500,000 pounds of bread and bread type rolls, average 
consumption of which was about 1.4 pounds per capita per week 
in 1958. 
Average total costs of production and distribution estimated 
at about 8.5 cents per pound in the above example are essentially 
outside the realm of possibility to the potential entrant into the 
wholesale bread segment of the industry. This is because the share 
of market necessary to operate a bread plant of near-optimum scale 
would be sizable. 
For example, in the Omaha market with 400,000 to 500,000 
people, the required market share for entry at optimum levels of 
efficiency would be roughly 70-90 percent. Given the further condi-
tion that five operating plants share the bulk of that market and 
operate at varying levels of under-capacity such that any two ot 
them with nearly full plant utilization could supply the entire 
market, the height of the entry barrier is further raised. 
Economies of scale and the existing excess capacity of plants 
effectively foreclose entry at optimum levels of operation. For mar-
kets with lower population than the above example, economies of 
scale and utilization levels of existing plants most likely present 
an even greater barrier; for markets with higher or increasing popu-
lation, the barrier may be somewhat less, but it is still a significant 
deterrent to entry at optimum levels of efficiency. 
3 / Technology and Costs of 
Bread Production 
The preceding chapter dealt with the changing patterns of 
market structure in the bakery industry. Here and in Chapter 4 
we shall examine baking technology and costs, since they have a 
bearing on our later appraisal of the industry's performance. Recent 
changes in technology and costs seem to foreshadow changes in the 
number and size of bread plants, the resource inputs required per 
unit of output in bread production, the methods of production and 
distribution, and the levels of horizontal and vertical integration. 
Changes in Cost Factors of Production 
Average costs provide some insight into the impact of techno-
logical and volume factors on optimum or model plant costs. More-
over, the industry's experience with changes in specific factor costs 
of production may help to shape its future market structure and 
behavior. In 1947, production costs accounted for about 60 cents 
of the consumer's bread dollar, or 7.5 cents per pound of wholesale 
bakery bread sold through retail stores. By 1958, the share of the 
consumer's bread dollar going for production costs had decreased to 
about 49 percent, or 9.4 cents per pound. Thus, while total produc-
tion costs increased by about 25 percent, or 1.9 cents per pound, 
they declined as a share of the consumer's bread dollar. From 1947 
to 1958, an estimated 1.9 cents, or only 28 percent, of the 6.8 cent 
increase in the retail price of a one-pound loaf of white bread was 
due to an increase in bakery production costs. 
Table 10 shows the postwar changes in the relative proportions 
of selected factor costs in bread production. It is readily apparent 
that all costs of bread production except costs of ingredients have 
increased since 1947, and at a rate in excess of the 55 percent increase 
in the average retail price of bread. Costs of ingredients have 
decreased both relatively and absolutely. As a share of the con-
44 
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sumer's bread dollar, they have dropped from about 41 percent in 
1947 to about 26 percent in 1958. Moreover, as costs to the baker 
they would have declined even more if it were not for absolute 
increases in transportation (despite the introduction of bulk han-
dling) and relative increases in exchange costs, both of which are 
included in prices paid by bakery firms for ingredients. Also, mod-
ern baking demands higher quality flour and a higher ratio of 
chemical additives-sugar, powdered milk, shortening and water to 
flour-which have caused a significant composition change in "ingre-
dients." Combined, these factors tend to understate the postwar 
decline in prices paid to the producers of raw materials used in 
TABLE 10 
ESTIMATED AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS OF WHOLESALE WHITE BREAD, UNITED 
STATES, 1947-1958 
A verage Costs per Percentage of 
Cost Item Pound Produced" Retail Pricee 
1947 1958 1947 1958 
Cents Cents Percent Percent 
Shop laborb 1.15 2.08 9.20 10.78 
Ingredien ts· 5.10 5.00 40.80 25.90 
Wrapping sUlpliesb .62 1.02 4.96 5.28 
Depreciation .20 .35 1.60 1.81 
Miscellaneous .43 .95 3.44 4.93 
Total production costs 7.50 9.40 60.00 48.70 
• One·pound loaf of white bread. Average cost estimates differ depending on the source. 
the internal and external economies of firms included in the tabulation. and other variables. 
The.e data are presented as reasonably typical; statistically significant data for the industry 
as a whole are not available. Also see Table 28. 
b Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. 
• Richard H. Long and V. John Brensike, "Marketing Margins for White Bread," The 
Marketing and Transportation Situation, July, 1958, p. 18; and Developments in Marketing 
Spreads for Agricultural Production 1958, Agricultural Marketing Service No. 316, U. S. De-
partment of Agriculture, 1959, p. 11. 
d Derived from cost data on the four h.rgest bread manufacturers as presented in Hearings, 
op. cit., p. 6580 . 
• Based on average retail prices published by Bureau of Labor Statistics of 12.5 cents 
per pound in 1947 and 19.3 cents per pound in 1958. 
bread production. For example, the average prices received by 
farmers for wheat dropped 25 percent in the period 1947-58.1 
Although there is generally a close relationship between the price 
of flour and the price of wheat, there is little relationship between 
the price of flour and the price of bread. 
Baking companies do not pay a uniform price for ingredients. 
This is due in part to locational advantage of some firms with 
respect to sources of supply, in part to different levels of quality 
1. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6089. Figures furnished by the Agricultural Market-
ing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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control necessitated by machinery employed, and in part to the 
market power advantages of size. In 1958, the four largest baking 
companies purchased ingredients for prices averaging about 10 
percent less than those reported by bakery plants of the five major 
grocery chains and by independent baking companies affiliated with 
cooperative buying groups.2 Although ingredient costs for the 
remaining unaffiliated independent baking companies are not avail-
able for 1958, data reported for the end of World War II suggest 
their ingredient costs average considerably higher than those of 
the largest four baking companies.3 
Labor is the primary factor among production costs contributing 
to higher retail prices for bread in the postwar years. Increased costs 
of production labor accounted for about half of the total postwar 
increase in production costs, but it should be noted that this factor 
accounted for only about 14 percent of the 6.8 cent increase in the 
average retail price of bread from 1947-58. There is evidence sug-
gesting that substantially all of the increase in per unit cost of 
production labor was due to increased wage rates, fringe benefits, 
social security taxes, and vacation allowances. The volume of bread 
produced per production worker has increased in the postwar years. 
Because of substitution of capital for labor, average productivity of 
plant labor has increased, and per unit production labor costs have 
not increased as much as hourly earnings.4 
Depreciation allowances and costs of wrapping supplies both 
rose a little faster, on a per unit basis, than did bread prices after 
World War II. Together their 1947-58 increase amounted to slightly 
more than one-half cent. Higher depreciation costs reflect inflated 
values of land and buildings as well as the widespread adoption of 
2. Report, op. cit., pp. 31 and 113. 
3. June, 1945, costs of ingredients and materials for the four largest baking 
firms (then Continental, Purity, General and Ward) averaged 3.66 cents per 
pound as compared with 3.87 cents per pound for medium and medium-large 
sized bakeries, 3.92 cents per pound for medium-small sized bakeries, and 4.62 
cents per pound for the smallest bakeries. Blair suggested that without the 
advantage of power to buy materials cheaply which stems from size, the total 
unit costs of the Big Four would have been only slightly lower than those of 
small bakeries in 1945. It is important to note that changes in technology and 
other conditions since that date may significantly alter these findings. John 
Blair, "Does Large-scale Enterprise Lower Costs?" American Economic Review 
(May, 1948), pp. 147-148. 
4. From 1947-54 Census data as reported in Farm-Retail Spreads for Food 
Products, Miscellaneous Publication 741. Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., November, 1957), p. 35. Also see 
Imogene Bright, "Trends in Labor Input and Output in Selected Agricultural 
Processing Industries, 1947-57," Agricultural Economics ReseaTch (October, 1959), 
pp. 115-120. 
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new bakery machinery. Wrapping supplies rose in cost partially 
because of the increased use of more expensive wrapping materials, 
more cellophane and polyethelene and less waxed paper. Increases 
in miscellaneous production costs including return on investment, 
plus light and power, fuel, repairs, and other expenses, accounted 
for slightly more than one-half cent of the 1947-58 increase in 
baking company costs. 
Technological Advance and Increasing Scale 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution in baking at 
the turn of the 20th Century, there has been a tendency for the 
scale of operations to increase. Early mechanization involved the 
development of machines to take the place of repetitive hand opera-
tions. Mixing machines were introduced in about 1880 followed by 
special machines for dividing, slicing, and wrapping.5 The largest 
bread plants which in 1900 turned out 1,000 pounds of bread an 
hour, or 15,000 loaves per day, by 1930 often surpassed 2,000 pounds 
per hour in a single production line, and some multi-line plants 
produced more than 100,000 loaves per day.6 By 1958, the median 
bread plant operated at a capacity of about 3,000 pounds per hour 
and some of the larger plants operated bread lines with output 
levels of 8,000 pounds per hour, or as much as 192,000 pounds per 
single production line in a 24 hour period (Table 4). The basis for 
this long-run trend has been technological innovation which has 
provided the capital equipment for a larger scale of operations. 
Table 11 shows the recent level of investment in selected bakery 
machinery. Since technological changes and machinery adoption 
have important effects on the baking industry, several of the more 
important developments will be considered here. 
Pneumatic Ingredient-Handling Equipment 
During the past 15 years the expanded use of pneumatic con-
veyors had made possible the bulk handling of ingredients all the 
way from the rail siding or truck dock to the mixing machines. 
Although their chief use is to move flour, pneumatic conveyors also 
carry dried milk, granulated sugar, and other ingredients. Intro-
duced in the bakery industry in 1946, bulk handling of ingredients 
by pneumatic conveyors is best suited for medium and large scale 
5. Herman J. Rothberg, Studies of Automatic Technology, A Case Study of 
A Large Mechanized Bakery, Bureau of Labor Statistics Report 109, U.S. Depart-
ment of· Labor (Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 1. 
6. Panscher, op. cit., pp. 123-124. 
48 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
bread plants among which there was an estimated 75 to 90 percent 
adoption by 1958 (Table 12). During the same period, it was adopted 
by only about 15 percent of the small bread plants. Significant labor 
saving results as the bulk material is moved by air through tubes 
TABLE II 
INVESTMENT IN SELEerED BAKERY MACHINERY, UNITED STATES, 1954 AND 1958 
1954 1958 
Machine Number Value Number Value 
Dough mixers N.A. $ 3,810,000 N.A. $ 6,584,000 
Traveling tray ovens 320 4,805,000 274 5,126,000 
Other ovens 481 2,580,000 N.A. 3,085,000 
Slicing machines 1,426 2,371,000 N.A. 1,176,000 
Other i?akery machinery and 
N.A. 23,540,000 N.A. 29,222,000 eqUIpment 
Bakery machinery and equipment 
3,034,000 697,000 not specified by kind 
Total N.A. $43,247,000 N.A. $48,869,000 
SOURCE: Census of Manufactures, op. cit., as reported in Baking Industry Magazine (March 
19, 1960), p. 41. 
N.A. -Not available. Total shipments include interplant transfers. 
and hoses. A case study showed a substantial (40 times) increase 
in output per man hour for unloading flour into the plant, or from 
less than 1,000 pounds per man hour for bagged delivery to 40,000 
pounds per man hour for bulk delivery.7 Investment pay-out time on 
the basis of labor saving alone has been estimated at less than three 
years. In addition, it reduces the cost of flour through reduced trans-
portation costs of bulk as compared with bagged delivery. Pneu-
matic handling eliminates loss due to sack breakage. It also facilitates 
sanitation and quality control as the conveyor system is sealed air 
tight and the bulk ingredient passes through sifters and an intoleter 
to assure product purity and proper aeration.8 
Continuous Mix 
Recent combination of the various dough preparation stages into 
one machine that will mix, develop, divide, shape, and pan bread 
dough automatically provides the element of automation between 
automatic ingredient handling and the automatic oven, depanner, 
slicer, and wrapper. Although there had been substantial automa-
tion of the individual stations replaced by continuous mix, the 
7. Rothberg, op. cit., p. 6. 
8. Inter·Bureau Committee, Technology in Food Marketing, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1952), p. 28. 
TABLE 12 
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF BREAD PLANTS HAVING ADoPTED SELECTED EQUIPMENT BY 1947, 1954, AND 1958, UNITED STATES' 
.., 
PERCENTAGE OF PLANTS OF SPECIFIED SIZE ADOPTING SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT BY YEAR (\ Approx. <'> ;:ro 
Year 2000 Lb./Hr. 4000 Lb./Hr. 6000 Lb./Hr. 8000 Lb./Hr. ~ 
Intro· (from 1000·3000) (from 3000·5000) (from 5000·7000) (7000 and above) C 
-Automatic Equipment dllced 1947 1954 1958 1947 1954 1958 1947 1954 1958 1947 1954 1958 ~ 
Depan-o.matic, ~ 
~ pan return conveyor 1949 20 75 40 90 40 95 45 95 R. 
Cooler, conveyors ~ 
C 
to slicers 1930 0 25 50 30 60 75 40 70 90 50 80 90 
'" I; 
Pan stacker and 
.Q. 
unstacker 1955 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
t:x:I 
Final proofer 1915 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 8 10 5 8 10 ~ 
Pneumatic flour R. 
handling 1946 0 8 15 5 50 75 5 50 85 5 75 90 '"t;j 
'i 




Tro hoists 1930 25 50 75 75 80 85 75 85 95 70 75 95 <'> .... 
-. C 
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elimination of batch mixing is of major significance in facilitating 
fully automated bread production. 
Developed out of basic research in cereal chemistry, the process 
of fermenting a yeast broth rather than the dough itself cuts dough-
processing time from several hours to a matter of minutes. An opti-
mum blend of: (1) equal parts of Hard Red Spring and Hard Red 
Winter wheat flour; (2) oxidant solution with potassium bromate 
and iodate; (3) melted shortening; and (4) yeast broth, is metered 
continuously and automatically into the dough mixing machine. 
Introduced in 1953 and operational by 1956, continuous mix is 
apparently best suited for medium sized plants among which it 
had been adopted by approximately 5 percent by 1958.9 Table 12 
shows it had been installed in none of the small and only a few 
of the large bread plants. The rate of adoption is expected to 
increase substantially in the 1960's owing in part to a dramatic labor 
saving potential of three to four men per shift (Table 13). For an 
investment cost of $150,000, continuous-mix machines enable bread 
plant managers to replace six of 12 stages in the conventional pro-
duction line: flour-scaling units, batch mixers, fermentation room, 
dough troughs and hoists, dividers, rounders, an overhead proofer, 
and a molder-panner. 
Through a sizable effect on the capital-labor ratio in bread 
plant cost structure, continuous mix intensifies the economic dis-
advantages of under-capacity plant utilization. Investment pay-out 
time in terms of labor saving is from three to four years with three-
shift operations, five to six years with two shifts and increases to 
eight to 12 years with a single shift operation. Continuous mix also 
introduces a certain inflexibility into plant operations as only white, 
rye, and whole wheat breads can be produced. If other variety 
breads, buns, rolls, and sweet goods are produced, additional auto-
mated-batch equipment of minimum size requirements must also 
be maintained. Some ingredient savings are realized because dusting 
can be eliminated and because improved automatic control of 
metering devices allows closer compliance with minimum weight 
laws. Improved fermentation control produces a bread structure 
9. The Do·Maker of Baker Process Company, a subsidiary of Wallace and 
Tiernan Chemical Co. is the outstanding case in point. The number of 
operating units increased from two in 1955 to five in 1956, to ten in 1957, to 21 
in 1958, to 56 in 1959. A second unit manufactured by the American Machine 
and Foundry Co. entered the field in 1958. See, "The Progress of Automa-
tion-What It Means to the Economy of the Baking Industry," Bakers Weekly 
(June 19, 1961), pp. 22-26. 
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TABLE 13 
COMPARISON OF SELEerED AUTOMATIC BAKERY EQUIPMENT COST WITH LABoR. 
COST SAVING AND YEARS TO PAY OUT INVESTMENT IN PLANTS OF 4000 LoAVES PER 





























Labor Cost Saving" Pay-out 
1 shifte $12,840 11.68 
2 shifts 25,680 5_84 
3 shifts 38,520 3_89 
1 shift 17,120 8.76 
2 shifts 34,240 4.38 
3 shifts 51.360 2.92 
1 shift 8,560 1.86 
2 shifts 17,120 .93 
1 shift 8,560 7.58 
2 shifts 17,120 3.79 
1 shift 4,280 3.97 
2 shifts 8,560 1.98 
1 shift 8,560 8.76 
2 shifts 17,120 4.38 
• The approximate labor cost per man per year is assumed to be $4,280 per man. This 
cost is based on a wage of $2.00 per hour. a 40 hour week, and an additional 7 percent of 
fringe benefits and Social Security matching costs. 
b Cost of equipment is taken from an equipment company, Approximate Installed Equip-
ment Cost, table dated March I, 1954. 
"Equipment was selected on basis of replacement equipment of a different nature than 
that replaced, addition without replacement. and replacement especially pertinent to labor 
saving rather than on the basis of a larger size of the same type. Continuous mix is an ex-
ample of replacement of old equipment of more than one station by a single new machine. 
d Total standard equipment assumed in operation of the plant is $291,000 before the 
addition of any equipment. 
• The 4000 loaves (pounds) per hour plant size is assumed to be operating at full capacity 
while in operation whether it be one, two, or three shifts. 
f Continuous mix replaces at least three men and under optimum conditions replaces 
four men. 
• With a plant of 8.000 loaves per hour production capacity, the addition of an automatic 
final proofer would cost $120,000. or $45,000 more than at the 4,000 loaves per hour capacity 
plant. and would replace four men. The result would be a labor cost saving of $17,120 on 
one-shift basis; $32.240 on a two-shift basis; and $51,360 on a three-shift basis. The pay-out 
time would be seven yean, 3.5 years, and 2.33 years respectively for one-, two-, and three-
shift operation. 
of uniform, small cells which has provided some visible basis for 
claiming a differentiated product. 
Automatic Conveyor Systems 
Traveling aprons move bread-in-process between and within the 
stages of production in a continuous assembly line operation. From 
the panner through a final proofer, oven, depanner, cooler, slicer-
wrapper, and to the loading dock, panned bread is moved by an 
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automatic conveyor system. There is considerable variation among 
the rates of adoption of the newer machines at the various pro-
duction stages. For example, modification of final proofing to allow 
continuous flow of panned bread by traveling apron from the 
panner to the oven has proceeded slowly in the postwar years. 
With an investment of $75,000, the automatic final proofer 
replaces two men resulting in a pay-out time of about 4.5 years 
under two-shift operations of medium sized plants (Table 13). 
Although introduced as early as 1915, by 1958 automation of the 
final proofing operation had occurred in only about 10 percent of 
the large plants, 5 percent of the medium sized plants, and none 
of the small bread plants. Table 12 shows, however, that there has 
been a 150 percent increase in the number installed since 1947. 
This increase in the use of automatic proofing equipment seems 
to be associated with adoption of the continuous-mix process and 
with more precise oven control. Prior to the development of auto-
matic continuous mix and closely controllable ovens, flexibility was 
required in the final proofing operation to adjust to plant break-
downs and to variability in oven output, and in mixing and first 
proofing time. With the current innovations and plant engi-
neering facilities, the feasibility of automatic final proofing is 
greatly increased. 
Modification of the cooler to allow continuous flow of baked 
bread by traveling apron from the oven and depanner through to 
the slicer-wrapper was introduced in 1930, and by 1958 had been 
adopted in approximately 90 percent of the large plants, 75 percent 
of the medium sized plants and 50 percent of the small bread plants. 
While none of the small plants had installed automatic coolers and 
traveling aprons by 1947, nearly half of the medium and large 
sized plants had done so by that date. Under two-shift operation of 
medium sized plants, with an investment of $65,000, the automatic 
cooler and conveyor replace two men resulting in a pay-out time 
of about 3.8 years. 
Introduced in 1949, the automatic depanner and pan return 
conveyor were adopted in 90-95 percent of the medium and large 
sized bread plants and in about 75 percent of the small plants by 
1958. The number of medium and large sized plants in which this 
innovation was adopted more than doubled from 1954 to 1958, 
while among small bread plants, adoption quadrupled during the 
same time period. The high rate of adoption among all plant sizes 
probably reflects the relatively low capital investment, which in the 
case of medium sized plants was $16,000 in 1958. Nonetheless, the 
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automatic depanner and pan return conveyor replace two men, 
providing a pay-out time of about one year under two-shift opera-
tions. They not only save labor but increase the average life of 
bread pans. 
Oven Operation and Design 
With the end of World War II practically all bread plants, 
regardless of size, changed their bread formula-increasing the ratio 
of sugar, shortening, and skim milk to flour. This change, coupled 
with improved oven performance and stepped up heat is estimated 
to have cut average baking time per pound from approximately 
35 minutes to 18 minutes.1o The additional heat and zone control 
of heat supply combined with the modified bread formula roughly 
doubled the capacity of practically all bread ovens in the United 
States during the postwar years. During the changeover period, a 
continuous automatic oven into which products are automatically 
loaded, baked, and unloaded without continual supervision, was 
adopted in 90 percent of the medium and large sized plants, and 
in 75 percent of the small bread plants. With little or no time lost 
due to adjustment, the modern oven is capable of baking pan 
breads, sweet goods, pies, cakes and rolls. 
In summary, it has been shown that while advances in baking 
technology have been utilized in small bread plants to a limited 
extent, most of the recent innovations have been readily fitted into 
the operations of medium and large scale plants. This is due, in 
part, to the lower investment and labor costs per unit of output of 
large as compared with smaller versions of the same machine. The 
significant innovations are in the areas of production process and 
materials handling. Moreover, each stage of bread production has 
been subject to output-increasing mechanization and to labor saving 
automation of the station-to-station movement of product. 
Foremost among technological developments are those that have 
made possible a shift from batch operations to continuous mixing. 
The conventional batch method of bread production by its nature 
took more time and labor. There were periods of dough fermenta-
tion and intermediate proofing and considerable hand labor, putting 
the product-in-process into or taking it out of machines or rooms 
at each of the 12 production stages. Thus, baking has become an 
organized and partially automated assembly line through develop-
ment of the pneumatic ingredient handling equipment, continuous 
10. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6189-6190. 
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dough mix, automatic final proofer, automatic oven, automatic 
slicer and wrapper, automatic depanner, pan return conveyor, pan 
stacker and unstacker, automatic cooler, conveyor to slicer, and 
conveyor to loading racks. 
Under typical conditions, the shift to automated baking in any 
given plant is only partial, with several of the operations carried 
on as before, and thus many bread plants have not achieved the 
optimum level of equipment utilization. Although the adoption of 
new equipment is far from complete, the equipment is available and 
its efficiency and output-increasing potentials are felt in nearly 
every bread market. 
Technological Advance and Production Costs 
A comparison between the cost of bread production in model 
plants with standard automated-batch equipment and continuous-
mix equipment reflects the magnitude of cost changes associated 
with technological change in the postwar years. In this context, 
"technological change" is interpreted as any change in input-output 
relations that is not directly attributable to changes in factor prices 
or variations in the rate or scale of production.H The synthesis of 
unit cost curves for model bread plants of various sizes used for this 
comparison has the advantage of focusing attention on the merits 
of currently employed baking equipment in relation to optimum 
equipment available. Of course, an increasing number of plants 
use all of the latest available equipment, but the vast majority 
do not. 
Figure I demonstrates that under the existing level of technology, 
the efficiency potential of automatic continuous-mix equipment rela-
tive to standard automated-batch equipment is significant for each 
of the four representative sizes (see Table 4) of model bread plants. 
At an output rate of 56 hours per week, the advantage of auto-
matic equipment over standard equipment ranges from 1.6 cents 
(15 percent) per pound when comparing small scale plants to 1.1 
cents (13 percent) per pound when comparing large scale plants. 
Subtracting the 1.1 cents per pound from the 1.6 cents per pound 
in the example above yields a cost advantage for the small plant 
compared with the large plant due to automatic equipment of 0.5 
cents per pound. However, the cost advantage due to automatic 
equipment at an operating rate of 36 hours per week is less for a 
small than for a large scale automatic plant. A decrease in plant 
1 I. Conference on Price Research, Cost Behavior and Price Policy (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943), p. 143. 
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operation from a 54 hour week to a 36 hour week is associated 
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SoURCE: These short-run plant cost curves are based on engineering studies and 
accounting experience shown in Tables 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33. 
FIG. I.-Comparison of average total cost curves for model bread plants with 
standard and with automatic equipment, and no daily variation in demand, 1959. 
automatic plant as contrasted with only 0.7 of a cent in the case 
of the large automatic plant, or a difference of 0.6 of a cent in 
cost in favor of the large scale automatic bread plant. Under-capa-
city utilization of small automated plants is relatively more costly 
than it is for large plants. 
These economies of automatic processes in baking are due 
largely to change in the capital-labor ratio per pound of output. In a 
medium sized bread plant, for example, replacing hand labor and 
less efficient machines with fully automatic continuous-mix equip-
ment results in a decrease in direct production labor from 15 
workers per shift to five workers per shift. At full-capacity opera-
tion, per pound production labor costs are reduced from 0.9 of a 
cent to 0.3 of a cent. The concurrent increase in capital investment 
required for this medium sized plant is approximately $158,000, 
from $674,200 to $832,000, which amounts to a per pound increase 
in cost due to increased investment of only .03 of a cent, from 0.34 
of a cent to 0.37 of a cent per pound, or a 9 percent increase. Thus, 
since the reduction of labor cost due to the increased investment 
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is 0.6 of a cent per pound, or 67 percent, there is a net saving of 
0.57 of a cent per pound of bread output due to the substitution of 
continuous-mix equipment for labor and standard automated-
batch equipment. 
Production Scale Economies 
There are marked economies of scale in bread production. With 
an increase in size of plant, at full capacity utilization, unit pro-
duction costs decrease significantly for the relevant range of plant 
size. Scale economies are due primarily to larger equipment which 
results in: (1) less investment per unit of output and, hence, lower 
per unit depreciation costs, (2) economy of labor utilization, and 
(3) economy of plant administration. In order to estimate the magni-
tude of scale economies, model plants of 2,000, 4,000, 6,000 and 
8,000 pounds per hour were synthesized from engineering and 
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SOURCE: Tables 29. 30. 31. 34. and 35. 
FIG. 2.-Comparison of average total cost curves for model bread plants 
with standard and with automatic equipment, operated under conditions of 
average daily variation in demand, 1959. 
12. Model plants were synthesized through the application of the building 
block method based primarily on engineering data. For a review of the methodo-
logical framework used, see L. L. Sammet, "Structural Trends and Economics of 
Scale in Agricultural Marketing and Processing," Proceedings of the Western Farm 
Economics Association (August 13-15, 1958), pp. 187-201. See notes to Tables 
30 and 31 for the data sources and assumptions made. See Tables 32 to 35 for a 
detailed tabulation of fixed and variable costs per pound of bread. 
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plants coincide approximately with the typical small, medium, 
and large plants in current operation, with both the 6,000 and the 
8,000 pound-per-hour model plants falling in the large size category 
(Table 4). In addition to analysis of the four plant sizes from 2,000 
pounds-per-hour output to 8,000 pounds-per-hour output, compari-
sons within size are made on the basis of: (1) standard batch equip-
ment vs. automatic mix equipment, and (2) production geared to 
daily variation in demand vs. uniform production through the week 
-capacity fixed independently in all cases (Tables 14 and 15). 
TABLE 14 
COMPA1USON OF PER POUND PRODUcnON COSTS OF SMALL AND LARGE MODEL BREAD 
PLANTS UNDER A RANGE OF HOURS PER WEEK OPERATION AND WITHOUT DAILY 
VA1UATION IN OUTPUT, UNITED STATES, 1959 
STANDARD BATCH EQUIPMENT CONTINUOUS MIX EQUIPMENT 
Hours 2,000 8,000 2,000 8,000 
per Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Differ· Per- Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Differ- Per-
Week Small Large ence cent Small Large ence cent 
36 11.69¢ 9.11¢ 2.58¢ 22 10.19¢ 8.04¢ 2.15¢ 21 
48 10.59 8.52 2.07 20 9.14 7.49 1.65 18 
72 9.84 8.08 1.76 17 8.08 6.99 1.09 13 
96 9.21 7.75 1.46 15 7.62 6.70 .92 12 
120 8.93 7.57 1.36 14 7.32 6.54 .78 9 
144 8.74 7.49 1.25 14 7.12 6.43 .69 9 
SoURCE: Same as FiKure 1-
TABLE 15 
COMPARISON OF PER POUND PRODUCTION COSTS OF SMALL AND LARGE MODEL BREAD 
PLANTS USING STANDARD AND AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT UNDER A RANGE OF HOURS 
PER WEEK OPERATION AND TYPICALLY DAILY VARIATION IN OUTPUT, UNITED 
STATES, 1959 
-I ,,,".,~ .,~ """ .. ~ CONTINUOUS MIX EQUIPMENT 
Hours 2,000 8,000 2,000 8,000 
per Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Differ- Per- Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Differ- Per-
Week Small Large ence cent Small Large ence cent 
36 11.72¢ 9.12¢ 2.6¢ 22 10.22¢ 8.05¢ 2.17¢ 21 
54 10.39 8.40 2. 19 8.84 7.34 1;5 17 
72 9.86 8.09 1.77 18 8.19 7.00 1.19 14 
90 9.33 7.81 1.52 17 7.74 6.76 .98 11 
108 9.15 7.70 1.45 16 7.49 6.62 .83 11 
SoURCE: Same as Figure 2. 
Under conditions of 54 hour week operation, a daily variation in 
demand for bread, standard equipment, and no storage of product, 
cost per pound decreased from 10.4 cents for the small plant to 8.4 
cents for the largest plant, a scale economy of 2.0 cents per pound 
(19 percent) between the small and the large bread plant. Using 
automatic equipment rather than standard equipment, other things 
remaining the same, the per pound decrease in cost was 1.5 cents 
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(17 percent) from 8.84 cents for the small plant to 7.34 cents for 
the largest plant. 
Increasing the hours of weekly operation from 54 to 108, also 
assuming weekly cycle of demand, standard equipment, and no 
storage of product, the per pound cost decreased from 9.15 cents 
for the small plant to 7.7 cents for the largest plant or 1.45 cents 
(16 percent). Substituting automatic equipment for standard equip-
ment under the same conditions, cost per pound declined from 
7.49 cents for the small plant to 6.62 cents for the large plant, or 
a decrease of 0.83 cents (11 percent). 
Comparing the small plant with the large plant, but under the 
assumption of uniform production, 48 hour weekly operation, and 
standard equipment, cost per pound declined from 10.59 cents to 
8.52 cents, a difference of 2.07 cents per pound (20 percent). Sub-
stituting automatic for standard equipment, ceteris paribus, cost per 
pound decreased 1.65 cents (18 percent) from 9.14 cents for the 
small plant to 7.49 cents for the large plant. 
Expanding weekly operation to the full 144 hours possible 
under uniform daily production and using standard equipment, 
cost declined from 8.74 cents per loaf for the small plant to 7.49 
cents per loaf for the large plant, or a decrease of 1.25 cents (14 
percent). Under the same conditions, except for the use of automatic 
equipment rather than standard equipment, cost per pound 
decreased .67 cents (9 percent) from 7.12 cents for the small plant 
to 6.43 cents for the large plant. 
Thus, it can be concluded that under a variety of conditions 
economies of scale are considerable. Costs decline with each increase 
in size of plant, but at a decreasing rate. Additional increases in 
the size of a bread production line beyond 8,000 pounds per hour, 
however, do not result in significant increases in efficiency. A 10,000 
pounds-per-hour bread line, for example, has essentially the same 
per-pound costs as an 8,000 pounds-per-hour line. 
Under-Capacity Utilization of Plants 
Station Excess Capacity 
The technical organization of production extant in the bakery 
industry can still be characterized as a "batch process" or discon-
tinuous process of manufacturing. This combined with the perish-
ability of the product-in-process results in a critical relationship 
of output rates between machines or stations. With the exception of 
sweet goods in some plants, storage or stockpiling of partially fin-
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ished product between production stages is virtually impossible. 
Thus, sustainable output rate of the lines is in large part limited 
to the output rate of the lowest capacity machine or station on the 
line. Stations or machines with higher output capabilities simply 
run at under-capacity. There is a minimum of flexibility in a bread 
line for adjustment of a particular machine in terms of running 
longer hours to achieve fuller utilization of other machines. This is 
because once the bread production process is started, there must 
be continuous movement of product through the various stations 
until the baked bread is wrapped. Variations in time between opera-
tions must be kept to a minimum. Mixing time, for example, is 
crucial to a fraction of a minute. From mixing through fermenta-
tion, dividing, rounding, intermediate proofing, and panning there 
is very little opportunity for adjustment in production time. Once 
the bread has been panned and final proofing is in process, it must 
be baked before proofing goes too far. Baking time cannot be altered 
significantly; cooling proceeds only until the bread is at the proper 
temperature for slicing; and wrapping is combined with slicing to 
maintain freshness. Bakers typically install machines at each station 
with sufficient capacity so that the oven can be operated at close 
to its rated output. Hence, in practical operation of the plant, the 
speed of the production line is geared to oven capacity. With 
demand fixed, the baker sets the number of hours of oven operation 
that will meet that demand schedule. This means operation of from 
one to three shifts with varying amounts of overtime rather than 
adjustments of oven speed within the limited flexibility of the 
oven output rate. Since all other stations are usually geared to the 
output rate of the oven, all machines or stations usually have a 
rated capacity equal to, or greater than. that of the oven. 
The life of equipment at the different stations of the line varies, 
typically lasting 30 years or more without excessive maintenance 
cost due to wear. Significant disparity between machine capacities 
at stations develops through the process of replacement. Technical 
advance that raises both output per man hour and output per hour 
of operation does not occur simultaneously at stations. Replacement 
of equipment at a given station, whether the available equipment 
be more advanced technically or simply larger, poses a problem of 
station excess capacity owing to piecemeal replacement of equip-
ment in the normal course of events over a period of years. Under 
these conditions much equipment is commonly operated at some 
percent of its rated capacity. There are, however, some notable 
exceptions to the tendency toward excess capacity within plant 
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stations. Moulder-panners and slicer-wrappers, for examples, are 
sometimes operated in multiples in large plants. Use of the large 
oven and multiple machines at some stations allows closer matching 
of station machine capacities and, hence, more efficiency within 
station use of capital equipment. 
The implications for line or plant excess capacity which stem 
from the introduction of continuous mix into an existing plant 
may be dramatic. A continuous mix machine replaces six of the 
12 stations in the conventional bread line. Hence, with a given 
oven, a continuous-mix machine of sufficient capacity to utilize 
the oven fully will of necessity idle one-half of the existing produc-
tion line, in the event that conventional equipment is not discarded. 
In view of the apparent taste and texture difference between bread 
made by conventional mix and bread made by continuous mix, a 
firm is unlikely to adopt the latter process for its entire production. 
Assuming that the changeover to continuous mix is only partial 
(a realistic assumption particularly if the plant produces variety 
goods as well as bread), either the continuous mix equipment or 
the equivalent half of the conventional line will be idle at all times. 
Cyclical Excess Capacity 
The weekly cycle of consumers' grocery shopping habits in con-
junction with the perishability of bread seems currently to necessi-
tate a weekly cycle in bakery production schedules (Table 16). Thus, 
plant capacity adequate to supply the peak demand for bakery 
products on Saturday results in various lower levels of capacity 
utilization during the week. The most extreme deviation in demand 
occurs on Tuesday with an average demand output of 42 percent 
less than on Friday. It should be kept in mind that this figure is 
an arithmetic average for those plants that baked on Tuesday and 
Friday. Moreover, although average plant output on Sunday most 
closely approaches the weekly Friday peak level, it falls short of 
that peak by 22 percent. Thus, a daily variation in aggregate weekly 
production, or an index of daily variation, can be constructed. This 
allows capacity to be defined in terms of the cycle and the aggregate 
of weekly demand as they exist. The index of daily variation in 
production (Table 16) is applied to the model bakery plants (Figure 
2). The resulting estimated practical utilization of capacity at 
rated hourly output is 108 hours per week, or approximately 75 
percent of a full 144 hours per week (24 hours per day, 6 days per 
week) of physical production capacity. 
This type of cyclical excess capacity, or variation in daily output 
TABLE 16 
EmMATED DAILY VARIATION IN BREAD PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES OF WHOLESALE BAKERY PLANTS, UNITED SrATES, SECOND QUARTER, 1958 
Index of Daily DAILY VOLUMES FOR HOURLY OUTPUTS OF 
Daily Houn of 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 
Days Variation- Operation Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. 
Percent Hours Pounds Pounds Pounds Pounds 
Sunday 77.7 18.7 37,296 59,052 111,888 149,184 
Monday 74.1 17.8 35,568 56,316 106,704 142,272 
Tuesdayb 57.7 13.8 27,696 43,852 83,088 110,784 
Wednesday 67.7 16.2 32,496 51,452 97,488 129,984 
ThurSday 70.5 16.9 33,840 53,580 101,520 135,360 
Friday 100.0 24.0 48,000 76,000 144,000 192,000 
Total or average 74.6 107.4 214,848 340,176 644,544 859,392 
• Index of daily variation constructed as follows: Based on actual daily operating rates of 20 plants located throughout the U.S. Average daily output 
was greatest on Friday. assigned a value of 100, with other days assigned an index value as a percent of output on Friday. Since the range of variation be-
tween plants with respect to level of utilization of capacity within the week was large, from 0 to 113 percent of plant output on Friday, no statistical signifi-
cance can be attributed to the index of averall'e daily variation presented in Table 16. Consultation with informed sources, however, suggest it is representa-
tive of the wholesale sell'ment of the industry for the range of plant sizes considered. It compares favorably with expenditures for bakery products by day 
of the week in Fleischmann's Consumer Panel Report on Baked Food Purchases, 1955-57, Standard Brands, Inc. (New York, 1957). 



























62 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
rates within the week, is not generally subject to control within the 
bakery industry. The opportunity for bakery management to con-
trol cyclical excess capacity varies depending upon: (I) the channel 
of distribution, (2) the multiplicity of bakery products, (3) the size 
of firm, and (4) the development of efficient freezer storage. With 
respect to channel of distribution, control of the variation in daily 
output rates is very limited. The home delivery channel has most 
nearly approached uniform daily sales within the week, but home 
delivery has declined rapidly during the postwar years. Distribution 
to institutions and some kinds of restaurants often approaches uni-
form daily sales. However, such outlets usually take only a small 
part of the total output from anyone bakery plant. By far the 
largest segment of the industry distributes wholesale to grocery 
stores and the daily variation in output is controlled largely by 
the weekly cycle of consumer grocery purchasing. 
So much for within the baking industry proper. Grocery chains, 
integrated into the industry, have some opportunity for levelling 
out their bakery plant production because they are in complete 
control of retail shelf space. Production in the grocery chain bakery 
plant can be scheduled at a level below average weekly store sales, 
allowing wholesalers to fill in on peak demand days. This can be 
done by grocery chains that sell 80 to 90 percent of their private 
label bread and allow two or three wholesale bakers a small amount 
of shelf space throughout the week. As the grocery chain brand runs 
short on peak selling days, more wholesale bread can be brought 
from the stock room or two to three daily deliveries can be 
required of wholesale driver salesmen. As expected, wholesale bak-
eries distributing to grocery chains that control shelf space in this 
manner tend to have greater variation in daily output within the 
week. Wholesale plants distributing more than 5 percent but less 
than 20 percent of their weekly output to stores of grocery chains 
tend to have more plant output variation than either those selling 
less than 5 percent or more than 20 percent to grocery chains. In 
fact, some wholesale plants with more than 20 percent of their dis-
tribution through grocery chains close down their operations on 
Tuesday as a result of low grocery chain sales on Wednesday. 
There is a tendency for plants producing primarily bread and 
bread type rolls to have somewhat larger variation in daily output 
than plants producing a full line of breads, variety breads, sweet 
goods, cakes and cookies. This is because cookies, and some cakes 
and sweet goods, can be produced in the middle of the week on 
days of low bread demand. Also, within-the-week cold storage has 
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proved more practical for cakes and sweet goods than for bread 
owing to their smaller volume-to-value ratio. The success of efforts 
to control daily variation in production, through filling in with 
variety goods, and thereby increasing plant efficiency depends upon: 
(1) the ability of workers to shift from one function to another 
within the same shift, and (2) the joint use of some equipment with 
respect to diverse products. 
There is a tendency for medium and large sized plants to have 
a greater variation in daily output than small plants, which may be 
related in part to the multiplicity of products discussed above. 
There is some evidence also that multi-plant firms have experienced 
more daily variation in demand than single-plant firms. As a result, 
large multi-plant firms often can adjust production schedules of 
various products between plants in order to schedule longer runs 
at each plant. For example, a major multi-plant firm combines the 
Kansas City and Omaha market area and produces a specialty bread 
in one plant and rolls in the other, distributing both products to 
both markets. The trans-shipment of products between markets to 
improve plant utilization depends also upon plant locations and 
transportation costs. Moreover, it may be that some medium and 
large sized plants of multi-plant firms have greater variation in 
daily output partly because through trans-shipment one of a group 
of plants can be closed down completely on the lowest demand day. 
Control of the weekly variation in output, decreasing the 
attendant costs of excess plant capacity, is possible through the 
use of freezer storage on a weekly cycle basis.Is Whether this method 
of cost control decreases total per unit production cost depends upon 
the cost of excess capacity maintained in order to meet the peak of 
the weekly demand cycle vs. the cost of freezer operations necessary 
to level out the cycle. For a medium sized model plant using auto-
mated-batch equipment and operating a six day week, freezing of 
13. In addition to the decrease in production costs, marketing of frozen 
bread would result in the elimination of the cost of stale returns and there 
would be a substantial decrease in distribution costs. See Robert V. Enochian, 
Marketing Frozen Bread: A Preliminary Report, AMS-395, Market Development 
Research Division, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (August, 1960), p. 12. According to Enochian, " ... it has been estimated 
that the net cost of unsold bread returned to the baker-wholesaler by the retailer 
runs as high as 4.3 percent of the wholesale price valuation, or 2.1 percent of 
cost .... In either case, the cost of stales ... would be entirely eliminated." 
Also, under the assumption that bread could be marketed through frozen 
food channels, Enochian estimated that distribution costs could be decreased 
by two cents per pound from the current wholesale distribution costs (p. 5) 
largely due to the drop shipment method of distribution utilized 
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product hypothetically decreases production costs by approximately 
0.675 of a cent per pound, and also increases weekly plant capacity 
from 214,848 to 288,000 pounds (or 34 percent). This cost estimate 
was obtained by subtracting 25 percent of the 0.5 cents per loaf 
cost of freezing estimated by Enochian from the 0.8 cents per loaf 
cost saving estimated from our model plant cost data. We estimated 
25 percent of the 0.5 cents by Enochian because, only about 25 
percent of a plant's weekly output would need to be frozen in order 
to level out the weekly production cycle. For a large plant using 
automated-batch equipment and operating a six day week, there is 
no significant decrease in production costs due to freezing of prod-
uct. Plant capacity, however, increased from 859,392 pounds per 
week to 1,152,000 pounds per week (also 34 percent). Thus, for 
large scale plants, the output increasing potential of within-the-week 
frozen storage of product is more significant than its impact on unit 
production costs. However, very little freezing to level out weekly 
production cycles in wholesale baking currently occurs except in 
the case of some specialty products of retail bakers.14 
While a single plant or a single-plant firm may introduce excess 
machine capacity at either the station or the plant level through 
machinery replacement and adoption, a multi-plant firm has some 
opportunity to limit this inefficiency. Among a number of plants 
having a variety of lines with the attendant potential disparities of 
station capacity, the multi-plant firm can make inter-plant equip-
ment transfers so that station by station the equipment of a produc-
tion line is roughly of the same capacity. This possibility depends 
primarily, of course, upon the possibility of inter-plant demand 
sharing within a market, or the trans-shipment of special products 
between market areas. The advantage in the alleviation of excess 
capacity of the multi-plant firms over the single-plant firms, with 
demand remaining unchanged in both cases, may result from under-
utilizing the least efficient plant of the multi-plant firm. This would 
give the multi-plant firm an advantage through greater economy 
in variable costs-assuming that the multi-plant is able to idle old 
equipment rather than under-utilize the newer equipment. A single 
plant firm that has adopted some new equipment would probably 
be using the old equipment at capacity while a multi-plant firm may 
ship equipment between plants, or ship products between markets, 
and use the old equipment at under-capacity while using the newer 
equipment at closer to full capacity. 
14. Ibid., p. 7. 
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Secular Excess Capacity 
It is important to develop a logical explanation for the exist-
ance of secular or long-run excess capacity in the bakery industry 
and an empirical basis for analysis of its economic significance. The 
primary basis for the development of secular excess capacity is found 
in the nature of bakery equipment and its adoption; the proportion 
of variable to fixed costs; the economic organization of bread 
markets; and the relationship of consumer demand to population 
growth. Plant capacity estimates and average total cost curves for 
model plants provide an empirical basis for estimating the economic 
significance of secular excess capacity in the industry (see Figure 2). 
Postwar increases in distribution and selling costs resulted 
in pressure on bakery management to seek out ways to reduce pro-
duction costs. Since most individual bakery managers could not 
achieve this result through variation in the amount and quality of 
ingredients, or through an expanding volume of sales, the obvious 
alternative was to seek reduction in the production wage bill. The 
adoption of output-increasing labor-saving machinery occurred in 
direct response to the economic goal of reducing variable costs by 
a greater amount than the additional investment increased fixed 
costs. Innovations that virtually doubled the capacity of nearly all 
bread ovens in the nation induced bakery management to adopt 
other pieces of machinery with capacities of approximately twice the 
scale of the machines replaced. The cumulative result has been the 
replacement of a sufficient amount of equipment, on the basis of 
obsolescence rather than wear, to increase the aggregate capacity 
of bread plants at a phenomenal rate in the postwar years. 
By 1958, the best available evidence of plant utilization levels 
for the bakery industry as a whole was approximately 40-60 percent 
of practical capacity of durable production equipment. This assumes 
capacity is an operation averaging 24 hours daily, 300 days per 
year.15 This level of secular excess capacity in the bakery industry 
is an approximation based on the records of bakery machinery 
manufacturers, testimony of informed industrial sources, and exper-
ience in 30 bakeries surveyed and/or observed by the authors. 
A superior estimate of under-utilization of bread plants can be 
15. Seasonal demand for bakery products would apparently justify excess 
plant capacity of 3 percent currently and 6 percent if the industry were oper-
ated at capacity levels. The monthly Federal Reserve Board index of bakery 
industry production divided by the average annual index, 1953-58, ranged from 
a low of 96.5 percent in January to 102.4 in July. David A. Storey, Market 
Performance in the Perishable Bakery Products Industry, Purdue University 
Research Bulletin No. 734 (Lafayette: December, 1962), p. 30. 
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made from Census and Senate subcommittee data. The reported 
capacity of the 275 bread plants owned by the eight largest 
wholesale baking companies combined with the reported ca-
pacity of the 83 bread plants owned by the largest eight inte-
grated grocery chains together amounted to 12.2 billion pounds 
in 1958 (see Table 4). This was almost sufficient to supply the 13 
billion pounds of bread consumed in this country that year, based 
on a per capita consumption estimate of 75 pounds of bread and 
bread type rolls and a population of 175 million. In other words, 
the 1958 bread output of the rest of the industry about equaled the 
idle capacity of 358 bread plants operated by the largest eight whole-
sale baking companies combined with the largest eight integrated 
grocery chain bakeries. There are 1,353 bakeries which are 90 
percent or more specialized in the production of bread and bread 
type rolls. About all of the 995 plants owned by smaller companies 
than the above group could have been closed with no iII effects on 
the industry's capacity to supply consumer demands for bread and 
bread type rolls." On this basis, excess number of plants is estimated 
at 74 percent, and excess plant capacity is estimated at 60 percent. 
This understates the excess capacity of bread plants, because it 
includes only those plants specialized 90 percent or more in the 
production of bread and bread type rolls. There are in addition 
383 plants specialized 75-89 percent in the production of bread and 
bread type rolls, 729 plants specialized 51-74 percent in the produc-
tion of bread and bread type rolls, and an unknown number of 
plants classified primarily in the production of sweet goods, cakes, 
pies, etc., that also produce bread and bread type rolls. 
The economic significance of secular excess capacity in terms 
of production cost may be estimated by considering the per unit 
costs of bread production at various levels of model plant utiliza-
tion. Cost differentials between capacity operation and various levels 
of under-capacity utilization are sizable for each of the four model 
plant sizes considered. Per unit costs decline at a decreasing rate 
with each increase in the level of plant utilization until practical 
physical capacity is reached. Thereafter, per unit costs increase 
sharply. To determine the magnitude of this relationship the rate 
of plant utilization is varied from 108 hours per week to 36 hours 
• This is not stated as a recommendation that these plants should be 
dosed. Possible increase in delivery costs due to poor location of the remaining 
plants is not considered here. This is merely an illustration of long-run excess 
plant capacity in the industry. Possible reorganization of the industry to resolve 
the excess-capacity problem will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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per week under typical conditions which include daily variation 
in demand, no freezer storage of product, and the use of standard 
automated-batch bakery equipment. For the small plant, per unit 
costs increase from 9.1 cents per pound for a 108 hour week to 
11.7 cents per pound for a 36 hour week, or an increase of 2.6 cents 
(29 percent) for the range of utilization rates considered. For the 
large model plant, per unit costs increase from 7.7 cents per pound 
for a 108 hour week to 9.1 cents per pound for a 36 hour week, or 
an increase of 1.4 cents (18 percent) per pound. 
4 / Costs of Bread Distribution 
Thus far the analysis of bakery technology and costs has been 
limited to the production process. We shall now examine distribu-
tion and selling costs to complete the foundation for the analysis 
of industrial performance. 
Economic Functions ill Bread Distribution 
Although bread must be distributed and sold much the same as 
any other food product, its perishability, bulk, and inelasticity of 
demand create unique selling and distribution problems. Thus, a 
brief discussion of the various functions l involved in moving bread 
to the point of retail purchase may help to reveal the route distribu-
tion cost structure. The fairly distinct functions making up selling 
and distribution are: transportation, bearing the risk of product 
deterioration, display servicing, record keeping and collection of 
payment, and information and advertising. 
Bread is transported from the bakery to retail outlets (or in 
the case of home delivery, to the consumer) in large part by truck 
and to some extent by rail. Truck transport by large semi-trailers 
from the plant to the grocery chain dock has been on the increase 
but much of the industry's output still moves via smaller trucks 
to grocery stores. Time is the over-riding consideration in all delivery 
service because of the demand for fresh bread. Also, handling in 
transit must avoid crushing and damage to the wrapper. Another 
important distribution cost is risk of product deterioration. The 
unpredictability of through-the-week cyclical demand, combined 
with the perishability of bread, results in some loss in value through 
deterioration. Hence, wholesale price less salvage value of stales 
is a significant risk that must be borne at some point as a function 
of the distribution system. Daily servicing of bread racks and display 
1. A more definitive discussion of the functions performed by the various 
distribution channels can be found in Slater, op. cit., Chapter 5. 
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in retail outlets is performed by either the driver-salesmen or 
in-store labor. The consumer's desire for fresh bread and the 
perishability of the product make daily deliveries imperative; these 
necessitate a complete reorganization of the bread rack every day. 
In some cases the bread rack is attended throughout the day and in 
all cases stale items are either returned to the plant or marked 
down in price for in-store disposal. Record keeping and collection 
of payment are another important distribution cost. With daily 
delivery and the resulting typically small dollar volume delivery 
relative to grocery items in general, the labor time necessary for 
record keeping and collection of payment is significant on a per unit 
basis. Thus, although record keeping and collection are required 
just as much for other products as for bread, volume deliveries and 
end-of-month billing have greatly increased distribution efficiency 
for many other products, an opportunity that has been largely 
ignored in the case of bread distribution. The function of informa-
tion and advertising is much the same as with food products in 
general. There are, however, limits to the utility of bread advertis-
ing in the aggregate owing to the product's homogeneity and its 
inelasticity of demand. 
Nature of Distribution and Selling Costs 
The functions listed above can be further broken down into 
cost elements. Our discussion of distribution and selling costs will 
be limited to these cost factors that affect the economics of bread 
distribution. The costs of some of the above functions are joint 
costs while others are but a fraction of the total cost associated with 
a particular distribution function. Driver-salesman compensation, 
for example, is allocated jointly among driving, delivery, display 
servicing, and record keeping. Vehicle expense, on the other hand, 
is only part of the total cost of the transportation function. These 
examples illustrate the problems encountered in the analysis. Many 
of the costs are separable by accounting records while others require 
detailed labor-time studies. This investigation will draw from both 
accounting records and labor-time studies from secondary sources. 
Delivc:)ry vehicle expense consists primarily of gasoline, oil, 
grease, repairs, tires, and depreciation. These include both fixed 
and variable costs. Thus, total vehicle cost directly affects route 
efficiency. It is fixed with respect to size of drop, varies with length 
of route, and varies to some extent with aggergate sales per week. 
Driver compensation cost may be a straight hourly truck driver 
wage or a guaranteed minimum per week plus commission on all 
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sales with higher commission on the increases in dollar volume 
above given levels. Thus driver compensation costs mayor may not 
vary with volume per route-week depending upon the channel of 
distribution and union-management wage agreements. Also, driver 
compensation mayor may not vary with size of drop and length of 
route largely for the same reasons. 
Sales supervision, salaries, and expenses of the plant or firm 
are not directly incurred on the route. Consequently, their cost level 
is associated primarily with the number of routes and turnover in 
route delivery labor rather than per week route volume, size of drop, 
or length of route. Indirect selling costs, such as sales management 
salaries and expenses and also shipping clerk wages, are a part of 
general overhead costs of a firm. This type of cost varies, therefore, 
with the general policies of a firm and between the segments of the 
industry. However, these costs are fixed for a given route with 
respect to volume per route-week, size of drop, and length of route. 
Advertising costs are fixed with respect to a route and vary 
with the nature and composition of a given market as well as 
between the segments of the industry. Thus, the per loaf advertising 
cost decreases with an increase in route volume and with the level 
of output in a given plant. There are minor variations in the inten-
sity of advertising market by market. Of major significance, how-
ever, is the fact that advertising costs vary between industry segments 
or channels of distribution, with the largest cost differential exist-
ing between the wholesale baking group on the one hand and the 
integrated grocery chain and private label bakers on the other. 
Discounts and allowances are costs closely associated with the com--
position of a given market and the relative competitive position of 
a firm. Allowances may vary between firms or channels of distribu-
tion and usually are variable with respect to volume per route-week. 
Display servicing costs are either: (I) a part of driver-salesman com-
pensation and hence, fixed per loaf regardless of volume per route, 
size of drop, or length of route, or (2) an in-store labor cost fixed 
irrespective of volume per route-week, size of drop, or length of 
route. Thus, display servicing costs can be expected to vary with 
the method of distribution and with size of delivery. 
Changes in Relative Importance of Cost Factors 
in Wholesale Bread Distribution and Selling 
This section introduces the element of change into the discus-
sion of factor costs of bread distribution. This is an important 
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consideration because: (1) prices paid by consumers for bread are 
affected by changes in the costs of wholesale bread distribution 
(distribution costs increased faster than production costs in the 
postwar years and by 1958 accounted for more than half of the 
consumer bread dollar); and, (2) changes in specific factor costs have 
played an important role in shaping the organization and practices 
of the industry. Essentially, they reflect changes in scale of opera-
tions, in services rendered, and in merchandising practices employed. 
This section deals with the distribution costs of bread moving 
through the bakery wholesale channel only, which has been the 
predominant method of bread distribution in the postwar years. 
Omitted in this discussion are retail and home service bakery dis-
tribution as well as integrated grocery chain bakery and private 
label dock delivery operations. 
In 1947, approximately 25 cents of the consumer's bread dollar 
was paid for wholesale distribution, or three cents per pound of 
wholesale bakery bread sold through retail stores. This compares 
with a total distribution margin for bread from the bakery plant 
to the consumer of about 40 cents of the consumer's bread dollar 
or five cents per retail pound of bread. By 1958, the share of the 
consumer's bread dollar paid for wholesale distribution had 
increased to 35 cents or about seven cents per pound of wholesale 
bakery bread sold through retail stores. The total distribution mar-
gin for bread from the bakery door to the consumer increased to 
more than half of the consumer's bread dollar or to approximately 
ten cents per retail pound of wholesaler's bread sold. Thus, from 
1947 to 1958, an estimated 3.7 cents, or 55 percent, of the 6.8 cent 
increase in the retail price of a one-pound loaf of bread went for 
wholesale distribution and selling services, while only 1.2 cents, or 
approximately one-fifth went for retail grocery services. In total, 
distribution cost increases accounted for approximately 72 percent 
of the bread price increase for this period, compared with 1.9 cents, 
or 28 percent, of the increase going for bakery production and 
administrative overhead. 
Table 17 gives the estimated changes in relative importance of 
specific factor costs in wholesale bread distribution. Driver com-
pensation is the main rising cost contributing to the increase in 
the average retail price of bread in the postwar years. While it is 
evident from the table that all distribution costs have increased 
faster than has the average retail price of bread, increased delivery 
wages accounted for about one-third of the total postwar increase 
in wholesale distribution costs or margins. 
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Part of the increase in per unit costs of driver compensation 
reflects increased fringe benefits, higher commission rates, and mini-
mum guarantees won by the Teamsters Union. Average weekly 
earnings of bread salesmen increased by about 50 percent from $94 
in 1947 to about $140 in 1958, but this represents only 0.6 cents2 
of the 1.6 cent increase in the average cost of driver-salesman com-
pensation and fringe benefits per pound of bread sold (1.4 cents in 
1947 and 3.0 cents in 1958 as shown in Table 17). Even more 
important, from an efficiency standpoint, is the fact that volume of 
bread delivered per wholesale route and per wholesale route driver 
has decreased in the postwar years. Slater3 reported that while the 
TABLE 17 
ESTIMATED AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION AND SELLING COSTS OF THE WHOLESALE AND 
RETAIL FUNCTIONS, BREAD, UNITED STATES, 1947 AND 1958 
Average Costs per Pound Percentage of Retail 
Functions of Net Sales' Priceb 
1947 1958 1947 1958 
Cents Cents Percent Percent 
Driver compensation 
and fringe benefits 1.4 3.0 11.2 15.5 
Sales supervision salaries 
.24 .5 1.9 2.6 and expenses 
Shipping clerk salaries and 
miscellaneous expenses .26 .5 2.1 2.6 
Advertising, discounts and 
allowances .4 1.0 3.2 5.2 
Delivery vehicle eXfvenses .6 1.0 4.8 5.2 
Stale returns less sa vage .2 .8 1.6 4.1 
Total, wholesaling· 3.l 6.8 24.8 35.2 
Total, retailing" 1.9 3.1 15.2 16.1 
Total, wholesaling and 
retailing 5.0 9.9 40.0 51.3 
• One pound loaf of white bread. 
b Based on average retail prices published by Bureau of Labor Statistics of 12.5 cents per 
pound in 1947 and 19.3 cents per pound in 1958 . 
• Bakery wholesaling cost items are estimates derived from route cost summaries of medium 
to large sized bakeries. Hearing>, op. cit., pp. 6055. 6079--6085, 6579--6581, 658lHi594. Also see 
Table 29 for a comparison of these sources. 
d Spread between average retail and wholesale prices in urban areas published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and appears in Richard H. Long and V. John Brensike, "Market· 
ing Margins for White Bread," The Marketing and Transportation Situation (July, 1958). 
p. 18; and Developments in Marketing Spreads for Agricultural Production 1958, Agricul· 
tural Marketing Service Repon No. 316, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 
1959). p. 11. 
2. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. Calculation for 1947 based on reported average 
weekly bread route volume sold of 6,746 pounds. Calculation for 1958 based on 
the same route volume as 1947 to eliminate the effect of an actual decline in 
average route volume to 4.714 pounds by 1958. 
3. Slater. op. cit., pp. 352-354. Slater reported that by 1954 average volume 
per route declined to 72 percent of the 1945 level. His analysis was based on 
distribution data supplied by 12 large interstate baking companies on several 
thousand routes from 37 wholesale bread plants located through the U.S. 
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historic pattern in average volume (pounds) of bread handled per 
route increased from 1935 to a peak in 1945, there has been a down-
ward trend since then. By 1958, average volume per route declined 
to 70 percent of the 1947 level.4 Also, the conversion to a five-day 
work week in 1951 in many bakery markets, while bread continued 
to be delivered six days, resulted in the addition to the distribution 
payroll of a "swing man," working one day a week on each of five 
routes. Thus, the driver-salesman wage share was increased and 
divided among a larger number of delivery personnel while route 
volume continued to decline. Comparison of non-production labor 
input and output in the baking industry with the dairy, meat, 
canned and frozen foods, sugar, and grain mill products industries 
reveals that, from 1947 to 1957, baking was the only industry in 
which output per non-production employee and man-hour decreased 
during this period.5 
The second most important increase among distribution costs 
occurred in product deterioration commonly referred to as "stale 
returns." Stale returns less salvage value represented about one-
fourth of the total percentage increase in the wholesale distribution 
margin. Product deterioration is, in part, a production cost result-
ing from management's inability to predict daily sales, but it also 
reflects a shift to the selling expense of excessively large displays. The 
third most important increase in distribution costs occurred in 
advertising, discounts, and alllowances. These selling and product 
promotion expenses accounted for about one-fifth of the increase 
in distribution costs between the two base years. To a large extent, 
advertising costs have resulted from intensified efforts to differen-
tiate the branded bread product, while discounts and allowances 
are a payment to the grocer for the right to attract the consumer 
with grocery shelf display in an increasing struggle for share of 
markets. Postwar increases in sales supervision, shipping clerk, and 
miscellaneous distribution salaries and expenses only slightly 
exceeded percentage bread price increases, as did delivery vehicle 
expenses. Aggregated, these factors accounted for only 1.2 cents of the 
10.4 cents increase in the share of the consumer's bread dollar going 
for wholesale distribution and selling expenses. 
Route Factor Relationship and Distribution Efficiency 
This analysis of wholesale bread distribution costs will help 
us to compare the various channels of bread distribution, and also to 
4. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. 
5. Bright, op. cit., p. 19. 
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analyze market behavior. As will be shown, efficiency in wholesale 
bread distribution is primarily a function of volume per route-week, 
volume per delivery, and length of route. The principal per unit 
cost factors conditioned by these variables are driver-salesman labor 
and vehicle operating expenses. 
Volume Per Route-Week 
To develop relationships between route cost factors and efficiency 
in wholesale bread distribution, data were obtained on 490 routes, 
and the effect of route volume on per unit cost was estimated. 
Typical operating conditions and 1959 cost-price relationships were 
assumed. How costs varied with size of route is shown in Figure 3. 
Three characteristics of this relationship are particularly significant. 
First, an increase in the size of wholesale bread routes from $450 
to $1,500 sales per week was associated with a decline of approxi-
mately 5.5 cents per pound in route costs, excluding advertising 
and other non-route costs of distribution and selling. Second, unit 
costs declined with each increase in route sales, but at a decreasing 
rate. A 100 percent increase in size of wholesale bread routes (from 
$450 to $900 per week) was associated with a 50 percent decline 
in cost per pound, whereas, the second $450 increase (from $900 to 
$1,350 per week) was accompanied by a 25 percent decline; there-
after, the unit cost declines by 16 percent for the maximum size 
route considered. Unit cost might continue to decline for route 
volumes in excess of $1,600 per week, but would soon level off 
and conceivably increase. 
Third, the way factor costs vary with changes in weekly sales 
is significant. The cost that declined the most, 3.8 cents per pound, 
over the range of volumes considered, was driver compensation. 
This was due largely to the fact that most driver-salesmen were 
employed under contracts specifying a guaranteed minimum wage 
per week and a base pay plus commission on sales above a given 
level. See the appendix for an example of Teamsters Union con-
tract specifications. A significant proportion of driver-salesman cost 
was fixed for the lower route volumes while the proportion of vari-
able cost became more significant for the higher volumes. Vehicle 
operating expenses declined by a lesser amount, 1.7 cents per pound. 
This is associated with the allocation of fixed vehicle expenses over 
increased unit sales, but it is also related to the lower mileage 
traveled on the higher volume routes. The latter aspect of route 
factor costs will be considered in a subsequent section. Another 
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SoURCE: Five wholesale baking companies with plants in the Midwest and East reported on 
490 wholesale driver·salesman routes as follows: all routes were ranked on the basis of sales 
volume per week, and data were reported on the lowest volume route, the first quartile vol· 
ume route, the medium volume route, the third quartile volume route, and the highest vol· 
ume route. Solpe coefficients in all cases are significant at the I percent level. 
FIG. !I.-The effect of volume on per unit cost of truck and driver-salesman, 
wholesale bread routes, 1959. 
costs of distribution and selling-such as advertising, discounts and 
allowances, sales supervision salaries and expenses, and shipping 
clerk wages-are largely fixed per route-week. If added to the route 
cost curve, they would have a marked effect in increasing its ver-
tical slant. 
Volume per Delivery 
Data made available by the Economics of Distribution Founda-
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tion illustrate how labor efficiency varies with volume per delivery.6 
Loscher made route labor-time observations from which the effect 
of volume per delivery on labor efficiency can be estimated. She 
found that large volume stops were more efficiently served than 
small volume stops. Labor efficiency in terms of units delivered per 
minute increased with each increase in sales per delivery but at a 
decreasing rate. The first 100 percent increase in size of drop from 
$1 to $2 was associated with a 45 percent increase in labor efficiency; 
the second 100 percent increase from $2 to $4 was accompanied by 
a 33 percent increase in efficiency; the third 100 percent increase 
from $4 to $8 resulted in a 20 percent increase in labor efficiency; 
the fourth 100 percent increase from $8 to $16 was accompanied by 
a 13 percent increase in labor efficiency; thereafter increases in 
volume per delivery observed up to approximately $28 were accom-
panied by practically no change in labor efficiency. 
The average percentage of delivery time spent by driver-sales-
men in record keeping declined from about 50 percent to 20 percent 
from the smallest to largest delivery volume considered. Labor time 
devoted to physical handling of merchandise increased from 50 
percent to about 80 percent of total delivery time over the same 
range of delivery volumes, reflecting primarily an increase in aver-
age percent of delivery time spent in performance of the display 
function from 20 to 50 percent. 
Thus, it was observed that the record-keeping function became 
increasingly efficient over the range of delivery volumes considered, 
that delivery efficiency increased with size of drop, and then sta-
bilized at the highest volume observed. Efficiency in rearranging 
goods on the display shelf increased sharply from the lower to 
medium range of volumes delivered but declined slightly for the 
larger drops. These relationships are the closest approximations 
that can be made from the available information which is illustra-
6. Elan M. Loscher, An Analysis of the Job of Driver-Salesman, report sub-
mitted to the Economics of Distribution Foundation, Inc. (New York: October 17, 
1956), p. 6. Of particular relevance here is a case study of a typical New York 
City bread route which in August, 1956, experienced the following daily sales: 
Sales per Stop Number of Stops 
Less than $1.00 6 
$1.00 to $2.99 19 
$3.00 to $7.99 15 
$8.00 to $1l.99 3 
Over $12.00 4 
Total daily deliveries 
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tive of the general tendencies stated.7 Studies of milk delivery by 
Clarke and Bressler provide ready examples of comprehensive dis-
tribution analysis based on a large number of observations of route 
cost and volume relationships. Although the basis for analysis here 
is less extensive than that of the Clarke and Bressler studies, the 
logical implications for economies of route delivery are very much 
the same. 
Length of Route 
The remaining relationship to be considered with respect to 
the influence of route factors on wholesale bread distribution is how 
efficiency may be affected by changes in length of route. Two char-
acteristics of this relationship are of major importance. First~ truck 
operating expenses, owing to a high proportion of variable costs, 
are largely a function of number of miles driven.s Thus, when 
route mileage per week is allowed to vary from 200 miles (a city 
route) to 500 miles (a suburban route) to 1;000 miles (a rural route), 
with route sales per week held constant at 5,000 pounds, vehicle costs 
per pound increase from 0.61 cents for the city route to 1.04 cents 
for the suburban route to 1.75 cents for the rural route. Rising 
vehicle cost per pound delivered associated with increased length 
of route has implications for inefficiencies due to cross hauling and 
the location of bread plants. Hence, geographic expansion of whole-
sale bread routes will increase the total cost of bread distribution 
unless route volume can be increased at a rate sufficient to offset 
the rise (see Figure 3). 
Second, variation in the length of wholesale bread routes 
results in changes in driving time which, in turn, affect the amount 
of labor time available for servicing stores. Driver-salesman time 
is allocated primarily between the driving and servicing functions, 
exclusive of approximately 20 percent of labor time per week for 
loading and unloading merchandise at the plant, turning in receipts 
and the next day's order, and personal break time on the route. If 
7. See D. A. Clarke, Jr., Milk Delivery Costs and Volume Pricing Procedures in 
California, California Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 757 (Berkeley, 
December, 1956); and R. G. Bressler, Jr., City Milk Distribution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1952). 
8. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. These figures are averages for several thousand 
wholesale bread routes throughout the U.S. 
Total variable expenses 
Total fixed expenses 
Average size of routes 
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length of route is allowed to vary, as in the example above, weekly 
driving time increases from approximately 10 hours for the city 
route to 16.6 hours for the suburban route to 20 hours for the 
rural route. 
The amount of labor time spent in driving the delivery truck 
depends on the distance to be traveled and the rate of speed 
maintained. Speed, in turn, depends on such factors as traffic and 
road conditions. Obviously, rural routes with some driving on high 
speed highways achieve less driving time per mile than routes oper-
ating on congested city streets. 
Thus, in the calculation here, driver time for the city route is 
based on a speed of 20 miles per hour as roughly representative of 
city conditions, while for the suburban route it is based on 30 miles 
per hour, and the rural route on an average speed of 50 miles per 
hour. If labor time is held constant at 50 hours per week, then the 
time available for servicing stores declines from approximately 30 
hours for the city route to 23.4 hours for the suburban route to 20 
hours for the rural route. 
Hence, where average delivery time per customer is uniform 
for the three routes considered, the decline in total delivery time 
available would result in 22 percent fewer customers being served 
by the suburban route compared with the city route and 33 percent 
fewer customers served by the rural route compared with the 
city route. Also, under the same conditions, route sales per week 
would decline by similar proportions. 
Wholesale bread firms are to some degree able to avoid the 
effects of the required additional labor time for servicing stores 
that is associated with longer routes by off-loading the problem 
onto labor. This stems from the driver-salesman commission system 
of compensation in which delivery labor cost is a function of weekly 
sales volume and has little relation to the number of hours worked. 
In actual operations observed, driver-salesmen with longer routes 
tend to work longer hours. Thus, if length of route is allowed to vary 
as in the example above, while the amount of time for servicing 
stores is held constant at 30 hours, the driver of the city route works 
50 hours per week, the driver of the suburban route 56.6 hours 
per week, and the driver of the rural route 60 hours per week. There-
fore, despite a 20 percent increase in hours of work, and under the 
assumption that both routes have the same weekly sales, the rural 
route driver receives the same compensation as the city route driver. 
To sum up, the efficiency of wholesale route delivery is largely a 
function of driver-salesman labor and delivery truck costs as they 
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are related to economies of volume per route, volume per delivery, 
and length of route. Driver-salesman labor efficiency increases with 
both increases in volume per route and volume per delivery and, 
to a lesser extent, with decreases in route length. Truck operation 
efficiency by contrast is most closely associated with length and 
volume of route and is affected by size of drop only to the extent 
that size of drop is a function of route length and volume. In 
conclusion, there is an empirical basis for believing that distribution 
and selling costs will vary within and between channels of distribu-
tion according to route factor utilization and the extent of serv-
ices performed. 
Costs of Bread Distribution by Alternative Methods 
To the extent that the changing structure of the bakery industry 
is associated with changes in the competitive relationships between 
segments of the bread market, comparison of the cost of alternative 
distribution methods becomes of major importance. The compari-
sons presented as Table 18 may be used to estimate the relative 
efficiency of different distribution methods. Average total costs of 
bread distribution exhibit considerable variation between the three 
primary methods used by the industry. It must be recognized, how-
ever, that variation in average costs reflects different marketing 
functions performed and the size composition of route customers, 
as well as different efficiencies of the alternative distribution systems. 
In 1959, a sample of typical wholesale bakeries utilizing the driver-
salesman system of distribution experienced an average cost of 
6.8 cents per pound of bread delivered primarily to retail stores, 
while a sample of typical chain store owned bakeries and private 
label wholesalers using a semi-trailer dock delivery system had aver-
age distribution costs one-fourth as great, or about 1.5 cents per 
pound of bread delivered to retail stores. This compares with an 
average distribution cost of 14.7 cents per pound of bread delivered 
direct to the customer's door by a small sample of home service 
bakeries utilizing the driver-salesman system. 
The major difference between costs of wholesale and home serv-
ice bread distribution occurs in direct and indirect route labor. 
These costs are higher for home delivery, reflecting primarily the 
differences in bread volume handled per stop and per week. Prac-
tically all bread sold through home delivery is in lots valued at 
less than 50 cents, requiring an average of about four minutes per 
delivery. Thus, for a 50-hour week, route volume is limited to about 
$375 which, in turn, limits driver compensation to about $77. As 
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a result, the turnover in driver-salesmen is high, leading to higher 
supervisory and training expenses. Home delivery, on the other 
hand, avoids the retail grocery margin which averaged 3.1 cents per 
pound in 1958. The net result is an estimated difference in total 
cost of about 5.8 cents per pound for home delivery above that for 
wholesale bread distribution. 
TABLE 18 
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION COSTS PER POUND OF BREAD PRODUCTS SOLD, BY DISTRIBUTION 






Distribution costs, total 14.7 
Delivery vehicle expenses 1.2 
Driver compensation 8.0 
Sales supervIsion salaries, 
expenses 3.0 
Other distribution costs 2.5 
Advertising 0.5 
Stale return loss 
Shipping clerk salaries, 
expenses 
Indirect selling salaries, 























a Driver compensation and delivery vehicle expenses are a median of five house-ta-house 
routes in a lar~e Midwest market, 1959; advertising, supervisory and indirect salaries and ex-
penses are estimates based on Clayton D. Nielson, "An Analysis of the Door-to-Door SeIling 
Methods of Omar, Inc. for the Period 1951, 1952 and 1953," Master of Business Administra-
tion thesis, University of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1954). For example, sales supervision salaries 
and expenses includes: junior salesman, 2 percent; supervisor, 2.6 percent; and route admin ... 
istration, 6.2 percent; for a total of 10.8 percent of sales valued at 24 cents per pound. 
b These cost items are typical based on averalle data from: (I) 490 wholesale routes and 
(2) route cost summaries of 122 medium to larlle sized bakeries supplied by a national as-
sociation of bakers. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. 
C These items are estimates of typical semi-trailer dock delivery operations of chain store 
bakeries and supermarket private label operations of Wholesale bakers in large Midwestern 
markets, and are reasonably consistent with other data available. A chain store bread dis-
tribution cost study by the U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly reported 
costs of one cent per pound for delivery labor and truck expenses, which is the same as our 
estimates. The Senate study reported chain bread advertisinll costs of about 0.08 cents pel 
pound, but did not report display servicinll costs. Report, op. cit., p. 113. 
d Whatever costs are incurred from the discount and instore sale of day-old products are 
allocated as a cost of retailinll and compensated out of retail store margins. 
The major difference between the costs of wholesale and private 
label bread distribution reflects the different combinations of serv-
ices performed and the resulting level of efficiency of labor utiliza-
tion. Practically all bread sold at wholesale in the United States is 
tied to a "service package" that includes in-store and media adver-
tising, delivery and display handling, point of sale payment, and 
assumption of the risk of value loss through overstocking. 
Most private label bread, on the other hand, is delivered by semi-
trailer to grocery docks or warehouses from which point grocery 
management controls the remaining distribution functions. It is 
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handled and displayed by in-store workers, and when overstocked 
may be featured as a "special" within the store at marked-down 
prices. It is advertised jointly with 50 or more other food products. 
It is often ordered and paid for by mail through a general account-
ing system. 
The net result is an estimated total cost of more than five cents 
per pound more for wholesale than for private label bread distri-
bution. The implication is that organizing labor by function rather 
than by product, especially in large volume super markets, results 
in more efficient labor utilization. 
It is important to note that differences between the costs of 
wholesale and private label bread distribution reflect, in part, 
different size compositions of route customers served. Wholesale 
delivery labor requirements are higher because of the time required 
to provide the "service package" to a combination of: (1) a large 
number of small outlets such as small grocery stores, gasoline sta-
tions, drug stores, and dime stores, (2) supermarkets and grocery 
chains that carry 6-8 brands of bread on their shelves in addition 
to a private label brand that dominates total bread sales, and (3) 
a few medium-large outlets such as independent supermarkets where 
the wholesale brand may dominate total bread display and sales. 
While, in general, private label distribution has a cost advantage 
over wholesale distribution, the combination of both systems in one 
retail outlet may increase distribution cost above either system 
operating alone. Given that wholesale bakers operate on a rela-
tively steep average distribution cost curve, the replacement of a 
part of their sales in a particular retail outlet by private label 
bread would significantly increase wholesale distribution costs. Pri-
vate label delivery, on the other hand, operating on a relatively 
flatter average cost curve, may not lower its distribution cost enough 
to offset the increased cost experienced by wholesale bakers sup-
plying the same retail outlet. Thus, for a significant range of 
volumes, the combination of the two distribution systems in one 
retail outlet may prove more costly than either system alone. More-
over, in an outlet handling both private label and wholesale brands, 
the wholesale brands may also bear the production and distribution 
costs inherent in the weekly cycle of demand for bread discussed in 
Chapter 3, thereby subsidizing the decrease in costs for the private 
label operation. As above, the decrease in average cost per loaf for 
private label bread would probably not be sufficient to offset the 
increased costs experienced by the aggregate of wholesale brands. 
5 / Price and Nonprice Conduct 
of Firms in Bread Markets 
Since retail prices of bread have risen much faster in the past 
decade than those of other foods and indeed of all consumer prod-
ucts,! there is good reason to consider the conduct of firms in bread 
markets to see how it may have contributed to this development. 
Price Leadership in Large City Wholesale Markets 
Price leadership is the generally accepted practice in large-
city wholesale bread markets in the post World War II years. 
Executives of large wholesale baking companies freely testify to 
its prevalence. Company replies to a U.S. Senate investigation ques-
tionnaire regarding 1952-58 bread price changes in selected large-
city markets demonstrate its ubiquity. Uniform prices for whole-
saler brands are achieved by the leadership of either dominant or 
cost barometric firms. Price leadership tends to have results anal-
ogous to those of collusive price fixing, which is infrequently dis-
covered in bread pricing. Moreover, it is generally acceptable in 
the eyes of the law, whereas collusive price fixing has been held 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 
Price leadership can be inferred from the repeated occurrence 
of virtually simultaneous price increases of equal magnitude. For 
example, between 1953 and 1958, bread producers in Seattle, Wash-
ington, including two large companies, Continental and Langendorf, 
raised their prices simultaneously on five separate occasions.3 In 
New York City, on February II, 1957, the large companies, General, 
Ward, and Continental, raised their prices simultaneously. In 
1. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Agri-
culture presented in Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6093 If. 
2. Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market Practices (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 302. 
3. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6123. 
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Detroit, Michigan, in 1954 and again in 1956, wholesale baking 
companies including Continental and Ward raised their prices 
effective the same day. In San Francisco, on June 11, 1956, 
Continental raised the price of white bread and on August 13, 
1956, Langendorf and Campbell Taggard raised their price to 
approximately the same level as Continental. Again, on June 12, 
1958, Langendorf raised the price of a one-pound loaf from 17.8 
to 18.8 cents, followed the next day by Continental and Campbell 
Taggart.' 
Over the six year period from 1952-58, there were a total of 80 
price changes in 24 cities surveyed by a Senate subcommitte, and 
in only three instances did the large baking companies reduce prices 
of their principal brands of bread.5 In virtually every instance of 
change, all large baking companies adjusted their prices to the 
same level within four days of an increase by a price leader. The 
president of a large wholesale baking company testified at the Senate 
hearings that "we cannot get a penny more than our major com-
petitors."6 By and large, price competition occurs infrequently in 
large city markets and then often only under duress. A director of 
a large management affiliation of independent baking companies 
and a Massachusetts bakery operator testified before the Senate sub-
committee that bakery firms try not to compete on price.7 But this 
does not result in a uniform price for all bread sold in a given market 
owing to the increase in private label and secondary brands, 
although these also tend to sell at uniform though somewhat 
lower prices. 
Firms generally accept price leadership on the basis of an 
"identity of interest" in maintaining returns on investment and 
market shares rather than with the view of joint profit maximiza-
tion. In wholesale bread markets, sellers typically are few, but they 
differ in size, and they face the possibility of private label expan-
sion by grocery chains in markets with essentially static demand. 
Under these conditions, firms tend to practice uniform pricing 
and distribution costs tend to rise owing to non price competition 
for market shares. Members of the wholesale bakery oligopoly 
group recognize their mutual identity of interest and accept price 
leadership which results in periodic adjustment of price to cover 
4. Ibid., p. 6118. 
5. Report, op. cit., pp. I4~147. 
6. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6120. 
7. Ibid., p. 6540. 
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increasing costs and to achieve profit goals. In the vernacular of 
the trade, price followers raise price "to meet competition."8 
Thus, in the typical large city market, a price leadership pattern 
has emerged. The price at which most of the firms in the market 
offer to sell bread of like quality and weight is determined by 
adopting the price announced by one of their number.9 The role 
of price leader may rotate among the few but usually falls to the 
larger firms in the market. Smaller rivals generally follow for one 
of two reasons. First, they consider the larger companies better 
equipped to assess full costs and to frame a satisfactory price policy 
for the entire market group. Usually changes in average input 
prices occur simultaneously for all companies in the area, and the 
barometric price leader is thought to be watching weekly cost 
changes, both his own and those of his competitors. lO Second, 
dominant firm price leaders are followed because they are recog-
nized as having the greatest interest in preventing price cutting 
8. Although the phrase "to meet competition" is used by the " ... major 
baking companies [to] explain such practices as price discrimination, secret dis-
counts, stales clobbering," etc., it is " ... something more than a convenient 
explanation to offer persons outside the industry. Rather, it is so deeply ingrained 
in the industry's own price-making philosophy and operation that it is fre-
quently found in the interoffice working documents upon which decisions to 
change bread prices are based." It is most frequently used in connection with the 
justification of price increases. The following quote is illustrative: Memorandum 
from the Chicago regional office to the president of Continental Baking Co., 
dated February 23, 1959, "This is to advise that Interstate Baking Co. made 
the following changes in the wholesale prices of their bread products this morn-
ing .••• I recommend on our following bread products we meet this competitive 
increase . ... " [italics added] Report, op. cit., p. 148. 
9. For a discussion of this definition of price leadership, see Arthur F. Burns, 
The Decline of Competition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), pp. 7&-77. 
10. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6124. This analysis treats all baking companies as 
separate entities. A number of large wholesale companies have interlocking direc-
torates with each other and with potential suppliers of bakery inputs. An F.T.C. 
study of interlocking directors among the 1,000 largest manufacturing companies 
in the U.S. showed that Continental, General, American, Interstate, and Ward 
had direct or indirect ties with each other and/or with several suppliers of bakery 
inputs. For example, Continental interlocked with General through Marine Mid-
land Trust, with General Foods, National Biscuit, Standard Oil, and American 
Sugar Refining; and, with Swift (which produces shortening) through Underwood, 
and with Wilson (also produces cooking oil) through Guarantee Trust. General 
Baking Co. interlocked directly with National Sugar Refining and indirectly with 
National Dairy, American Sugar Refining, Anheuser-Busch, General Mills, and 
Best Foods. These ties provide channels for a meeting of minds among the 
top companies in the baking industry and with suppliers. It was reported that 
interlocking directorates were much more numerous than similar relations in any 
of the branches of the food industry previously studied. Federal Trade Com-
mission, Interlocking Directorates (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1951), pp. 64-711. 
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and they are the most able to enforce their policies upon others 
because they often command the greatest amount of productive 
capacity and financial resources. 
Price leadership, then, involves the selection of a price by a 
leader as opposed to the case in a purely competitive market where 
price would be determined by independent market forces. It is 
imperative that the price level be satisfactory to all members of the 
oligopoly group in order to forestall open price competition. Thus, 
the prevailing price level for a particular market area, as established 
by the actions of leader and followers, is derived largely through 
the application of the cost barometric or "cost covering" principle.· 
Costs are well known in the industry through trade and cooperative 
management associations that publish various informational and 
advisory material. Hence, a price leader is reasonably well supplied 
with information upon which to base changes in price based on 
changes in costs of firms participating in the oligopoly core.H 
Oligopolists naturally wish to protect their profit position even 
while competing for market shares. The maintenance of profit 
levels has had a special appeal for some members of the baking 
industry who are somewhat disadvantaged as compared with manu-
facturers at large. Further, the increasing level of excess capacity in 
the baking industry as a whole places most bakers in a vulnerable 
position with respect to the point at which they produce on their 
average total unit cost curve. Thus, the price level resulting from 
oligopoly pricing behavior is partially determined by the relative 
cost structures of the oligopolists within any single market. More-
over, when the aggregate industry level of analysis is considered, 
it is apparent that price is determined also by their recognition of 
mutual dependence on a broader level, market area by market area. 
While one might expect that the price chosen by the price leader 
would conform pretty closely to his production costs, there is con-
siderable evidence· that the price set acts more like an umbrella 
that will cover average unit costs of any members of the oligopoly 
group in the market, irrespective of plant size and utilization level 
of the price followers. The umbrella price is frequently set at a 
level to cover costs not only of the large baking company partici-
pants but also of any large independent bakeries with a sizable 
share of the market, which may be affiliated with one of the three 
bakery cooperative management groups in the industry. 
• See footnote 12 of this chapter. 
11. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6054, 6589--6594. 
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This type of price leadership arises from the fact that there are 
many combinations of market shares and plant sizes from market to 
market. For example, while company A may be the price leader in 
market I, because it has a substantial share of that market and 
as a consequence is producing with a large plant at a high level 
of utilization, it may face company B in market II under conditions 
such that size of plant, market share, and level of plant utilization 
by company B are far superior in that market to those of company 
A. Thus, the determination of price level by a price leader within 
any given market area may be largely in terms of the cost rela-
tionship between large multi-plant companies on the national 
level, with only the question of who is going to be the leader 
being determined, usually by share of market or concentration, 
within the area. 
Share of market and cost advantage within a market area not-
withstanding, leadership is sometimes provided by a major or 
an independent firm with a very small share of the market and/or 
high costS.12 This apparent contradiction to expected price behavior 
on theoretical grounds is partially explicable in terms of historic 
establishment of leadership, membership among the largest eight 
multi-plant companies, and demonstrated reliability of the firm 
in initiating price increases justified by rising costs, i.e., correctly 
gauging the price level desired by the various participants in 
the market. 
Once price leadership is established and prevailing prices are 
accepted by most producers, price leaders have little trouble keep-
ing other firms informed of price changes. The president of a large 
baking company testified before a Senate committee that prenotifica-
tion several days in advance of price change is required by grocery 
chains, which pass the information along to other bakery route men 
servicing the stores.IS Price change information is also made avail-
able by phone, mail, and at meetings.14 
12. While in many instances of price increases the advances have first 
been announced by the dominant firm in the market, in a surprising number 
of other cases the lead has been taken by companies with relatively low profit 
rates or relatively small shares of the markets in question. Perhaps the most 
conspicuous example among the largest eight bakeries in this respect has been 
Ward Baking Co. From 1955 to 1959, Ward's average annual rate of return on 
stockholders' investment has been the lowest in the group (6 percent). Six of 
the other large firms have shown average annual rates of return of from two 
to three times that of Ward (12-19 percent). Despite this, Ward has been a 
frequent price leader in the markets in which it sells. Report, op cit., p. 149. 
13. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6121. 
14. Report, op. cit., p. 159. 
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Most wholesale bread producers quickly adjust their prices to 
that of the price leader. There are sound bases in economics for 
their action. Most bakers have learned that they cannot materially 
increase their share of the aggregate volume of bread sales with an 
openly aggressive pricing policy because each price decrease is met 
with at least similar decreases by competitors. They are forced to 
go down with the leader when he drops his price if they are to main-
tain volume. Moreover, when the leader raises his price, they have 
good reason to follow suit. If the price rise was due to cost increases, 
the follower firms may need the higher price even more than 
the leader firm, which may be operating at a lower cost level. In 
addition, all firms stand to gain from increased revenue in the 
short run as aggregate sales remain substantially the same. If they 
do not follow, the price leader can simply drop his price again, 
and little has been gained or lost. 
Failure to follow the price leader would be interpreted by the 
leader and other firms in the market as "price competitive," and 
inconsistent with expected behavior. Open price competition may 
be avoided also to discourage consumers from shopping or buying 
on the basis of price. Oligopolists much prefer to persuade con-
sumers through advertising of product differences other than price 
and thus to keep their market shares undisturbed by price-induced 
shifts. Also, nonprice competition is preferred to price wars which 
might bring about distress selling, i.e., sales at prices below costs. 
In recent years, nonprice competition has been widely used as a 
pricing tactic. This includes changing loaf size, baking a secondary 
loaf, giving special allowances to grocery stores, and similar forms 
of price concession other than a downward change in price itself.15 
These competitive practices have the advantage that they can usually 
take place at the same time that price covers increasing costs. 
Differential Pricing in 
Outlying Wholesale Markets 
In the section above, wholesale bread pricing was approached 
from the viewpoint of typical behavior in large city markets. There 
are, however, several important subordinate cases. Paramount 
among these is the case of differential pricing behavior in the "out-
lying" or fringe areas of large city bread markets. Company replies 
to a U.S. Senate investigation of 1958 bread prices show a price 
differential of from 1-4 cents per pound between the large city and 
15. Ibid., pp. 66-90. 
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the outlying market areas served by large city plants.16 Figures 4 
through 8 Hlustrate five typical cases of this differential bread pric-
ing. These territorial price differentials are the result of the historic 
failure of large city companies to increase prices in outlying areas 
as much or as fast as they do in the city. 
In its effects, this has approached discriminatory price cutting, 
and it explains, in part, the increased concentration among large 
baking companies and the correlative decrease in the number of 
wholesale baking companies. It has the advantage of generally being 
considered legal, whereas, discriminatory price cutting has been held 
in violation of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman 
Act.17 It should be pointed out that the practice here described as 
differential pricing in outlying areas of large city wholesale bread 
markets was defined as "route price discrimination" by the Senate 
subcommittee report. IS In the course of the hearings, the persistent 
theme of the independent bakers was: "we feel it is unfair competi-
tion. It is an example of the profits of operation in one area financ-
ing the development of the invaded area."19 Equally persistent, more-
over, was the reply by major bakers: "If we want to do business in 
that area we have to do it at the lower price. We have to meet 
competition in that area."20 Apparently this defense has proved 
effective in recent years, for the case on record in which the Federal 
Trade Commission issued orders against territorial price discrimina-
tion by a bread producer was before World War II, and then not 
against a large baking company.21 
During the war, most outlying areas in small cities and rural 
communities located within 150 miles of large city markets had 
been dominated by smaller independent firms. With the end of 
World War II and the easing of distribution restrictions, major 
baking companies with plants in large cities looked with renewed 
interest upon the possibilities of expanding into these outlying 
16. Differential pricing "assumes its most striking form when the price 
charged at a distant community is lower than that charged at the plant where 
the bread is baked. This was found to be a very prevalent practice among the 
larger wholesale bakers .... " Ibid., p. 39. This finding is supported by extensive 
testimony of company management and is documented by market area maps with 
prices, plants, and mileage shown. Ibid., pp. 38-66. 
17. Corwin D. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law: A Review of Exper-
ience, The Brookings Institution (Washington, 1959), p. 458. 
18. Report, op. cit., p. 39. 
19. Ibid., p. 49. 
20. Ibid., P. 55. 
21. In the matter of Metz Brothers Baking Co., Sioux City, Docket 3740, 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, September 16, 1938. 
15. 
SoURCE: Hearings, p. 6167. 
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markets. The need for wider distribution consistent with the adop-
tion of new machinery of greater capacity inspired many of them 
to initiate semi-trailer delivery to depots set up in outlying areas 
some 150 miles from their large city plants. Driver-salesmen delivery 
systems operate out of these outlying depots much the same as in 
large cities. 
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In general, price behavior of large city firms entering an out-
lying area differs from their price behavior in large stable metro-
politan markets because their goals differ. Their objective in out-
lying areas is to capture substantial market share rather than to hold 
their own or to rely upon gradual accretion to their sales as popu-
lation increases in the metropolitan areas. It follows that outlying 
independents cannot all share in the identity of interest that 
typically exists in large city markets. Most independents in outlying 
market areas are in the position of attempting to hold their sales 
volume against the inroads of large city companies. 
When a major firm attempts to sell in an outlying area, it no 
longer faces the identity of interest typically shared by the oligopoly 
group in large city markets. For if price leadership had been exer-
cised in the outlying market previous to the large city firm's entry, 
it is doubtful that the market participants would be willing to 
recognize a new leader without serious price competition. Or, if 
there had been no price leadership previously, the firms in the out-
lying market probably would react by using price as a competitive 
weapon. Thus, although the dominant independents of an outlying 
market area mayor may not conform to the general picture of 
oligopolistic price behavior, when the area is entered by one or more 
large city companies, price may become one of the competitive 
tactics used. 
Differential prices in outlying market areas usually arise out 
of the refusal of large city companies to raise prices there as large 
city market prices are increased. Although there are a few notable 
examples of open and hidden price cutting by large city companies 
in the process of entering outlying areas, the typical case is pricing 
at a level "to meet competition" in the initial stage, and then 
refusing to participate in efforts to raise prices as costs increase. 
As a competitive tool of large city companies operating in outlying 
market areas, price is thus used almost exclusively in a negative 
sense. This is due, in part, to the expectation that independents 
may respond in kind to positive price actions. Moreover, the 
indirect price approach is not as questionable to the Federal 
Trade Commission. 
That large city baking companies seldom take the lead in 
lowering prices in outlying areas may be understandable in view 
of the propensity of independent bakers in these areas to initiate 
price decreases themselves. Many independents apparently believe 
they can preserve or improve their market shares only through 
price competition and, hence, do not pay strict attention to the rules 
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of the oligopolist's competitive game. Price competition is about 
the only tactic that is as freely available to the great majority of 
independent firms as to the large companies. They are prone to use 
it in last-ditch attempts to stay in the baking business. Moreover, 
they also have improved their plants through the adoption of 
volume-increasing equipment and need a larger market to maintain 
"economic" production. However, they are virtually foreclosed from 
entering the large city markets of the major companies, owing to 
the possibility of severe retaliation by them, as well as their access 
to advertising. 
An independent bakery in an outlying area can hardly persuade 
a sizable number of grocery retailers in the large city to accept a 
new unknown brand in preference to long established brands. 
Even if it did succeed in entering some large city outlets, they would 
probably be scattered, of small size, and hence uneconomic. More-
over, interviews by the authors with independent bakers in out-
lying areas of Midwest markets suggest that they cannot readily 
afford the discounts, free bread, and/or other concessions expected 
by the large city grocer, that might secure adequate shelf space in 
a sizable number of grocery outlets. Also, they believe the oligopoly 
group established in a large city market would take immediate 
action to forestall such an entry of new wholesaler brands. On the 
other hand, the independent baker in an outlying area can some-
times invade the large city area of the market by the use of private 
label contracts and drop shipment. Evidence presented later in this 
study shows that many small grocery chains have secured private 
label bread from outlying independent bakers when the oligopoly 
group in large city areas refused to supply it. 
The refusal of large city companies to raise prices in outlying 
areas to cover cost increases can only be enforced as a pricing tactic 
because they are relatively secure from retailiation above the 
single-market level, owing to the one-plant, one-market nature of 
most independent baking companies operating in these areas. 
Their security vis-a-vis the outlying independents is in marked con-
trast to their vulnerability in large city markets which are dominated 
by an oligopoly core of wholesale bakers. In the latter situation, the 
use of price tactics in one market is subject to retailiation in another 
market in which the same firms may meet and the relative positions 
with respect to scale efficiencies and market share may be reversed. 
A big company may gain in one large city market through price 
tactics but would lose through retaliatory price tactics in another 
one, so price is much less apt to be used in large cities than in out-
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lying markets by baking companies. The power to retailiate through 
price in another market is not usually available to independents 
operating in outlying market areas. Large city bakers are therefore 
not so reluctant to use price tactics in those outlying areas where 
they can do so with relative impunity. Price tactics can be effectively 
used to squeeze the profits of independents until they are forced to 
close, whereas market-share distribution in large city markets is 
determined almost entirely by non price tactics. 
Notwithstanding the economic facts of the matter, the practice 
of differential pricing, as described above, has thus far been suc-
cessfully defended by large multi-plant companies as not being 
"area price discrimination." It can be argued that differential pric-
ing reflects real cost differentials in marginal terms. The defense 
can rest on realized returns to scale in production, advertising, and 
other overhead costs;22 the relatively small increase in per unit costs 
of delivery over greater distances; and the assumption that bread 
produced for shipment to the outlying area is the marginal product. 
A price difference alone cannot be labeled discriminatory until a 
nondifference in costs is demonstrated; as Adelman suggests, buyer 
A in an outlying area may pay a lower price than B in a large city 
area of a market and yet be discriminated against.23 
Large city firms have a real incentive to extend their market. 
They want to expand sales enough to realize the returns to scale 
made possible by advances in baking technology. But the oligopo-
lis tic structure and behavior in large cities tends to foreclose their 
sales expansion there, so they naturally try to gain business in 
outlying areas. The Senate report presents data suggesting that 
refrigerated semi-trailer delivery of bread a distance of 50 miles 
costs about one-half cent per pound.24 When only this cost item is 
considered, it is apparent that its absorption by large city plants 
selling in outlying market areas offsets the locational advantages 
of small independents in these communities.25 But this overlooks 
the shape of the production cost schedule. Chapter 3 of this report 
shows that with production at some point less than optimum, the 
large city plant can be expected to produce additional products 
for distribution to outlying market areas at costs justifying a differ-
22. E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 72. 
23. M. A. Adelman, "Review of the 'Price Discrimination Law,' by Corwin 
D. Edwards," American Economic Review (September, 1960), pp. 790--795. 
24. Report, op. cit., p. 96. 
25. H. L. Purdy, M. L. Lindahl, and 'V. A. Carter, Corporate Concentration 
and Public Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 651. 
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ential price of some considerable magnitude. Whether a price differ-
ential of from 1-4 cents per pound, the range actually found in 
1958, or even greater differentials are justified, depends on a consid-
eration of advertising, and other overhead costs, and whether, as is 
assumed, the bread sold in outlying market areas is the marginal 
product of a plant. 
Although this assumption would be consistent with marginal 
economic analysis at the firm level, its use as a defense of differential 
pricing of bread in large city and outlying market areas may be 
questioned. As the Attorney General's committee to study the anti-
trust laws puts it, "the idea that the cost of serving a given buyer 
is less than that of serving other buyers, for no other reason than 
that this buyer's additional volume spreads the overhead, imputes 
arbitrarily to a particular buyer the savings of larger volume."26 
Adelman also suggests in this connection that the outlying area 
buyer might with equal logic have been considered the first buyer 
and have the whole overhead charged to him, as to be called the 
marginal buyer and have none of it imputed to him.2T 
Predatory Price Practices 
Collusive Price Fixing 
Collusive price fixing by direct and express agreement is infre-
quently discovered in bread markets. In so far as it exists, it is 
usually concealed because of its illegality under the antitrust 
laws. Nonetheless, there are several recent examples of litigation 
charging groups of wholesale bakery firms with violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In 1957, four companies failed to 
contest federal grand jury charges of "illegal combination and con-
spiracy to fix and maintain prices at which white, rye, and whole 
wheat bread would be sold to wholesale accounts in Oklahoma, 
North Texas, South Kansas and Southwest Missouri" markets.28 
Fines were imposed totaling $25,500. Also in 1957, five companies 
were indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to fix the whole-
sale price and terms of sale of bakery products in the Las Vegas, 
Nevada, market.29 
26. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the 
Antitrust Laws (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 334. 
27. M. A. Adelman, A&P: A Study in Price· Cost Behavior and Public 
Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 180. 
28. U.s. vs. General Baking Co., Continental Baking Co., Mead's Bakery, and 
Colonial Baking Co., a subsidiary of Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, et. al., 
Trade Regulation Reporter (New York: Commerce Clearing House). par. 66.305. 
29. U.S. vs. Continental Baking Co., Phoenix Bakery. Fisher Bakery, et. al., 
Trade Regulation Reporter (New York: Commerce Clearing House). par. 66,345. 
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In 1958, four companies with bakeries in Memphis, Tennessee, 
were found guilty by a U.S. district court of fixing the wholesale 
prices of bread, buns, and rolls, and policing the market ranging 
up to 150 miles from Memphis (with annual sales totaling $9 mil-
lion) to insure adherence to such prices.so Fines were imposed total-
ing $1l3,500. The case has since been appealed to a higher court 
and found in favor of the defendants. The ultimate outcome of 
the case is not resolved. 
Evidence submitted in the latter case suggests how enforcement 
of possibly collusive price agreements by major producers in large 
city markets may be applied to independent producers in outlying 
market areas.31 With the widespread invasion of outlying areas of 
bread markets by major baking companies, some outlying indepen-
dents come under considerable pressure to conform to the accepted 
price and non price competitive practices established in the large 
city areas of these markets. When price leadership in invaded areas 
proves ineffective, major companies may resort to collusive agree-
ment to hold price at the desired level while competition for out-
lying market share proceeds on a nonprice basis. 
Price Discrimination 
While the oligopolistic structure of sellers in most wholesale 
bread markets results in group efforts to avoid the full impact of 
open price competition, individual firms sometimes attempt to 
capture increased market share through price discrimination. In 
recent years, the Federal Trade Commission has brought several 
cases against medium and large sized baking companies for price 
discrimination not justified by cost differentials. This practice has 
been held in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
One example of bread price discrimination appeared in a recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decision.32 In September, 1948, a medium sized 
baking company with three plants cut its bread price in half (from 
14 to 7 cents a pound) in Santa Rosa, New Mexico, but did not 
reduce its bread prices in any other town in which it operated. 
The "discriminatory" price was continued for several months and 
as a result a small local bakery was forced to go out of business. 
The Supreme Court held that Section 2(a) of the Clayton Antitrust 
30. u.s. vs. Continental Baking Co., American Baking Co., Colonial Baking 
Co., a subsidiary of Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Hart's Bakery, et. al., 
Trade Regulation Reporter (New York: Commerce Clearing House), par. 66,345. 
31. From trial transcript as reported in Report, op. cit., pp. 161-162. 
32. Moore vs. Mead's Fine Bread, U.S. Supreme Court Decision, December 
6, 1954, 1951 Trade Cases (New York: Commerce Clearing House), par, 67,906. 
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Act and Section 3 of the Robinson Patman Act were violated and 
awarded treble damages amounting to $57,000. 
In 1958, one of the largest eight wholesale baking companies was 
ordered by the Federal Trade Commission to discontinue making 
discriminatory 5 percent price discounts to certain favored customers 
not made on a proportionately equal basis to other competing cus-
tomers.ss This practice had been initiated in East Coast markets 
in 1955. The defendant admitted all the facts of the case and the 
practice was held in violation of Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act 
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. In the same year, one 
of the largest baking companies was charged by the Federal Trade 
Commission with giving discriminatory price discounts amounting 
to 10 percent of established wholesale prices.84 The defendant also 
was accused of giving special promotional allowances of an addi-
tional 5 percent in a discriminatory manner. The Federal Trade 
Commission charged that neither of these discounts was made 
available to all competing customers on proportionately equal 
terms. There are several other Federal Trade Commission charges 
of price discrimination against wholesale baking firms that are 
still pending.35 
Price Cutting - -
Secondary and Private Label Bread 
Most retail grocers who can buy in large quantities-i.e., chains 
and affiliated groups of independents-stock two lines of bread. 
One consists of several wholesaler brands selling at uniform prices, 
and the second is a lower-priced line, offered at 1-10 cents per pound 
less. Except for the type of wrapper or other superficial difference 
between them, the two lines of bread are essentially identical. In 
selling the standard or "primary" loaf, wholesale baking companies 
depend upon extensive advertising for consumer acceptance, and 
upon driver-salesmen services combined with higher net retail 
margins for shelf position in grocery stores. The selling of the 
other bread also depends upon the reputation of the label and on 
33. In the matter of Ward Baking Co., Docket No. 6833, U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission, December 30, 1958. 
34. In the matter of William Freihofer Baking Co., Philadelphia, Federal 
Trade Commission Docket No. 7072, 1958 Trade Cases (New York: Commerce 
Clearing House), par. 27,080. 
35. For example see "FTC Charges Discount Deals Against Continental and 
Huber," Bakers' Weekly (November 9, 1959), p. 30; and, "Southern Bakeries 
Denies Charges of Price Discrimination by FTC," Bakers' Weekly (May 30, 1960), 
p. 16. 
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shelf location for consumer appeal, but has the added competitive 
advantage of a price differential. 
This advantage originally arose through the vertical integra-
tion of chain grocers into the baking industry. By baking bread in 
their own plants for sale in their retail stores, they were able to 
effect cost savings, which were at least partially passed on to the 
consumer. The smaller independent grocers, at first unable to meet 
this price competition, eventually joined together into buying 
groups to match the chains' purchasing power. These groups of 
affiliated independents then proceeded to obtain their own line of 
bread in one of two ways. Either they owned and operated a bakery, 
thus directly emulating some of the chains, or else they bought 
bread on a bid or specification basis under contract from wholesale 
bakers. The bread thus bought was not the regular wholesaler brand 
but was purchased in quantities large enough to effect economies 
reflected in a lower price. It was also wrapped under the retailer's 
label, thus avoiding all the advertising and other selling costs 
associated with the wholesaler's own brand. 
This "private label" bread has become increasingly popular in 
recent years. The proportion of total bread sales represented by 
standard wholesale brands has been on the decline in the post 
World War II period. In 1958, Slater36 estimated that about 25 
percent of total bread sales were private label, of which about 
two-fifths were produced in bread plants owned by vertically inte-
grated grocery chains (according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census). 
In an attempt to regain some of these lost sales, many wholesalers 
have introduced a secondary brand which sells at a somewhat lower 
price than their regular brand, though usually not as low as that 
of private label bread. No estimate of its sales are available, but it 
is believed to be much less important than private label bread. 
A 1959 survey of 43 markets located primarily in the Eastern, 
Southern, and Central Regions of the U.S. reveals that 20 markets 
offer both types, 12 have one or more private label brands but no 
secondary wholesaler brands, nine markets have a secondary brand 
but no private label brands, and only two markets have neither.87 
A 1958 survey of 54 bakeries affiliated with a large management 
group found that half the companies were producing either a pri-
vate label or secondary loaf of bread at prices averaging five cents 
36. Slater, op. cit., p. 23. 
37. Survey of Secondary and Private Label Bread-Selected Metropolitan 
Markets, Bakery Products Division, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (St. Louis, September 
I, 1959). 
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below wholesale prices of the primary loaf, representing 24 per-
cent of their volume.as 
When, as repeatedly happened in the early stages of the develop-
ment, the oligopoly group of baking companies in any given market 
area refuses to provide a secondary or private label bread at prices 
competitive with the large chain bread prices, grocery retailers 
frequently persuade a wholesale baking firm in an adjoining market 
to do so. The contracting bakeries can get into private label pro-
duction primarily because of the decrease in average costs of pro-
duction and distribution due to better utilization of facilities (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). A chain with five supermarkets in a city may 
have an annual bread account of over $200,000. A regional chain 
with 50 supermarkets could have an account of over $2,000,000. This 
is sufficient to entice bids from baking companies located up to 500 
miles from the grocery stores. With the resulting decrease in aver-
age cost due to increased output, the baking company could, in 
theory, lower the price of all the bread it sells. This would, however, 
directly alert and mobilize its competitors and market shares would 
very likely stay the same. The firm would gain some additional 
sales in the private label market but would lose by virtue of the 
lower price in its primary market. However, by maintaining the 
prevailing price level in the primary market and defining the con-
tract bread as the marginal product, the company can temporarily 
succeed in selling private label bread at a substantially lower price. 
This additional market can be held, however, only as long as the 
relevant competitors either remain unaware of it, as is quite 
unlikely, or are in no position to defend themselves through retalia-
tion. Typically, once a contracting bakery is in a secondary loaf 
or private label operation, bakeries ,in the invaded market suffering 
decreased market share: (1) retaliate with a secondary loaf or 
private label bread of their own, (2) set up a retail store handling 
day-old products (dumping station), or (3) cut price in the pri-
mary market. 
Price cutting by wholesale baking firms is perhaps the most 
important development that may follow the entry of one or more 
secondary or private label brands into a market at lower prices than 
those of the established wholesaler brands. When, for example, 
the Pan-O-Gold Bakery of Fort Dodge, Iowa, entered into private 
label contracts with the Hinky Dinky chain in Omaha and with 
the Super Valu Stores buyer group in Des Moines in 1958, it is 
reported that wholesale bakeries in the latter area, led by Campbell 
38. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6343. 
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Taggart and Continental, retaliated by reducing prices some four 
cents per pound on their standard or primary loaves in both the 
Des Moines and Fort Dodge areas.39 Of course, not all baking firms 
in both markets were fortunate enough to gain supplemental vol-
ume. Some lost a significant amount of market share, and their aver-
age unit costs of production and distribution increased. Aside from 
the possibility that some independents may quit the game via the 
merger route, this kind of situation is ripe for a general price 
increase for primary wholesaler brands in both areas to cover the 
higher unit costs of lower volume operation. In fact, by 1960, pri-
mary wholesale bread prices in these markets had risen to former 
levels and even higher.40 
Grocery Chain Bread Pricing Behavior 
Grocery chain bread pricing policy is a very important part of 
bread market behavior. The private label price policy of grocery 
chains affects the market structure and behavior of wholesale bread 
producers in two ways. First, the bakers have few alternatives to 
marketing an increasing share of their production through the 
grocery chains, many of which are integrated into bread production. 
By 1958, the ten largest grocery chains had about 27 percent of 
total retail food store sales. All were integrated into bread pro-
duction and, on the average, their private brands represented about 
40 percent of total bakery product sales in their stores.41 Second, 
there is a differential impact of vertical integration by grocery chains 
upon large vs. small wholesale baking companies. 
Grocery chains, in general, are accustomed to oligopolistic pric-
ing in their relationship to other grocery chains and, hence, tend 
nearly to conform with the price policies of the wholesale bakery 
oligopoly core. Of course, they are not subject to encroachment on 
their market share by wholesale bakers; their bread sales will 
expand naturally owing to the growth in chain store merchandising 
of all foods. Thus grocery chain firms generally do not need to price 
significantly below the major wholesale baking companies. They 
can increase market share over time and make substantial profits 
by keeping their prices close to wholesale bread prices in their 
markets. There are, however, important exceptions to the general 
case of price following, especially in the establishment of new stores, 
39. Ibid., p. 6127; also, Report, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
40. National Bread Price Survey, Bakery Products Division, Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc. (St. Louis, September I, 1960), p. 18. 
41. Calculated from sales data in Report, op. cit., p. 103; and Economic 
Inquiry into Food Marketing, op. cit., p. 30. 
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in the entry of grocery chains into new market areas, and less fre-
quently, in competition among grocery chains. 
Recent bread market behavior of grocery chains is based on 
their ability to exploit opportunities for technological and organiza-
tional changes in bread distribution. Shortly after World War I, the 
fast-growing grocery chains sought to secure quantity discount prices 
from wholesale baking companies consistent with the economies of 
large-volume deliveries and the elimination of special services to 
smaller stores. Also, in this period of rapid chain growth, many 
chains failed to follow the resale price maintenance policy of whole-
sale baking companies and used bread as a "price leader." By and 
large, bakers refused to sell to chains under such conditions. They 
were under pressure from non-chain grocers not to do so, and they 
faced the possibility that chain control of retail bread prices would 
tend to "weaken the wholesale price for bread."42 As a result, most 
large grocery chains integrated vertically into bread production. 
Two distinct bread marketing practices have emerged: (I) the 
curtailment and simplification of service associated with chain label 
bread. and (2) the policy of selling at lower prices than primary 
wholesale brands, thus allowing consumers some price-product alter-
native. These principal aspects of grocery chain price policy allow 
some variety with respect to marketing strategy such as utilizing 
bread as a promotional item or the establishment of a grocery chain 
as a price leader. 
In most markets, integrated grocery chains establish private label 
bread prices below prices of wholesale brands. Company replies to 
a U.S. Senate investigation questionnaire regarding 1958 bread 
prices in cities where one or more of the largest seven wholesale 
baking companies have plants show that integrated chain bread was 
generally retailed at prices of 15, 16, or 17 cents a pound.43 This 
was usually from two to five cents less than prevailing retail prices 
for wholesale brands. The differential ranged from 0.5 cents to 7.2 
cents per pound. Census data show the average difference between 
prices of integrated grocery and wholesale bakery brands in 1958 
was 3.3 cents per pound, or 17 percent, for the nation as a whole 
(Table 22). 
For representative markets, the price differential tends to be 
greatest in the Central and Northeastern U.S., and least in the 
42. A. C. Hoffman. Large·Scale Organization in the Food Industries, Mono-
graph No. !l5, Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Congress, !lrd Ses-
sion (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 47. 
43. Report, op. cit., p. 108. 
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South and West where the price of private label bread "follows" 
very closely price levels for wholesaler brands. "For the nation as 
a whole, the chains tore price is not the determinant price. The most 
that may be said is that the private label prices charged by grocery 
chains tend to establish a floor below which retail prices for the 
wholesalers' products, with some exceptions, do not fall. In the vast 
majority of markets, however, the retail prices of the principal 
wholesale bakers are primarily determined by factors other than 
chainstore private label price."44 The inference may be made that 
as long as only a few of the largest chains integrate into baking, a 
price differential of 3.3 cents per pound has little or no noticeable 
effect on wholesale bread prices nationally. Of course, for individual 
markets, and for greater differential prices, the effect may be sig-
nificant indeed, as will be discussed below. 
Price differentials of a few cents may be sufficient to achieve 
consumer acceptance of private label brands because wholesale 
bakeries have no alternative but to supply integrated grocery stores 
with wholesale brands under nonprice terms that are relatively 
unfavorable. These include adverse shelf location, stacking, and 
size of display, all of which tend to limit the sales of wholesale 
bakery brands in large chain stores. The extent of this exclusion 
varies considerably. For example, in 1958, A&P private label bread 
products represented 80-90 percent of total bread product sales 
in A&P stores.45 But this is a unique case. A&P is the second largest 
producer of bakery products as well as the largest food retailer. 
44. Ibid. 
45. These estimates are based on tabulation of value shipments by the bakery 
plants of the ten largest grocery chains, to which is added an average store 
markup of 17 percent; these are then compared with the 4-5 percent of total 
chain sales that are bakery products. The basic data are as follows: 
Value Shipments, Total Sales, 
Private Label Bread All Products 
(In millions of dollars) 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. $180.5 $ 5,095 
Safeway Stores, Inc. 33.9 2,225 
Kroger Co. 43.7 1,776 
American Stores 19.7 875 
National Tea 8.5 794 
Food Fair 2.l 734 
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. 8.1 666 
First National Stores 15.3 532 
Grand Union 0.7 504 
Colonial Stores 8.6 437 
Total $321.l $13,638 
Value shipments of private label bread from ibid., p. 103; total sales of grocery 
chain companies from Federal Trade Commission, op cit., p. 76. 
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Safeway Stores and National Tea are more typical of the ten largest 
grocery chains, as a whole, in that private label products are about 
40 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of total bread product sales 
in their stores. 
Table 5 compares the percentage of consumers who buy brands 
of the major wholesale baking companies with the percentage who 
buy brands of grocery chains in 27 large city markets. In over three-
fourths of the markets, chains tore brands account for less than 10 
percent of consumer preferences.46 There are indications that several 
of the largest grocery chains may have reached the upper limit to 
the restriction of wholesale brands from sales in their stores. With 
wholesale brands in their stores, they can off-load some of the inven-
tory and production problem associated with heavy week-end 
demand onto wholesale baking companies. Moreover, through the 
acquisition and construction of new stores, they have gained a 
greater share of total grocery sales, including bread, and have thus 
achieved fuller utilization of existing plants. 
On occasion, integrated grocery chains have temporarily set 
their private label bread prices at a level far below those of whole-
saler brands, resulting in a differential much wider than normal. 
Company replies to a U.S. Senate investigation of retail bread 
prices by the ten largest grocery chains between July 1, 1958, and 
June 30, 1959, revealed 290 cases of special sales in one or more 
stores at prices of ten cents or less.47 
In order of size of grocery sales, the ten largest grocery chains 
reported the following number of bread sales at ten cents per pound 
or less: A&P, 60; Safeway, 76; Kroger, 104; American Stores, none; 
National Tea, 5; Food Fair, none; Winn-Dixie, 28; First National, 
none; Colonial Stores, 4; and Grand Union, 3. These promotional 
prices were usually less than half the prevailing retail price of 
wholesale brands in the market areas involved. They were usually 
continued for three to six days and were confined to chain stores 
located in one or two cities at a time. 
Cut-rate bread sales in some markets, however, continued for 
nine months and one large chain held simultaneous sales through-
46. In none of the 27 areas did market share of all reported chain store 
brands equal the preference for the brands produced by the single leading major 
wholesale baking company. In only one city was the leading grocery chain bread 
preferred by half as many consumers as the brands produced by the leading 
wholesale baking company. In 19 of the 27 communities, at least five times 
as many consumers preferred the leading wholesale company's bread to the 
leading chain store brand. Ibid., pp. 105-107. 
47. Ibid., pp. 115-118. 
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out all its stores. Three of the ten largest grocery chains reported 
no instances of bread sales of ten cents per pound or less, and 279 
of the cases were reported by four chains including the three largest, 
A&P, Safeway and Kroger, and one of the fastest growing, now 
seventh largest chain, Winn-Dixie. The latter four companies have 
used "price leader" bread sales regularly to build store traffic in 
those areas in which much of their recent expansion has taken place. 
However, no bread sales of ten cents per pound or less were reported 
in regions west of the Rocky Mountains. 
As long as this practice occurs infrequently and briefly and is 
restricted to a few markets, its effects on major wholesale bakers 
with plants in a number of states may not be severe. The large 
multi-plant wholesalers apparently can absorb temporary losses in 
markets affected by these promotions by offsetting them with profits 
in other markets where chains abstain from such practices. An 
important point is that integrated grocery chains can set bread 
prices relative to input costs such that single-market whole-
sale baking companies are squeezed and will operate with a 
minimal profit or a loss, while the integrated, multi-market grocery 
chains, who produce and deliver their own private label bread at 
average costs below those of the non-integrated firms, can at the 
same time prosper. 
Non-Price Competition in Bread Markets 
The primary competition between wholesale baking companies 
distributing bread to grocery stores is on a non price basis. Instead 
of price competition, the usual market conduct pattern seeks 
improvement in the consumer franchise of individual wholesale 
brands by preferential product display in retail outlets, product 
advertising and promotion, and variation in product. In contrast to 
their pricing behavior, these oligopolists apparently do not achieve 
spontaneous coordination of their non price practices.48 Independent 
action is preferred if it is expected to achieve advantages that are 
unlikely to be matched in the short run, if at all, by other wholesale 
baking companies. Thus, the nonprice conduct of firms in bread 
markets closely conforms to the theory of monopolistic competi-
tion.49 These non price practices have two principal results: (1) they 
alter the relative competitive strength of small and large baking 
companies, and (2) they create a cost-push effect on prices. The 
48. Weston, op. cit., p. 109; also Fellner, op. cit., p. vi. 
49. Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cam. 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 
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concept of "cost push" as used here refers to the tendency toward 
rising costs resulting from the various non price practices in distribu-
tion and selling, as well as from capital investment in new equip-
ment, which is not used efficiently. These rising costs can be tolerated 
under the protective cover of cost barometric price leadership in 
bread markets, discussed above. The basic factors contributing to 
rising costs and prices in bread markets are very difficult for anyone 
firm to control, but it should be noted that they are primarily 
endogenous to the industry. 
Product Display 
Perhaps the most widely used and significant non price practices 
in wholesale bread markets in the postwar years have been the 
various tactics of firms to win favored display positions for their 
brands in retail outlets. Under the umbrella of cost barometric 
pricing, firms resort to the purchase of rack position with cash,5o or 
in lieu of cash give free bread, building improvements (such as dis-
play racks, counters, signs, new floors, paint, etc.), special entertain-
ment (such as travel and tickets for shows and sports events), and 
management service (such as consultation on store layout, account-
ing, tax study and so forth). They also try to dominate display 
shelves with "massed displays."5l The term "massed display" is 
defined as the overloading of display space in retail outlets beyond 
expected sales. Its purpose is to appeal to consumers through what 
has been colorfully termed "pile psychology."52 It is utilized for this 
purpose by grocery chains with private label bread, and by driver-
salesmen with wholesaler brands, to gain or maintain preferential 
shelf space in retail outlets. 
The bread industry came out of World War II with government 
controls over some market practices. Under the ,\Var Food Admin-
istration the consignment of bakery products to grocery stores and 
the removal of day-old products were prohibited. With the end of 
50. An example of buying out distributive shelf display is provided by the 
president of an independent bakery in Lincoln, Nebraska, who submitted a sworn 
affidavit to the House Committee on Small Business dated November 3, 1955. 
Affiant stated that at Sutton, Nebr., in October, 1955, Colonial Baking Co. of 
Des Moines, Iowa (an affiliate of Campbell Taggart), paid Oscar Griess Grocery 
Store $50 worth of bread free and as a result Wendelin Baking Co. was elimi· 
nated as a seller of bread in the store. House Committee on Small Business, 
Price Discrimination, The Robinson-Patman Act and Related Matters, Part 1, 
84th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), 
p.370. 
51. For a discussion of other similar practices, see Report, op. cit., pp. 67-84. 
52. Ibid., p. 69. 
108 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
controls in 1946, consignment selling was again introduced by 
wholesale bread producers. Consignment selling facilitates the domi-
nation of distribution outlets by firms who overload limited display 
shelves with their bread, and thus force competitors to accept dis-
advantageous display space. Largely as a result of this form of 
nonprice competition, average costs of "stale return" loss increased 
from 1947-58 at a rate second only to distribution labor costs (see 
Chapter 4). The percentage of bread returns to route sales increased 
from 1.3 percent in 1947 to 7.4 percent in 1958, for a sample of 105 
baking companies affiliated with a management cooperative. Even 
though a small part of this was recovered through sales of "day 
old" product, the remaining loss rose from 1.1 percent of sales in 
1947 to 4.8 percent of sales in 1958.53 
This experience is typical of the industry as a whole. Moreover, 
in a specific case of retaliatory overloading of grocery bread dis-
play in a single midwestern market, "stale return" loss of a medium-
large single-plant baking company almost doubled in four years, 
increasing from 4.9 percent of sales in 1954 to 9.5 percent of sales 
in 1957.54 A careful study of the stale bread problem in the baking 
industry estimated that net loss from stale bread in the 1920's 
averaged about 2.5 to 3 percent of sales.55 It concluded that a stale 
loss not in excess of 0.5 to I percent of production is an attainable 
standard in wholesale bread markets. 
When effective, these nonprice competitive tactics can result 
in making grocery outlets no longer available on equal terms to all 
wholesale baking firms in a market. When non price concessions are 
given in the form of merchandise and services which have indefinite 
value, it is difficult for grocers and competing bakers to tell which 
company is offering the best deal. This tends to facilitate the 
intended result of dominating distributive outlets. However, while 
various non price tactics may be introduced by one firm as offense 
weapons, they are almost invariably adopted by others as defense 
weapons. 
The introduction of one or more of these tactics into a market 
rarely goes unnoticed by competitors but is adopted or matched 
in value by all. When this happens they typically neutralize each 
other and no single firm is better off than before, while all have 
experienced increased costs. Higher costs may be more difficult to 
53. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6593. 
54. Report, op. cit., p. 71. 
55. J. S. Davis and Wilfred Eldred, Stale Bread Loss as a Problem Of the 
Baking Industry, Publication No.1, Food Research Institute, Stanford Uni-
versity (California, February, 1923), p. 7. 
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bear for independent firms in competition with one or more large 
firms in the outlying area of a market. Moreover, by their nature, 
some nonprice tactics, e.g., buying up shelf space, foreclose the 
possibility of adoption by rivals. Thus, nonprice practices as well 
as overt price policies are effective in the extension into outlying 
markets by large companies and the corollary demise of smaller 
firms. 
Advertising 
Among the food industries, baking was one of the first,56 and is 
today one of the foremost, users of advertising. In the postwar years, 
the ratio of advertising to sales has been about a third higher for 
baking corporations than for all corporate manufacturers of food 
products. In absolute terms, bakery corporations' advertising 
expenditures have been increasing faster than those of all food cor-
porations but their sales have not responded in kind, so that relative 
to sales, the increase has been roughly the same for both. According 
to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, corporate food processors 
spent 1.1 percent of their sales on advertising in 1947 and 2.0 percent 
in 1957. By comparison, advertising expenses of bakery corpora-
tions represented 1.6 percent of their sales in 1947 and 2.8 percent 
in 1957. Or, to look at it another way, the bakers' share of all food 
corporation advertising rose from 12.1 percent to 14.6 percent in 
the ten-year period. 57 Since food processors are generally heavier 
advertisers than other manufacturers, these results would be even 
more dramatic were the comparison drawn between bakery adver-
tising and that of non-food manufacturers. 
Wholesale bakers do virtually all the advertising in the bakery 
industry. Among these companies, the ratio of advertising to sales 
varies considerably and is inversely associated with size of firm.58 
In 1958, the four largest bakers spent $32.8 million on advertising, 
or about 4 percent of their sales, a ratio more than two-thirds higher 
than the industry average. By comparison, independent wholesale 
56. E. J. Sperry, "65 Years of Bakery Advertising," Baking Industry Magazine 
(April 12, 1952), pp. 149-150. 
57. Data for food firms from U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of 
Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1947-58 and 1957-58. Data for bakery 
firms from U.S. Agricultural Marketing Service, AMS 399, Advertising Expendi-
tures by Food ManUfacturing Corporations, 1947-57, by Roberta Lamb (re-
printed from The Marketing and Transportation Situation, July, 1960). 
58. There is one major exception: the largest wholesale baking company 
spent about 5 percent of sales on advertising; the remaining members of the 
big four and big eight wholesale bakery groups spent approximately 3 percent 
of their sales on advertising. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6055, 6062, 658()"{)581. 
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bakeries affiliated with the three largest management cooperatives 
spent about $25 million, or 4.4 percent of sales. Although complete 
data on advertising expenditures by small unaffiliated wholesale 
bakeries are not available, one document indicates that, for a limited 
sample of such firms, they amount to about 5.2 percent of sales, or 
close to a third more than the big four. 59 These relationships sug-
gest that media advertising is one form of competition where the 
larger firms can achieve economies of scale not likely to be matched 
in the short run, if at all, by smaller rivals. Of course, there are 
occasional exceptions to this rule where a smaller firm, in attempting 
to insulate its market from larger competitors, will engage in heavy 
advertising relative to its sales. 
Since wholesale baking companies account for practically all 
advertising by the baking industry, it is clear that house-to-house 
and multi-unit retail baking companies use other means to isolate 
their markets. These include special service in the case of house-to-
house delivery. Multi-unit retail bakeries use a differentiated prod-
uct, location, and service. All of these involve selling costs which, 
as suggested by the theory of monopolistic competition, are incurred 
primarily to secure a degree of market isolation, i.e., protection 
from cross elasticity of demand. 
Evidence of private label selling expenditures by the ten largest 
chain store bread producers indicates advertising expenditures in 
1958 amounted to about $1.2 million or less than one percent (0.68) 
of their bread sales.60 This ratio was one-fourth of the industry 
average, and about one-sixth of that of the largest four wholesale 
baking companies. Lower advertising expense for private label bread 
reflects, in part, lesser total advertising effort, in part economies of 
joint-product advertising of about 50 store items with bread in 
newspaper ads, and in part, the tendency to advertise the chain name 
rather than specific food items. Moreover, to the extent that con-
ventional bread advertising is intended to influence the managers 
of grocery stores as well as consumers, advertising is of less impor-
tance to private label bread producers. Retailers of private label 
bread have complete control of their own shelf space and it is to 
their advantage to sell as much of their own label as possible. Hence, 
they need not be convinced through advertising by the contracting 
bakery company. As the baker of private label bread secures his 
retailer demand through contract, his selling costs, including adver-
tising, are unnecessary. 
59. Ibid., p. 6092. 
60. Report, op. cit., pp. 113-114. 
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Advertising is one of the most obvious forms of bread promo-
tion. It usually includes expenditures on television, radio, maga-
zines, newspapers, and billboards. In addition to these, sales promo-
tion policy may include: "consumer deals, premiums, coupon offers, 
menu-related item promotions, contests, sample and demonstration 
programs, special displays, various trade deals, and special promo-
tion associated with the introduction of new products."61 Estimates 
of the costs of non-advertising promotion practices are not available 
for the bakery industry. But it is not unreasonable to expect that 
for many large wholesale baking companies these costs are as great 
or greater than advertising expenses. To an increasing extent, sub-
sidization of grocery store outlets with in-store facility and promo-
tional allowances is becoming a major instrument of sales promotion 
policy. While costs of in-store facilities are usually hidden in broad 
ill-defined categories of a firm's operating statement, there is evi-
dence that promotional allowances to chain stores amounting 
to 3-5 percent of sales are not uncommon. 62 Thus they fre-
quently double the promotion expenditure on bread sold through 
these stores. 
In its early days, advertising undoubtedly performed an infor-
mational function that helped to expand the market for bakery 
bread relative to that baked at home. Through advertising, con-
sumers were made aware of the existence and the convenience of 
this new form of mass-produced, wrapped bread. By the end of 
World War II, however, commercially produced bread was an 
established and well known staple of the American diet. It is 
doubtful that bread advertising has contributed significantly to 
any further increase in the aggregate demand for bread. 
In the postwar years, the purpose of bread advertising has shifted 
to influencing the distribution of total bread sales among wholesale 
baking companies. Bread advertising is increasingly aimed at per-
suading rather than informing the consumer. Criticism of recent 
advertising appeals to unreal or even harmful values has come from 
the Federal Trade Commission.63 In 1954, the largest baking com-
pany was ordered to discontinue advertising: 
(I) that Wonder Bread restored normal growth processes in 
physically retarded children; 
61. Sidney Hoos, "The Advertising and Promotion of Farm Products-Some 
Theoretical Issues," Journal of Farm Economics (May, 1959), p. 355. 
62. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6344, 6641-6651. 
63. In the matter of Continental Baking Co., Inc., Stipulation No. 8553, u.S. 
Federal Trade Commission, October 5, 1954. 
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(2) that any amount of Wonder Bread consumed daily is a nutri-
tional substitute for other foods having a greater total 
nutritional value; 
(3) that Wonder Bread improves a child's appetite for other 
foods; etc. 
In 1952 a West Coast baking company was ordered to stop adver-
tising that its breads produced "better complexions or a smoother, 
more beautiful skin, or contributed to the health except to the 
extent that they may contribute to the prevention of the develop-
ment of those conditions which may be due to deficiencies of vita-
mins and minerals."64 
Numerous other examples of "misleading advertising" of bread 
are found in Federal Trade Commission actions. Perhaps the most 
frequent are stipulations and complaints against low-calorie bread 
promoters who say directly or by implication that as part of a diet 
this bread will enable the consumer to lose weight or will prevent 
the gaining of weight. Typical of such advertisements: 
"When a woman's PANTHER SLIM 
[picture of Elizabeth Taylor and panther 
with basket of bread in his mouth] 
... she's vital as well as slender. A good 
figure is more than luck when a lady watches 
her weight the famous HOLLYWOOD WAY. HOLLYWOOD 
BREAD is high in protein, vitamins and minerals, 
yet has only 46 calories per 18 gram slice."65 
The Federal Trade Commission has brought complaints against 
scores of diet bread advertisers, and all except three have agreed 
to discontinue the low-calorie theme.66 Lite Diet Bread (Bakers' 
Franchise Corporation), Hollywood Bread (National Bakers Service, 
Inc.), and Slender-Way (Safeway Stores) admit that, on an ingredient 
basis, the difference between diet bread and regular bread is not 
significant, but they argue that through thinner slices and smaller, 
lighter loaves, diet bread has fewer calories per slice. If the consumer 
is misled, they say, it is because of his long-standing misconception 
that regular bread is fattening. 
Product Variation 
There is considerable evidence that product variation policy is 
a significant aspect of firm behavior in bread markets, both in its 
64. In the matter of Silver Leaf Baking Co., Spokane, Washington, Stipula-
tion 8306, U.S. Federal Trade Commsision, August 26, 1952. 
65. In the matter of National Bakers Services, Inc., Docket No. 7480, U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission, April 30, 1959. 
66. Baking Industry Magazine (August 6, 1960), p. 69. 
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impact on costs and on the competitive relationship between bakery 
firms. Product variation can be defined as the "periodic alteration 
of products, of the sort not necessarily identifiable as improvements, 
in order to stimulate a consumer demand."67 
The regular introduction of superficial product and packaging 
changes in variety breads, or diet breads, or of "new" loaves of 
white bread exemplify this policy. On the individual firm level, 
product variation has a rational basis in recent studies of consumer 
behavior. Engle, for example, found that bread consumers tend to 
shift their brand or product loyalties every three to five years, 
reflecting a sense of monotony and a desire for something new or 
different.68 He urged baking companies, as a matter of policy, to 
adopt rates of product variation and selling outlays consistent with 
the noted consumer turnover cycle. Product variation by baking 
companies generally has taken three forms, usually not associated 
with significant improvements in bread quality. In the postwar 
years, firms have periodically introduced one or more selling "fea-
tures" such as variation in size of loaf, texture, and wrapper. 
Variation in Pan Size, Shape, and Type 
Many baking companies, seeking to broaden the appeal of 
bread to buyers who have not previously been important bread 
consumers, have added a "low calorie" loaf by using smaller pans 
and thinner slices. Others have added a "high nutrient" loaf by 
using larger pans and thicker slices.69 Many, in addition, cater to 
the sandwich trade with a larger number of uniform square slices 
by using longer pans with lids. These are examples of many product 
variations that have increased the obsolescence cost of pans. A 
president of a large baking company testified that largely as a 
result of the multiplication of superficial changes in loaf sizes, 
their pan expenses increased "about 400-fold" between 1947 and 
1958.70 Independent decisions by firms to change pan sizes may not 
be matched by rival firms in the short run owing to a lag of several 
weeks for delivery from pan manufacturers. Meanwhile the leader 
may gain some market share at the expense of rivals. 
Changes in Bread Texture 
Several firms have introduced "new" loaves of white bread In 
67. Bain, op. cit., p. 323. 
68. Engle, op. cit., p. 195. 
69. In 1958, a large baking company advertised "10 percent more food value 
in every slice of big new 'Yonder bread." Testimony was given that the only 
significant change was to enlarge loaf and slice sile by approximately 10 percent. 
Report, op. cit., p. 89; Hearings, op. cit., p. 6673. 
70. Ibid., p. 6113. 
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recent years having unique textural characteristics, but otherwise 
not significantly changed. The most notable example is the uniform 
small-hole texture achieved by chemical action in the continuous-
mix production process. The process is complicated and expensive; 
equipment investment costs may be increased by $150,000 for the 
adopting firm. In the short run, this innovation has not usually been 
matched by all rivals in any given market area. The manufacturer 
of the equipment has reported that firms adopting this process in 
the latter 1950's experienced short-run increased sales of 10-40 
percent.71 In this case, independent action may tend to bring about 
a short-run redistribution of market shares. 
Another product variation of this general type is to divide 
and twist the dough as it is placed in the pan. This results in a 
distinctive indention in the loaf crust clearly visible to consumers 
through a cellophane wrapper. The fact that rival firms in many 
cases do not adopt the twisting process, however, is an indication 
that twisted bread is a relatively ineffective tactic in gaining 
market share. Apparently the effect upon share is small enough so 
that rival firms are not compelled to adopt twisting in defense. The 
process is easily accomplished; two unskilled employees or a $20,000 
machine adds only a small amount to production costs of "twisted 
bread." 
New and Fresh Packaging 
Since World War II, most bakeries have shifted from wax paper 
to cellophane, and recently some have tried polyethylene bread-
wrapping materials. Wax paper is the cheapest of the three and has 
the advantage of color, so it is frequently used to wrap the most 
expensive loaves of bread. Although higher in price, cellophane is 
the most widely used today. It is suited to handling by high speed 
machinery, and facilitates visible inspection of bread by the con-
sumer, but also tears easily when opened. A few firms have recently 
perfected new wrapping machines to handle polyethylene, which 
is preferable to either wax paper or cellophane for home storage 
of bread by the consumer. At this time, independent decisions 
by some firms to adopt polyethylene wrap have not been matched 
by all rival firms in the short run, primarily because of technical 
complications. Thus, the innovator of new and fresh packaging may 
possibly gain market share from rival firms in the short run. 
71. Dough-maker Continuous Dough Mixing, undated publication by Wallace 
& Tiernan, Inc., Belleville, N.J. 
6 / Industrial Performance 
Performance refers to the economic effects on the general welfare 
of market adjustments made by buyers and sellers.l There are 
various performance criteria which, to different observers, may be 
considered crucial indicators of how well the market activity of 
baking companies contributes to public welfare. The evaluation 
of market performance presented here considers: the level of profits 
relative to long-run interest rates and to those of comparable indus-
tries; the progressiveness of firms in improving product quality; 
and the changes in price relative to average costs, to the price of 
similar products and to the cyclical problem. Nor are these criteria 
alone enough to characterize the net performance of bread markets. 
We must also measure the economic costs to society of less-than-
optimum performance with respect to: 
(1) production efficiency-the rate at which firms adopt available 
technology and techniques of production to bring individual 
plant cost curves down to the long-run industry cost curve; 
the size of plants and firms relative to optimum scale; and 
the under-utilization of production facilities; 
(2) distribution efficiency-the rate at which firms facilitate labor 
specialization and other economies to bring individual distribu-
tion cost curves down to the long-run industry cost curve; the 
size of delivery and routes relative to optimum scale; and the 
under-utilization of distribution facilities; 
(3) the aggregate selling or sales promotion costs relative to con-
sumer benefits. 
A comparison of the existing organization of bread markets with a 
model of optimum system suggests the relative importance of these 
various performance criteria, and hence the direction of possible 
adjustment or remedy. 
Only a few decades ago concepts of perfect competition and 
monopoly were thought sufficient to treat economic problems. Econ-
1. Bain, op. cit., p. 11. 
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omists had derived theorems about the socially desirable perform-
ance of markets characterized by large numbers of small firms, 
homogeneous product, and free entry and exit, at one end of the 
scale, and of single-firm monopoly at the other. 
During the past 30 years, however, students of market structure 
and industrial organization have found that concepts of perfect 
competition and monopoly are not sufficiently adequate bases for the 
normative appraisal of individual capitalistic markets,2 and have 
attempted to formulate explicit criteria of adequate and optimum 
market performance under various intermediate graduations of 
oligopoly or imperfect market structure. Thus, if a reduction (or an 
increase) in a market's concentration would improve market per-
formance, it is better to say so directly, not to suggest that the con· 
clusion follows from an ideal of perfect competition.3 The tradi· 
tional "monopoly problem," associated with the evils of high 
concentration, is not a very useful concept in appraising actual 
market performance. In its stead, we shall consider the whole 
problem of achieving "optimum levels of market performance" in 
individual capitalistic markets, from the public viewpoint. 
While these judgments are necessarily tentative, we can minimize 
the range of possible dispute about the relationship between the 
performance criteria selected and the more basic aims of a demo-
cratic society by reference to the enabling legislation under which 
this study was made. The Congress of the United States in 1946 
specified that the primary objective of publicly supported research 
into the economic problems of marketing agricultural products is to 
improve the efficiency of marketing methods and facilities and to 
reduce distribution costs.4 Congress declared that "an efficient mar-
keting system to distribute in an economical and orderly manner 
that which is produced" by agriculture is indispensable to "the 
welfare, prosperity, and health of the nation."5 As applied in this 
case, Congress has established efficiency as a norm or criterion of 
bread market performance and has tied market efficiency to the 
public welfare. 
For purposes of this analysis, a bread market would be defined 
as "adequate" if its actual performance were not extremely detri-
mental to the public welfare with respect to any single criterion 
nor moderately detrimental with respect to several. A bread market 
2. Sosnick, op. cit., pp. 383-384. 
3. Ibid., p. 385. 
4. 7 U.S.C. 1621 (Public Law 733, 79th Congress, Title II, Sec. 202). 
5. H. Rep. 2458, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, July 8, 1946. 
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would be defined as "optimum" if its actual performance were as 
favorable in all respects as unavoidable circumstances permit.6 Thus, 
the level of performance attainable in bread markets depends, in 
part, on the limiting circumstances of the environment. Important 
limitations to the improvement of any market's performance 
include: the nature of the product, consumer demand, and capi-
tal equipment. 
Bread products are largely staple food, with general uniformity 
of quality between producers within a market. Because bread 
products are consumed fresh and have a high bulk-to-value ratio, 
spatial conditions of bread markets restrict a firm's ability to improve 
performance. Consumer demand for bread products is price inelas-
tic and negatively income elastic and is limited by population loca-
tion and growth. The purchasing pattern for bread is largely set by 
the purchase of other foods. Capital equipment in bread plants has 
a single use and, once adopted, represents a fixed input in the 
short run. 
Price, Profit, and Product Performance 
Market Price Performance 
Generally speaking, bread markets have performed somewhat 
inadequately in product price behavior. Price increases in bread 
products have tended to lead the business cycle during the postwar 
period. The average u.s. price of white bread has risen more than 
twice as fast as prices of all consumer goods, according to reports of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Between 1947 and 1958, the average 
retail price of all food products increased about 24 percent and the 
price index of consumer products rose about 26 percent, while the 
average retail price of white bread increased from 12.5 cents to 19.3 
cents per pound, a rise of 54 percent. Figure 9 shows that most of this 
6.8 cent increase in average retail bread prices represents larger pay-
ments to the baking industry. Payments to farmers for ingredients 
used in baking bread dropped from 3.7 cents per pound in 1947 
to 3.0 cents in 1958, or about 20 percent. In addition to their larger 
payments to bakeries, consumers paid more for bread to retail 
grocers, from 1.9 cents per pound in 1947 to about 3.1 cents per 
pound in 1958, up about two-thirds. Thus, wholesale prices of bread 
did not increase quite as fast as retail bread prices during this post-
war period (Table 8). 
Exclusive of the cost of ingredients, however, payments for the 
6. Sosnick, op. cit., pp. 41~11. 
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bread baking and wholesaling functions increased from 5.1 cents 
per pound in 1947 to 11.2 cents in 1958, an increase of 120 percent I 
Clearly, had the postwar increase in payments for bread baking and 
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SOURCE: U.S. Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing Margins in White Bread, Mis-
cellaneous Bulletin No. 712 (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 8-9. 
FIG. 9.-Estimated average retail and wholesale prices, gross margins of 
retailer, baker and miller, value of farm ingredients, pound loaf of white 
pan bread, United States, 1947 and 1958. 
of all foods, the rise in average wholesale and retail bread prices 
would have been less than the price rise for all food, because cost of 
ingredients dropped. This does not imply that increases in bread 
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prices should have been held to those of all food, because techno-
logical changes have occurred in food industries, altering the under-
lying production functions, an aspect of bread market performance 
discussed later in this chapter. This reservation about price compari-
sons should be kept in mind when taking an overall view of these 
price changes. 
The above account of price increases is based on average retail 
prices in 48 urban areas reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
This is the most general and relevant measure of average U.S. bread 
price levels because we are rapidly becoming a nation of city and 
suburban dwellers (estimated at 70 percent of total population in 
1960). But those remaining in small towns and rural areas tend to 
pay lower prices for bread. 
Although it is impossible to measure the proportion of total 
bread consumption involved, it may be estimated roughly at 30 
percent. It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 that consumers in metro-
politan area markets tend to pay an average of two to five cents 
per pound more for white bread than those living within a 150-mile 
radius in outlying small towns and rural areas, despite additional 
transportation costs of about one-half cent per pound for every 50 
miles bread is shipped (as for example, by common carrier). These 
average price differentials are hidden within the average prices 
reported to the Census Bureau by wholesale baking companies, as 
shown in Table 19. It is also important to note that the lower 
TABLE 19 
COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE TRANSFER PRICE PER POUND OF WHITE PAN BREAD 
AMONG SEGMENTS OF THE BAKERY INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, AND 1958 
Share Average Change in of Total 
Segment of Pound. Transfer Price Average Transfer Price 
Bakery Industry Shipped, Year 
1958 1947 1954 1958 1947·1954 1947·1958 
Percent Cents Cents Cents Cents Percent Cents Percent 
Wholesale 79 10.9 15.2 16.0 4.3 40 5.1 47 
Integrated grocery 
chain 11 9.7 11.4 13.3 1.7 17 3.6 37 
Home service 9 12.5 17.4 18.6 4.9 39 6.1 49 
Multi·unit retail 11.3 14.6 18.9 3.3 30 7.6 67 
Bakery industry, 
total 100.0 11.0 15.1 16.0 3.9 3.1) 5.0 45 
SoURCE: Average prices for seflDlents of the industry were computed from reports of value 
of shipment and total pounds shipped data ~iven in: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
Census of Manufactures, 1947, 1954, 1958, op. CIt. 
average prices in non-metropolitan areas are gross estimates and 
only indicative of a tendency. Evidence of prices paid in a large 
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number of non-metropolitan markets shows that in many cases 
average prices are higher than in metropolitan areas of the same 
markets. This is an illustration of the pricing pattern explained in 
Chapter 5 in which a large city baking company maintains a lower 
price in an outlying area until its entry is firmly established. In the 
short run, consumers in the area benefit by a lower price. In the 
long run, however, there are instances where bread prices have then 
been raised to cover average total unit costs, including costs of 
common carrier shipment to the outlying area. 
Postwar increases in retail bread prices have not been uniform 
for all bread. Some consumers have bought bread made by retail 
grocers under their own private labels; others have chosen brands 
of wholesale baking companies; and still others have used the prod-
ucts of bakers offering home delivery or have bought bread in spe-
cialty bakery stores. 
Average price data prepared from Census Bureau reports and 
presented in Table 19 show that from 1947 to 1954 the average 
differential between the transfer or wholesale price of private 
label and wholesaler brands widened from 1.2 cents per pound to 
3.8 cents per pound. Although this is admittedly a gross figure, it 
suggests that integrated grocery chains pursued a pricing policy 
on private label bread that increasingly enhanced the material 
welfare of consumers during this period. Since 1954, however, this 
price differential has tended to narrow and by 1958 had fallen to 
2.7 cents per pound. The price and profit performance of integrated 
grocery chains varies significantly between market areas, as will be 
shown in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
Estimates by the industry place the proportion of private label 
bread sales to total industry sales at about 25 percent.7 As shown in 
Table 18, II percent of the industry's total bread output is baked 
in plants owned by integrated grocery chains. Although the balance 
of private label bread consumption cannot be estimated with any 
precision, evidence presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that it is a 
significant aspect of production in many wholesale bakeries. Table 
19 suggests that multi-unit retail baking companies charge higher 
prices for white bread in their specialty stores than either wholesale 
brands or private label brands distributed through grocery stores. 
In making this comparison, one must add an average retail grocery 
store margin for bread estimated at 17 percent to the wholesale and 
private label brand transfer prices shown in the table. 
The discussion of market price performance has thus far been 
7. Slater, op. cit., p. 2!l. 
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confined to the price of white bread. Table 20 shows the average 
price increase of all important bakery products in the postwar years. 
The percentage price rise of non-bread products has been about half 
that of bread and bread type rolls during this period, but the 
non-bread products were the higher priced ones in 1947. In the 
case of cakes, pies, and handmade cookies, superior price perform-
ance from the consumers' point of view may reflect the competition 
of substitute products such as cake mix, frozen pies, and machine-
made cookies. Census data show that output of these three bakery 
products has decreased in the postwar years, while output of their 
TABLE 20 
AVERAGE TRANSFER PRICE PER POUND, VARIOUS BAKERY PRODUCI'S, TOTAL INDUS. 
TRIAL PRODUCTION, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, AND 1955 
Average Transfer Price per Pound 
Bakery Product 1947 1954 1958 
Change 
1947-195R 
Cents Cents Cents Percent 
Bakery products, totala 15.2 19.0 21.0 3S.2 
White pan bread 11.0 15.1 16.0 45 
White hearth bread 12.3 15.4 IS.6 51 
Wheat bread U.S 16.0 IS.1 53 
Rye bread 12.7 16.2 IS.4 45 
Specialty breads 14.5 17.6 19.9 37 
Rolls, bread type 16.2 20.1 23.4 44 
Sweet yeast goods 29.S 37.1 36.S 23 
Soft cakes 32.3 35.3 3S.4 19 
Pies 24.4 25.7 29.1 19 
Cookies, handmade 31.2 37.1 36.S IS 
Doughnuts (doz.) 25.9 30.1 35.2 36 
SoUllCE: U.s. Bureau of the Census, Census of ,HartH/actures, 1947, 1954, 1958, op. cit. 
a Average price per pound for total shipments for which poundage and value were re-
ported. Does not include some pastries and unspecified items. 
substitutes has increased.8 This represents a net loss to the baking 
industry since these substitutes are produced by other food indus-
tries. An even larger share of cake sales is in the form of semi-
prepared cake mix, manufactured by the milling industry, while 
more pies are produced by the frozen foods industry, and machine-
made cookies classified in the cracker industry. 
8. From 1947 to 1954, production of soft cakes in the baking industry declined 
from 1,200 million pounds to 1,047 million pounds, or about 13 percent. For the 
same period, output of cake mix, a substitute product produced in another indus. 
try, increased from 605 million pounds of soft cake equivalent to 795 million 
pounds, or about 31 percent. "1954 Census of Manufactures," op. cit. It is 
estimated that output of frozen pies and other frozen bakery products has 
increased rapidly in recent years and by 1955, accounted for 17 percent of total 
output of the frozen prepared foods industry. W. G. Gechtel, ''The Future of 
Frozen Bakery Products," Bakers' Weekly (May 18, 1959), p. 39. 
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Profit Criteria of Bread Market Performance 
Market performance is often assessed in terms. of the profits-
to-sales ratio or the rate of return on net investment after payment 
of federal income taxes. One authority suggests that a standard 
profit rate of 4 percent of net investment after taxes may be con-
sidered as a "normal" or target rate of return in the 1940's and 
1950'S.9 Of course, reported profits are not divided on company 
income statements between imputed interest on capital, return for 
innovations, frictional gains or losses, and rent on scarce capital 
resources or monopoly returns. The implications of this view, how-
ever, are that since most baking innovations are developed by 
baking equipment manufacturers, most innovation costs are paid 
for through the purchase of equipment, and since frictional losses 
tend to offset frictional gains, the remaining elements of profit above 
4 percent can be attributed to "economic rent," or "above normal 
returns." This argument, rigorously applied to the baking industry, 
would suggest that average rates of return above 4 percent on net 
investment after taxes are more than are necessary to attract an 
efficient level of capitalization and tend to encourage an inefficient 
distribution of resources at least in the short run. Thus, the average 
return on investment of wholesale baking companies of 10-12 
percent in 1958 indicates an excess profit rate of about 6-8 percent 
or one and one-half to two times the standard of optimum perform-
ance posited above (Table 21). But the application of this standard 
of optimum performance is not sufficient for analysis. 
In the first place, although above normal profits of wholesale 
baking companies are sizable, their complete elimination would 
result in little change in the price of bread products. For the period 
1947-58, such profits amounted to roughly two-thirds of total profits 
of wholesale baking companies, or approximately $45 million per 
year. This amounts to only about 1.7 percent, however, of the 
total $2.8 billion sales of wholesale baking companies in 1958. At 
most, such above normal profits account for approximately 2 percent 
of the consumer's bread dollar. 
In the second place, a study of costs indicates that factors other 
than profit explain the postwar increase in bakery margins and 
bread prices. In 1958, the average net profit of wholesale baking 
companies after taxes was approximately 3.2 percent of dollar sales, 
9. Bain, op. cit., p. 383; this compares with a 1953-59 average of about 3.5 
percent interest rate on prime commercial paper. Monthly Letter, New York City 
Bank Gune, 1959). 
TABLE 21 
PROFITS (AFI'ER TAXES) AS A PERCENTAGE OF STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY, SELECTED BAKING FIRMS, FOOD FIRMS, AND MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 
UNITED STATES, 1940 AND 1947-58 
Baking Company or 
Industrial Group 1940 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Continental 8.0 17.0 22.7 15.7 14.8 11.4 11.6 12.8 12.2 16.0 15.1 14.1 1M 
General 8.9 10.2 16.7 10.3 10.2 8.2 8.8 6.7 6.8 6.3 7.2 7.7 7.7 
Campbell Taggart 33.0 40.6 32.4 26.0 20.1 18.9 16.8 20.2 20.8 19.9 19.6 18.7 
American 6.5 18.9 20.8 14.4 13.6 12.0 11.7 12.7 12.2 14.4 14.9 14.1 12.1 
Interstate 7.5 25.0 33.2 26.5 24.3 16.4 18.1 17.5 20.4 19.4 17.9 18.4 15.0 
Ward .2 17.6 22.6 17.3 16.2 11.2 10.9 13.6 7.4 7.3 6.2 7.4 5.6 
Langendorf 13.8 17.9 15.0 19.0 15.7 
Southern 8.9 6.5 1M 13.7 13.4 
Largest foura 7.9 15.8 21.2 14.7 14.1 11.1 11.6 11.7 11.9 13.7 13.6 14.2 1M .... ;;S 
Eighteen multi-rlant ~ 
15.1 11.7 11.9 13.2 11.9 12.0 12.5· 11.7· .: baking firms 
'" .... Eighteen single-~lant "'l 
baking firms 15.7 11.4 10.5 8.9 8.7 7.9 [ 
All food processing" 8.3 19.4 16.6 10.6 13.9 11.0 8.9 9.2 9.0 9.7 10.0 9.9 9.6 ~ 
..::t 
All manufacturingd 8.8 17.0 18.9 13.8 17.1 14.4 12.3 
c 
12.5 12.4 15.0 13.8 12.9 9.8 ~ 
• Federal Trade Commission, as reported in Hearings, op. cit., p. 6138. \::. ~ 
b Cost and Margin Trends in the Bakinll Industry, op. cit. ~ 
• Compiled from Moody's industrial manual and annual reports. (\> 
d Statistics 0/ Income, U.S. Treasury Department. Internal Revenue Service, various years. These data are for corporation food manufacturers and 
all manufacturers filing corporate income tax returns. ........ 
-~ 
c.o 
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or slightly more than one-half cent per pound (0.512 cents).10 This 
is slightly lower than the average net profit of 5.8 percent or 
0.638 cents per pound reported by wholesale baking companies for 
1946-47. In recent years, falling average profit rates of wholesale 
baking companies have been associated with rising consumer prices 
for bread. 
In the third place, although average profit levels of wholesale 
baking companies have been consistently higher than those of food 
processing and manufacturing industries throughout the postwar 
period, the three profit series have tended to move together. The 
Federal Trade Commission publishes rates of return on net invest-
ment after taxes of 421 identical companies in 24 selected industries 
for the prewar year of 1940 and the postwar period. Between 1940 
and 1958, the group of 14 reporting baking companies showed the 
greatest increase in rates of return of reporting companies in 
24 industries.ll 
In part, this is because the baking companies started from a 
lower base, but their profits also rose to higher levels in the postwar 
years. In 1940, all manufacturing industries sampled earned 8.8 
percent on net investment as compared with 7.4 percent for the 
baking companies. By 1958, all manufacturing industries earned 
9.8 percent as compared with 10.1 percent for the baking companies. 
The four largest baking companies reported profits of 13.4 percent 
in 1958, as compared with 7.9 percent in 1940 (Table 20). The 
average rate of return on net investment for the four largest baking 
companies was at a postwar high of 21.2 percent in 1948, almost 
three times the prewar level, but not much greater than profits 
reported for food processing and manufacturing industries at that 
time. By 1954, the average rate of return reported by the four largest 
baking companies had fallen to 11.9 percent as compared with 9.0 
percent for all food processing and 12.4 percent for all manufac-
turing industries. 
Large multi-plant baking companies tend to earn higher rates 
of return than smaller single-plant companies in recent years, 
while, in 1950 and 1951, average profits for the two groups of firms 
were nearly the same (Table 21). By 1955, profits of single-plant 
10. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6579. This is the reported earnings of the four largest 
baking companies on sales of white bread. This compares with profits of 2.92 
percent on sales of all products including bread. 
II. The industries sampled included more than 50 percent of total assets 
of all manufacturing industries. Federal Trade Commission, Rates of Return For 
Identical Companies in Selected Manufacturing Industries, 1940, 1947-58, 
Department of Justice (Washington, D.C., 1960), P. 10. 
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companies averaged about one-third less than profits of multi-plant 
companies. Indications are that this trend has continued since 1955, 
with one important exception. Single-plant baking companies affil-
iated with bakery management groups apparently have earned con-
siderably higher returns than nonaffiliated companies. In 1958, the 
eight largest wholesale baking companies reported accounting profits 
of $32.8 million or about 3 percent (2.92) on sales of $1,125 million. 
The 123 plants operated by predominantly single-plant firms affil-
iated with Quality Bakers of America management group had profits 
of $12.2 million, or 4.35 percent of reported sales of $280 million.12 
Price and Profit Performance of Integrated Grocery Chains 
Thus far the discussion of the profit criteria has dealt primarily 
with profits reported by selected wholesale baking companies. These 
have been such as to have little appreciable impact on bread 
prices. Some additional evidence is available on the profits earned 
by the bakery divisions of integrated grocery chain companies. 
Table 22 shows the bakery profit experience of the A&P grocery 
chain from 1924 to 1939. The company is, and was during this 
TABLE 22 
BAKERY SALES, INVESTMENT, AND PROFITS-A&P BAKERY DIVISION-1924-1939 
Retail Invest· Unadjusted Adjusted' 
Sales mentin Profit Rate of Profit Rate of 
Bakery Return Return 
Year Plant and on Invest- on Invest· 
Equipment ment ment 
(thousand (thousand (thousand (thousand 
dollars) dollars) dollars) (percent) dollars) (percent) 
1924 $ 9,162 $2,569 $ 440 17.1 $ 120 4.5 
1925 15,174 3,086 407 13.1 -53 -1.7 
1926 21,913 3,288 1,998 60.8 1,384 42.2 
1927 29,646 3,668 2,585 70.8 1,840 55.8 
1928 34,627 4,268 3,540 82.9 2,539 59.3 
1929 36,451 4,698 3,855 82.0 2,796 59.2 
1930 38,752 4,871 5,464 112.2 4,224 86.8 
1931 37,824 4,951 4,621 93.3 3,391 68.4 
1932 32,413 4,859 3,885 80.0 3,303 67.9 
1933 34,391 4,373 2,942 67.3 1,703 39.1 
1934 38,126 4,014 3,176 79.1 1,956 48.6 
1935 41,027 3,681 3,156 85.7 2,374 64.6 
1936 42,183 3,461 2,784 80.4 1,898 55.0 
1937 41,793 3,313 2,956 89.2 2,538 76.7 
1938 40,853 3,035 5,191 171.1 4.333 142.0 
Av.1924-39 81.6 59.1 
SoURCE: From company records in trial transcript quoted by Adelman, M. A., AiTP, 
A Study in Price· Cost Behavior and Public Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1959), p. 254 • 
• Adjusted bakery profits estimated as follows: bakery sales are multiplied by the retail 
net profit rate for the year, yielding the estimated retail profit on bakery goods. This is 
subtracted from the unadjusted profit, and a rate of return calculated on the same invest-
ment base. 
12. Hearings, 01'. cit., p. 6088. 
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period, the largest retailer of food in the United States and also 
the largest producer of private label bakery products. The average 
unadjusted rate of return on net investment in its bakery division 
was 81.6 percent during this 15 year prewar period. This was several 
times the average rate of return after taxes reported by wholesale 
baking companies in 1940, and suggests that grocery chains may have 
had a considerable incentive to enter the baking industry because of 
the potential improvement in their profit positions. 
There is some evidence on the extent to which more recent 
grocery chain integration affects the performance of bread markets 
with respect to profits and prices. Indications are that as long as 
only a few of the largest grocery chains integrate into baking (they 
accounted for about 11 percent of total U.S. bread output in 1958), 
price differentials between private label and wholesaler brands 
probably do not appreciably affect the price behavior of wholesale 
baking companies on their own brands. Analysis of private label and 
wholesaler brand prices in a large number of bread markets has 
shown that no consistent relationship exists between the two. This 
finding lends support to the view that the lower average prices 
paid by consumers of private label brands are unrelated to prices 
of wholesaler brands. Integrated grocery chains deliver their private 
label bread at costs much below those of the nonintegrated firms, 
and pass part of this differential forward to consumers of private 
label bread. 
Table 23 presents evidence from various sources which indicates 
that, for the U.S. as a whole, in 1958 consumers paid an estimated 
3.3 cents per pound, or 17 percent, less for private label bread than 
for wholesale brands. 
The data suggest that the five largest integrated grocery chains 
received approximately 1.5 cents per pound profits on their bakery 
divisions. After provision for corporate income taxes, this is esti-
mated at about a 30-35 percent return on net investment (less depre-
ciation of plant and equipment) of their bakery divisions.13 
While this is two or three times the rate of return on net invest-
ment by wholesale baking companies (also after corporate income 
taxes) in 1958, it has very little effect on consumer bread prices. 
Assuming that grocery chains integrated into private label bread 
production charge themselves the same gross store margins per dollar 
13. Net investment estimated on the basis of reported depreciation allow-
ance of 35 cents per hundred pounds of bread produced by the largest four 
wholesale baking companies and 17 cents for the five largest integrated grocery 
chain bakeries, depreciation at 15 years in 1958. Report, op. cit., p. 113. 
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TABLE 23 
ESTIMATED AVERAGE WHOLESALE BAKERY AND INTEGRATED GROCERY CHAIN BREAD 





Regionaand Bread vail. Pre· 
Brand Produc- ing Esti· vail· 
tion and Whole- mated ing 
Whole- sale (or Bakery Con-
sale Dis· Trans· Profits Retail Grocery 8umer 
tribu· fer (Before Store Margine Retail 
tionb Price)" Taxes)d Price! 
Cents Cents Cents Cents Percent Cents 
WESTERN REGION 
Wholesaler brands 15_7 17_9 2_2 5.1 22.2 23.0 
Groce:-;; chain brands 12.4 17.0 4.6 5.0 (22.3) 22.0 
Chain di erential -3.3 -0.9 +2.4 -1.0 
NORTHEAST REGION 
Wholesaler brands 15.1 17.5 2.4 3.3 15.9 20.8 
Grocerli chain brands 1l.8 14.3 2.5 2.7 (15.9) 17.0 
Chain d' erential -3.3 -3.2 +0.1 -0.6 -3.8 
CENTRAL REGION 
Wholesaler brands 15.5 16.0 0.5 3.2 16.7 19.2 
Groce~ chain brands 12.2 12.5 0.3 2.5 (16.7) 15.0 
Chain di erential -3.3 -3.5 -0.2 -0.7 -4.2 
SoUTHERN REGION 
Wholesaler brands 14.5 15.4 0.9 2.2 12.5 17.6 
Groce~ chain brands 11.2 14.9 3.7 2.1 (12.5) 17.0 
Chain di erential -3.3 -0.5 +2.8 -0.1 -0.6 
AVERAGE, U.S. 
Wholesaler brands 15.1 16.0 0.9 3.3 17.1 19.3 
Groced; chain brands 11.8 13.3 1.5 2.7 (17.1) 16.0 
Chain di erential -3.3 -2.7 +0.6 -0.6 -3.3 
a Representative bread markets were selected in each of four regions: Sacramento, Cali· 
fornia, in the Western reKion; Brooklyn, New York, in the Northeast region; Chica~, IIIi· 
nois, in the Central region; and San Antonio, Texas, in the Southern region. 
b Average U.S. costs per pound, white pan bread, 1958, from reports by the four largest 
wholesale bakinlr companies and five major lIl"ocery chains' intelrrated bakeries, filed with the 
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, and ~rinted in, Report, op. cit., p. 
lIS. Variation in costs by reKion based on reKional cost variation reported on 123 medium to 
Iarge'sized bread plants. Ibid., p. 31. 
• Western regional average wholesale or transfer prices from a special tabulation of U.S. 
Census data. Average U.S. wholesale price or transfer price of white pan bread from, 1958 
Census of Manufactures, op. cit., pp.12·11I. For other reKions, prevailing price of wholesale 
brands at wholesale from reports by the seven largest wholesale baking companies to the U.S. 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, and prevailing chain store brand transfer 
prices computed from, National Bread Price Survey, Anheuser·Busch, St. Louis, (September, 
1958). 
d Profits of the bread bakery division of wholesaIer and grocery chain bakeries is a residual 
estimate, i.e., coL 2·col. I. 
• Retail lrfOCery store marKins on wholesaler brandl of white bread computed on a pound 
basis from reports on these markets from Anheuser-Busch, ibid. Store margins on grocery 
chain brandl of white bread assumed as the same percentalre per dollar sales as on whole· 
saler brandl. This Is a reasonable assumption based on prevailiDir practice of chain stores. 
• Prevailing consumer retail price of wholesaler brandl of white pan bread in 1958 from 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Development in Marketing Spreads for Agricultural Pro· 
ducts, 1958, op. cit., p. 1I. ReKional data from reports by major companies, Report, op. cit., 
pp. 191-194. Prevailing consumer retail price of grocery chain brands, average U.S., calcu· 
lated by adding the average grocery store margin to the average transfer price of grocery 
chain bakeries, as reported by U.S. Census. Prevailinlt consumer retail price of grocery 
chain brandl by reKions from reports on these markets m Anheuser·Busch, op. cit. 
sales as they receive on wholesaler brands, the chain bakery divisions 
captured only about 0.6 cents per pound (before corporate income 
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taxes or about 0.3 cents per pound after taxes) more in profits than 
the four largest wholesale baking companies. Were this amount (0.6 
cents) passed forward to the consumer along with the 3.3 cents per 
pound he currently receives, it would exert very little marginal 
effect. It would add about $8 million to the $112.5 million saved 
by the 25 percent of U.S. consumers buying private label bread in 
1958. Thus the inference seems justified that the benefits to the 
consumer in the form of lower private label bread prices resulting 
from vertical integration by grocery chains into the baking industry 
far outweigh the costs of this integration in the form of excess 
profits in 1958. 
There are some notable exceptions to this generalization. In 
many markets, integrated grocery chains have been content to follow 
the price leadership of wholesaler brands. A good example of this 
sort of price conduct is shown in Table 23. Average retail price of 
chain store bread in most Western markets was 22 cents per pound 
compared with average retail prices of wholesaler brands of 23 
cents per pound, or a one cent differential in 1958. However, average 
costs of production and distribution in Western markets are esti-
mated at only about 12.4 cents per pound for chain brands, as com-
pared with 15.7 cents per pound for wholesale brands, or a cost 
difference of 3.3 cents. Assuming the same gross store margins per 
dollar sales for both brands, the chain bakery divisions captured 
2.4 cents per pound more than wholesale baking companies in profits 
(before corporate income taxes). The inference seems justified that 
the western consumer benefits very little from the vertical integra-
tion by grocery chains into the baking industry. In some markets the 
costs to consumers of profits by the bakery divisions of integrated 
grocery chains apparently far outweigh the benefits of lower private 
label bread prices. Table 23 also illustrates that, in other regions 
where the differential between private label and wholesale label 
bread is greater than the national average, the effect is that most or 
all of the potential integrated grocery chain profits are passed for-
ward to the consumer. 
Data on price and profit levels are not sufficient to explain the 
net effect of chain integration on performance in bread markets. 
Price and profit measures show only part of the effects. Considera-
tion of the impact on efficiency and the cost of non price competition 
must await analysis of technological and costs data in a later section 
of this chapter. 
Product Quality Criteria of Market Performance 
A known set of quality alternatives would provide a reasonably 
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clear test of market performance. Theoretically, firms should 
enhance product quality as long as the marginal cost of improve- -
ment is outweighed by the additional price that consumers are 
willing to pay.14 In real life, however, such quality determinants are 
difficult to evaluate, and nowhere more so than in judging bread. 
Possible variations in texture and taste have important technical 
limits. Nor can the nutritional quality of bread be wholly deter-
mined by the consumer. The usual test of softness is more nearly a 
test of water and air content than quality. Thus, it is extremely 
difficult for consumers to express accurate quality-price preferences 
for bread. Also some aspects of bread quality are related to costs 
only tenuously if at all.15 Beyond the problems faced by the indi-
vidual firm in determining cost-quality relationships lies the more 
difficult evaluation of market performance with respect to quality 
under conditions of interdependence among firms in a market area. 
Even though the relatively inelastic demand for bread with 
respect to price indicates that consumers would pay for quality 
improvement, the oligopolistic structure of the bread market tends 
to preclude it. As we saw in Chapter 2, except for nutritional re-
quirements originally imposed by federal standards, most white 
pan bread is probably not appreciably superior in quality to that 
produced in the early stages of commercial mechanized production. 
There are minor exceptions to this generalization. Some improve-
ment in texture of bread resulted from the continuous dough-mix 
production process introduced during the past decade, but this 
accounts for less than 5 percent of total bread output. Moreover, 
per capita production of non-white bread (wheat, rye, raisin, and 
specialty breads) has declined in the postwar years, although not as 
fast as white bread. Most bread remains plain white bread. 
Due to the virtual homogeneity of product and the difficulty 
of consumer quality-price evaluation, costs incurred by anyone 
firm as a result of quality improvement are difficult to recoup by 
increased prices. With the exception of some notable success with 
a dense frozen loaf in recent years (probably less than 1 percent of 
total bread output), no single firm has been able to isolate its 
demand from that of other firms in the market. 
Necessary costs of information and production connected with 
14. Bain, op. cit., p. 398. 
15. Interviews with bakery operators suggest that change to a more nutri-
tious and firmer loaf could be achieved with practically no increase in cost. 
This is especially true if frozen storage becomes practical so that factors now 
conducive to spoilage can be controlled without eliminating them from the bread. 
Also, frozen bread would not be subject to the squeeze test for freshness. 
130 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
the introduction of an improved product are not usually offset by 
future returns to a single firm. If the quality change is successful, 
it is rapidly imitated by other firms in an oligopoly market situation 
with inelastic demand.16 No one firm can elevate quality above or 
below that of other firms for long in an oligopoly situation. If 
quality improvement should occur, it would be based on leadership 
within an oligopoly market group similar to price leadership. 
Otherwise the innovator risks loss of consumer acceptance and of 
shelf space in grocery stores. In the case of price leadership, the 
impetus for change stems from cost increases experienced by the 
market group in general. In the case of bread quality there has 
been no comparable signal. The net result is that real bread 
quality improvement has not been an important competitive vari-
able in the postwar years. 
Efficiency of Bread Production and 
Wholesale Bread Markets 
Least-Cost Bread Production* 
Primary emphasis in Chapter 3 was on the synthesis of short-
run and long-run cost functions for bread baking from engineering-
economic data. These functions represent the cost of production 
with least-cost combinations of technologies and with reasonably 
efficient management and worker performance. Few bread companies 
have achieved or may be expected to achieve this degree of pro-
duction efficiency. A comparison of actual with hypothetical pro-
duction systems suggests relative weights to attach to various fac-
tors being used inefficiently, and hence points in the direction of 
possible improvement. 
There are three major types of adjustments which may lead 
• Use of the word "potential" throughout this section, when referring to 
the difference between existing and least·cost bread production, is not meant 
to imply that removal of the disparity would be desirable or possible in 
all markets. 
16. A vice· president of Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Inc. (second 
largest in the U.S.) reports that "when the really soft breads started coming on 
the market about 1947," it was determined that Campbell Taggart would not 
use chemical bread softeners to make bread softer than it already was. "We 
felt certain that the consumers would soon tire of bread with a softener added, 
and that our competitors would suffer. We soon found ourselves in the position 
of any other businessman who guessed wrong. We lost business. It took us as long 
as seven years in some locations to regain the business we had lost." Steve 
Vesecky, "Where's the Good Bread that Grandma Baked?", Co.op Grain Quar-
terly (May 1958), p. 60. 
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to sizable cost reductions (Table 24). These are: (I) adoption of 
efficient technology and techniques of production which would 
bring individual plant cost curves down to the long-run cost curve; 
(2) movement along the short-run plant cost curve by increased 
hours of operation to three-shift levels; and (3) movement along the 
long-run cost curve by increasing size of plant to optimum scale. 
Potential long-run industrial savings are estimated to be about 
$183 million per year for the first step, $187 million per year for the 
second step, and $150 million per year for the third step. 
This amounts to more than one-half billion dollars per year 
in potential production cost reductions, or about 23 percent 
of net bakery sales of bread and bread type rolls in 1958 (exclud-
ing retail margins). 
In addition to the specific results, the cost functions provide 
the basis for reorganization of production in particular market 
situations. While there is evidence that bread market conditions 
differ very little throughout the United States, certainly there are 
pronounced differences in wage rates and ingredient costs. Such 
changes in the economic relationships can be incorporated into 
the basic production functions, and the revised functions used to 
make meaningful estimates of the costs and savings that could be 
expected from reorganization in particular geographic and histor-
ical situations. 
A full evaluation of the potential cost reductions presented as 
Table 23 would require consideration of costs of delivery as well. 
However, since most plants tend to be closely located within metro-
politan area markets, a considerable amount of plant reorganiza-
tion could be accomplished without materially increasing delivery 
costs. As shown in Chapter 4, delivery costs could be substantially 
reduced through economies associated with size of delivery, volume 
of delivery vehicle, and specialization of delivery labor. 
An important constraint to improving production cost perform-
ance in bread markets is the under-utilization of plant resulting 
from the daily variation in bread market sales. DeLoach reports 
that grocery stores have made little headway in efforts to equalize 
sales between days of the week, and that, as a result of consumer 
shopping habits, about 70 percent of food sales are on Thursday, 
Friday, and Saturday.u When an allowance is made for the daily 
variation in consumer buying habits within the week, presented as 
17. D. B. DeLoach, Changes in Food Retailing-Causes, Effects, Washington 
State University Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 619 (Pullman, 
October, 1960), p. 23. 
TABLE 24 
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL PRODUCTION COST REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD RESULT FROM POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, BREAD 
AND BREAD TYPE ROLLS, BY SIZE OF PLANT, UNITED STATES, 1958 
PRODUCTION COST REDUCTIONS BY 9PECIFIED ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 
Under Optimum Utilization of Plants 
/ With Weekly varia-/ Without Weekly Varia- Under Introduc-
Under Adoption 
Size of Plant of Automatic 
tion in Consumer tion in Consumer tion of Optimum- Continuous-Mix 
Total Total Buying Pattern" Buying Pattern" Sized Plants· Machineryd 
--
Cents Million Cents Million Cents Million Cents Million Cents Million Cents Million 
per lb. dollars per lb. dollars per lb. dollars per lb. dollars per lb. dollars per lb. dollars 
Total 4.0 521.5 1.4 187.9 0.9 125.8 0.5 62.1 1.2 150.4 1.4 183.2 
2000 Ibs. per hr. 5.4 287.9 1.7 90.7 1.2 64.0 0.5 26.7 2.0 106.6 1.7 90.6 
4000 lbs. per hr. 4.0 158.4 1.6 64.5 0.9 36.3 0.7 28.2 1.0 40.3 1.4 53.6 
6000 Ibs. per hr. 2.2 52.1 0.9 22.2 0.7 17.3 0.2 4.9 0.14 3.5 1.1 26.4 
8000 Ibs. per hr. 2.0 23.1 0.9 10.5 0.7 8.2 0.2 2.3 0 1.1 12.6 
SoURCE: Calculated from the engineering-based short- and long-run cost curves presented as Figures 1 and 2. Census reports sales of 13 billion pounds of 
bread and bread type roUs in 1958, valued at 17.3 cents per pound or $2,262 million. This assumes that the size distribution of bread plants is the same 
as the size distribution of aU plants classified by Census in the industry. See Table 4 . 
• Difference between an estimated average rate of bread plant utilization in 1958 of 54 hours per week and practical plant capacity of 108 hours per 
week, given the external limitation Qf consumer purchasing habits. 
"Difference between average plant utilization of 108 hours per week and 144 hours per week, or 24 hours per day, 6 days per week . 
• With 8,000 pounds per hour capacity, 
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Table 16, bread plant capacity is adjusted downward from 144 
hours per week to 108 hours per week. Table 24 shows that only a 
small part of the costs of under-utilization of bread plants is asso-
ciated with consumer buying habits, or about $62 million of the 
aggregate cost of under-utilization estimated at $188 million. 
It should be noted that these calculations of cost-saving alterna-
tives available to the baking industry abstract from the problem of 
multi-product plants. This serves the intended purpose of simplify-
ing the analysis to manageable proportions, and white bread repre-
sents about 60 percent of the total product of the industry. It may 
have the additional effect of slightly overstating the case for opti-
mum plant reorganization presented here. Most bread plants have 
multi-product outputs. But bread and bread type rolls are the most 
important and represent 75.3 pounds of the 92.4 pound total annual 
per capita consumption of the industry's total production in 1958. 
The cost analysis here abstracts from the problem of producing the 
remaining 17.1 pounds, which is made up of sweet rolls, cakes, 
pies, cookies and doughnuts. 
Although not tested here, one implication is that similarly 
shaped cost functions may be found for many of these specialty 
bakery products. Within the bread and bread type roll cate-
gory, some limitations arise when, for example, some specialty 
breads require more expensive ingredients or a minimum amount of 
additional equipment to that posited here for white bread plants. 
These possible limitations were not measured in this study, but 
other sources lead the authors to conclude that in the aggregate, 
differences in total production cost per pound are probably not 
greater than 5 percent. IS 
The achievement of optimum performance in bread and bread 
type roll markets would reduce the aggregate investment in plant 
and equipment by an estimated $200 million-from about $550 mil-
lion to about $350 million. As a rough estimate, investment (less 
depreciation) in inefficient bread plants in 1958 was between $300 
million and $400 million, based on a ratio of sales to investment of 
four or five times.19 
In theory, the inefficient plants of 2,000 and 4,000 pounds per 
hour capacities could be closed and their owners compensated in 
a single year, out of a hypothetical $500 million fund created by 
18. See for example, Evert Kindstrand, "Mechanization of Roll and Bun 
Operations," The Bakers' Digest (April, 1958), pp. 68-71. 
19. Calculated from data presented in Cost and Margin Trends in the Baking 
Industry, op. cit., pp. 6-7; and Chapter 3 of this report. 
134 / The Baking Industry, 1947-1958 
shifting the production of bread and bread type rolls to 225 least-
cost plants.2o This assumes the estimated investment (less deprecia-
tion) of $100 million in plants with near-optimum capacities of 
6,000 pounds per hour would not be wholly lost, nor would the 
investment of about $50 million in plants with capacities of 8,000 
pounds per hour. 
New investment of approximately $200 million would be 
required to construct 52 new least-cost plants, to expand the capac-
ity of existing plants with capacities of 6,000 pounds per hour in 
1958 to 8,000 pounds per hour, and to install efficient equipment 
in the plants currently with output capacity of approximately 8,000 
pounds per hour in 1958. Such investment is compensated at a rate 
of 10 percent annually in the synthesis of least-cost operations used 
to estimate potential cost reductions shown in Table 24. Capital 
should be readily forthcoming at this rate. If not, profit levels 
could be doubled under optimum bread plant organization to 20 
percent annually at a cost to consumers of only 17/100 of a cent 
per pound of bread produced. 
Taking advantage of potential reductions in costs of producing 
bread and bread type rolls would have substantial effects on market 
structure and industrial concentration levels. If, as hypothesized, 
42 bread plants with output of 8,000 pounds per hour were modern-
ized and kept in operation, the eight largest baking companies 
would operate exactly half of these, or 21 plants (Table 4). If in 
addition, the 131 bread plants with output of 6,000 pounds per 
hour were modernized and expanded to a size of 8,000 pounds per 
hour, the largest eight baking companies would operate slightly 
fewer than half, or 64 plants. This would represent a sizable 
increase of about 32 percent over their share of national output in 
1958, as measured by both bakery sales and plant capacities. 
Moreover, while the eight largest grocery chains integrated into 
bread production in 1958 owned only 8 percent of bread plant 
capacity, this would be increased to about 12 percent if only 6,000 
20. Although economic forces tend to lead in this direction in the long run, 
this estimate should not be interpreted as a precise measure in the short run 
of the ideal number of needed bread plants in a privately operated bread mar-
keting system. In reality we would expect that there would be many practical 
reasons why, in particular cases, such size plants as this smaller number contem-
plates would not necessarily be the optimum type today and certainly not in 
the future. Of the more than $520 million potential production cost reductions, 
about $400 million could be realized by maintaining in operation most plants 
of 4,000 pounds per hour capacity and above, by adopting automatic continuous-
mix machinery, and by operating at practical capacity of about 108 hours 
per week. 
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and 8,000 pound per hour plants were retained. This would leave all 
other owners of bread plants with about 39 percent of plant capac-
ity retained and modernized in 68 plants. 
It is readily apparent that the critical question of whether con-
centration at the national level would be increased would depend 
upon who builds the 52 new bread plants each with output of 
8,000 pounds per hour. If small baking companies were to construct 
these 52 plants, the structure of the industry nationally would not 
be greatly changed at the eight-firm level. Concentration among the 
eight largest baking companies would be increased from approxi-
mately 32 percent in 1958 to 38 percent of total bread sales, and 
the share of integrated grocery chains in the baking industry would 
decline only slightly, from 11 percent of bread sales in 1958 to 
9 percent. Another important implication for market structure and 
industrial organization is that while concentration in certain bread 
markets would be appreciably increased by reorganization to achieve 
least-cost production in bread plants, concentration at the national 
level could be substantially lower than 1958 levels without adverse 
effects on efficient bread production, at the plant level. Also, testi-
mony before the Senate subcommittee indicates that managerial 
economies that may accrue from multi-plant organization under a 
single management are as readily achievable through voluntary asso-
ciation of independent operations as through multi-plant ownership. 
There is little or no evidence that large corporations have appreci-
able advantage over cooperative and voluntary management groups 
in the baking industry. 
Census reports that the 1,353 bakeries with 90 percent or more 
specialization in bread and bread type rolls employed 38,194 pro-
duction workers in 1958. These plants had sales of $1,452 million, 
practically all of which was for bread and bread type rolls. Total 
sales of bread and bread type rolls are reported as $2,262 million 
in 1958. 
If we assume that production labor imputed to bread and bread 
type roll production in plants with less than 90 percent specializa-
tion is the same as in specialized bread plants, we can estimate total 
production labor for bread and bread type rolls in 1958 as about 
60,000 workers. Reorganization of bread and bread type roll plants 
to achieve least-cost production in 8,000 pound per hour plants 
would displace an estimated 43,000 workers, in both direct and 
indirect production jobs. Such a change would require retraining 
of displaced bakery production workers, and moving them out of the 
baking industry into other industries where rapid growth in labor 
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requirements develops. A fund of $100 million annually could be 
partially devoted to the task. This amount is the balance of the 
hypothetical $500 million fund created by shifting the production 
of bread and bread type rolls to 225 least-cost plants after $400 mil-
lion is set aside to compensate owners of inefficient plants. 
With the many institutional barriers to change that exist in 
bread markets, it is doubtful that more than a few of these adjust-
ments and consequent savings can be actually achieved in the short 
run. However, the material that has been presented should provide 
useful guides for bread plant operators interested in planning new 
facilities, for groups of plant operators contemplating reorgani-
zation, and for agencies planning labor retraining programs. 
Barriers to Achieving Production Efficiency 
in Oligopolistic Bread Markets 
While the progressiveness of firms in adopting new machines 
and techniques of production in bread markets is less than optimum, 
it perhaps approaches adequacy relative to the costs of progress, 
especially when compared with evidently attainable rates (Tables 
12 and 13). Baking companies are reasonably quick to adopt many 
new machines that increase efficiency and productive capacity. In 
some cases, the adoption of machines such as the twister is an 
attempt to differentiate the product and thus to compete on non-
price terms. But the usual reason for adopting new machines is to 
achieve production efficiency. In concrete terms, this is measured by 
the pay-out period in terms of labor cost saving, as illustrated earlier 
in this report. Average production labor costs to the industry have 
increased from $1.07 per hour in 1947 to $1.97 cents per hour in 
1958, a development that makes potential savings on labor costs 
attractive. That labor displacement has taken place is suggested by 
the fact that the total number of industry production laborers has 
declined from 189,000 in 1947 to 145,000 in 1958 while output 
increased slightly. In general, firms in the industry consider short 
machine pay-out periods as the relevant horizon because of the 
insecurity of their market shares and because of the single-use aspect 
of most bakery machinery. 
Much bakery machinery is purchased on the basis of a two to 
four year pay-out period (Table 13). This evidence refutes the usual 
assumption that high profit levels are necessary for capital equip-
ment adoption. The findings in bakery equipment markets is con-
sistent with the assumption that firms could experience zero returns 
at the time the adoption decision is made without reducing their 
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incentive to adopt new machines and techniques of production. 
What is economic for the plant or firm, however, may not necessarily 
represent efficient performance for the market or industry. 
This type of market situation is synthesized in Figure 10. The 
situation shown in the figure is one of a wholesale market for stan-
dard wholesaler brands of bread. The demand curve DBDB shows 
the quantity of these brands that can be sold at varying 'prices in 
the market area. We assume, for purposes of illustration, that four 
wholesale baking companies are operating in this market. Three are 
small-scale, relatively high-cost firms, and one is a larger-scale rela-
tively low-cost firm. The different firm cost conditions are shown 
graphically in Figure 10. The average total unit cost structures 
refer only to the cost of producing and distributing bread, not to 
other perishable bakery products that may be sold by the wholesale 
baking plants. The slope of the curve reflects the plant production-
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SoURCE: Production cost functions from Filfllre 2; distribution costs assumed constant at 
approximately six cents per pound. 
FIG. IO.-Average total unit costs before and after introduction of new pro-
duction technology into a bread market. 
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cost functions, as average total unit costs of delivery and selling 
are assumed constant for purposes of this illustration. We have no 
problem of determining the price at which wholesale bread is to 
sell. It was established by the price leadership of one of the small-
scale, high-cost firms at 16 cents per pound to cover his average 
total unit costs of 15.8 cents per pound on sales of 140,000 pounds 
per week. 
Assume first that firm A adopts output-increasing and cost-
reducing equipment and/or techniques of production which nearly 
double its production capacity and allow a considerable profit (1.5 
cents per pound) over production and selling costs with no change 
in output. This shift in its short-run cost structure down and to 
the right is suggested by the dotted cost structure, ATUCa> shown 
in Figure 10. Although the dominant firm D is making a good 
profit (1.3 cents per pound) on sales of 280,000 pounds per week 
and might be happy to leave things as they are, firm A has reduced 
its costs below those of D. The prospect of greater profits may 
induce firm D to adopt output-increasing and cost-reducing equip-
ment and/or techniques that have similar effects on productive 
capacity. This shift in its short-run cost structure down and to the 
right is suggested by the dotted cost structure, A TUCd, shown in Fig-
ure 10. 
Excess productive capacity (over and above the 700,000 weekly 
consumption in the market), which was formerly about 600,000 
pounds per week, now rises to 900,000 pounds per week after the 
technological changes introduced by two of the four firms in 
the market. 
Perhaps more important is recognition of the fact that the 
price-quantity solution in this type of market is made more unstable 
by technological change. Observers have recognized that "a com-
posite of local market oligopoly, of an outmoded distribution 
method, and of union influence on wholesale distribution costs"21 
provides a strong incentive for vertical integration of grocery chains 
into bread baking and delivery to their own stores in efficient semi-
trailer volumes. What has been little recognized is that a grocery 
chain with sales of 350,000 pounds of bread per week, in a market 
with similar conditions to those hypothesized in the model, may 
be attracted to the production of bread through construction of new, 
efficient bread plants. 
Such a chain could operate a 4,000 pound per hour automatic 
21. Richard B. Heflebower, "Mass Distribution: A Phase of Bilateral Oligopoly 
or of Competition?" American Economic Review (May, 1957), p. 280. 
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continuous-mix plant at practical capacity of 108 hours per week 
(similar to ATUCa, shown in Figure 10) at a saving in production 
costs of about three cents per pound below the wholesale price of 
16 cents. Since the total quantity of bread sold in the market remains 
almost static, the new firm's sales will cut into those of the wholesale 
baking companies in the market by about 350,000 pounds per week. 
All are producing at a smaller volume than before at lower levels 
of plant utilization and at higher total unit costs. As small-scale and 
high-cost firms Band C sell less, they are forced to operate in the 
area upwards and to the left of the point of operation shown in 
Figure 10 and suffer losses at existing prices. 
One of the small-scale high-cost firms becomes a price leader, and 
market price of wholesale brands is increased to cover the higher-
cost operations at lower levels of plant capacity. In most cases, 
large-scale lower-cost firms follow price increases to keep most of 
the small-scale members of the oligopoly group in business and 
avoid aggressive price cutting. 
The historic result in most bread markets is that consumers have 
realized little or no benefit from the progressive adoption of more 
efficient bread production technology. There is a strong tendency 
toward chronic underemployment of capital equipment in the 
bakery industry. This stems primarily from the adoption of new 
output-increasing equipment and/or techniques by bakery firms in 
spite of an almost static demand for bread. Adoption of new capital 
equipment is transformed into higher fixed costs and higher market 
prices because, even if some firms increase their efficiency or gain 
fuller plant utilization, their success tends to spread the excess 
capacity over the other competitors in the market. 
Excess capacity persists owing to the acquiescence of an oligopo-
listic market structure. Market organization is characterized by the 
dominance of an interdependent group of sellers whose costs of 
operating old and new equipment at less than full capacity are 
protected by price leadership. The tendency toward chronic excess 
capacity is a long way from being offset by merger and failure which 
result in scrapping of some plant equipment. 
In fact, it has been demonstrated that although the industry 
includes more than 5,000 firms, the plant capacity reported by the 
eight largest baking companies in 1958 combined with the bakery 
plant capacity owned by the eight largest grocery chains is about 
sufficient to supply current consumption levels of bread and bread 
type rolls. Excess investment (less depreciation) in bakery plant and 
equipment has been estimated as $300 to $400 million. 
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Potential Reduction in Distribution Costs 
Primary emphasis in Chapter 4 was on the development of 
short-run distribution cost curves from survey data. These observa-
tions have the limitation of the survey technique in that they fail 
to reflect optimum operation of the bread delivery system at mini-
mum cost levels. However, the relative efficiency of the wholesale 
driver-salesman route delivery system can be estimated by com-
paring it with a semi-trailer dock delivery system utilized by some 
retail grocery chains to deliver private label bread to their own 
stores, by some wholesale baking companies, and by common carrier 
trucking firms. Although no evidence is developed on least-cost 
organization of semi-trailer dock delivery to grocery stores, the 
system does represent a practical alternative to the driver-salesman 
system and average cost studies suggest sizable potential reductions 
in bread distribution costs (Table 25). 
There are two important areas of potential adjustment in bread 
distribution which will be discussed here and which may lead to 
sizable cost reductions. These are: (I) adoption of a distribution 
organization which would facilitate the specialization of delivery, 
display, and billing labor by function; ins tore disposal of day-old 
bread; and newspaper advertisement of bread prices; which would 
bring individual distribution cost curves down to the long-run cost 
curve, and (2) movement along the long-run distribution cost curve 
by increasing size of the delivery vehicle. 
Potential long-run industrial savings are estimated t~ be about 
$270 million per year for the specialization of delivery, display, 
and billing labor by function, $63 million per year for ins tore dis-
posal of day-old bread, $92 million for exclusive use of newspaper 
general food advertisement, $30 million for increasing the size of 
delivery vehicle, and $75 million for associated miscellaneous sav-
ings in sales supervision, etc. This amounts to more than one-half 
billion dollars per year in potential distribution cost reductions, 
or about 30 percent of bread and bread type roll sales by whole-
sale baking companies in 1958 (excluding retail margins). 
These considerations do not exhaust the possibilities for 
improved efficiency and economy in bread distribution. For exam-
ple, the assumption is made that bread will be delivered fresh within 
24 hours after baking. But bread might be distributed in frozen form 
within the established frozen food channels. Preliminary reports by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture indicate that frozen bread dis-
tribution could result in a cost reduction of about 2 cents per pound 
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below distribution costs via the existing system of wholesale driver-
salesmen delivery and selling.22 
A comparison of the driver-salesman system with the grocery 
dock delivery system suggests the relative weights to attach to various 
bread distribution factors now used inefficiently, and hence the 
direction of possible remedy. In addition to the specific results 
presented in Table 25, the relationships provide a basis for reorgan-
ization of distribution in particular market situations. While the 
TABLE 25 
EmMATED DISTRIBUTION CoST REDUcnONS THAT WOULD RESULT FROM POSSIBLE 
ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, BREAD AND BREAD TYPE ROLLS DISTRIBUTED 
WHOLESALE THROUGH GROCERY STORES, UNITED STATES, 1958 
Avera~ Costs per Pound 
of et Bakery Sales Cost Reduc· Estimated 
Wholesale Semi· Trailer tion per Total Cost 
Alternative Driver- Dock Pound of Reduction, 
Organization Salesman Delivery Net Bakery U. S., 1958f 
System System Sales (million 
(cents) (cents) (cents) dollars) 
Instore disposal 
of surplus product" 0.80 0.17 0.63 $ 63 
Semi-trailer 
delivery vehicleb 1.00 0.70 0.30 $ 30 
Specializa tion of 
labor delivery" 3.00 0.30 2.70 $270 
Joint food newspaper 
advertising" 1.00 0.08 0.92 $ 92 
Associated miscella-
neous saving" 1.00 0.25 0.75 $ 75 
Aggregate cost reduction 
in wholesale 
distribu tion 6.80 1.50 5.30 $530 
SoURCE: See Chapter 5 for sources of average costs of distribution via driver·salesman and 
semi-trailer dock delivery systems. Specific sources and standards of efficient bread distribu-
tion services are Kiven below. 
"Estimate based on a study of the stale bread problem by the Stanford Food Research 
Institute, which concluded that a loss of 0.5 to 1.0 percent is an attainable standard, and 
"losses above 1.0 percent reflect obiectionable trade practices, poor business management, or 
both." Davis and Eldred, op. cit., p. 7. 
b Using accounting records of representative dock delivery to grocery stores in large Mid-
western markets utilizing semi-trailer vehicles, 48,000 pounds per week, delivery vehicle costs 
are about 0.7 cents per pound. 
• Using the same source as above, semi-trailer truck driver expenses are about 0.5 cents 
per pound. Instore functions such as ordering and display servicing are transferred from the 
wholesale driver-salesman to specialized instore personnel, and are compensated for out of 
the gross retail store marilin, as is the case for most food products distributed through grocery 
stores. 
d Estimated advertisinll and promotion allowance reductions that would result from the 
exclusive use of newspaper general food ads, based on reported chain store costs of private 
label bread advertising of 0.08 cents per pound in 1958. Report, op. cit., p. 113 . 
• Associated savinllS in sales supervision and accounting is a residual estimate based on 
calculated total dock delivery costs of 1.5 cents per pound and average wholesale distribution 
costs of 6.8 cents per pound as presented in Chapter 4 of this study. 
f Same source as Table 24, adiusted. An estimated 76 percent, or $1.719 million of annual 
sales of bread and bread type rolls estimated at $2,262 million in 1958, were by wholesale 
baking companies. The estimated total cost reductions are calculated on the basis of $1,719 
million sales. 
22. Enochian, op. cit., p. 5. 
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conditions under which bread is distributed to grocery stores differ 
very little from market to market, day-old bread loss and labor con-
tract specifications including commission rates show pronounced 
variation. Specific factor costs can be substituted for the average 
cost levels shown in Table 25, and the revised relationships used to 
make meaningful estimates of the costs and savings that could be 
expected from reorganization in particular geographic and histori-
cal situations. 
With the many institutional barriers to change that exist in 
bread markets, it is doubtful that more than a few of these adjust-
ments with their attendant savings can be actually achieved in the 
short run. The driver-salesman commission system of daily delivery 
of a single product class to individual grocery store shelves by about 
one-half dozen wholesale baking companies is supported by Team-
sters Union contract and by individual baking companies, each 
bent upon obtaining a favorable shelf position within individual 
grocery stores. Nor are most retail grocery firms that operate on a 
fixed percentage margin of bread sales likely to favor a bread distri-
bution system which transfers costs of instore servicing of bread 
shelves and billing to grocery firms. Although gross grocery store 
margins on bread of 16-17 percent in 1958 were not appreciably 
lower than average store margins on grocery items of 17.9 percent 
in medium-sized chains,23 most groceries are delivered to retail store 
docks or distribution centers, and instore display and order serv-
icing are a normal cost of retail grocery firms. 
It is estimated that reorganization of bread and bread type roll 
distribution to achieve the cost reductions associated with semi-
trailer dock delivery of wholesale bread to retail outlets would dis-
place about 30,000 delivery and sales employees, in both direct and 
indirect categories. This estimate is based on Census reports that 
wholesale baking companies with 90 percent or more specialization 
in bread and bread type rolls employed about 40,000 non-production 
employees in 1958. These companies had sales of $1,362 million, 
virtually all bread and bread type rolls, or 79.2 percent of the total 
wholesale sales of those products. If we assume these firms had the 
same share of wholesale delivery and sales employees as they had of 
it sales, we obtain an estimate of about 50,000 workers in both 
direct and indirect wholesale distribution jobs. A reasonable opti-
23. DeLoach, op. cit., p. 22; and Wilbur B. England, Operating Results Of 
Food Chains in 1958, Harvard University Bureau of Business Research Bulletin 
No. 156 (Cambridge, 1960), P. 10. Markup OD groceries is less than for frozen 
foods, produce, meat, and nonfood items, but costs are also lower. 
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mum-sized semi-trailer dock delivery system can handle 12,000 
pounds per trip, and a single truck can average four trips per week, 
delivering about 48,000 pounds per week to retail outlets. This is 
more than ten times the average volume for a large sample of 
wholesale driver-salesman bread routes reported as 4,714 pounds per 
week in 1958.24 Some of the over-all saving in bread delivery labor 
would be offset by increased ins tore labor requirements. The dis-
placed bread distribution employees, as in the case of displaced pro-
duction workers, could be retrained and assisted in their movement 
out of the baking industry into other industries where rapid growth 
in labor requirements develops. A hypothetical fund of approxi-
mately one-half billion dollars created by shifting the distribution 
of bread and bread type rolls to the semi-trailer dock delivery 
system could be partially devoted to facilitating this transition. 
The Costs of Nonprice Competition 
If the efficiencies from increased distribution volume and spe-
cialization of the delivery function by semi-trailer dock delivery are 
as large as suggested in Table 25, why have not the most efficient 
firms continued to grow until they achieved optimum efficiency? 
Performance in wholesale bread markets appears closely associated 
with the oligopolistic nature of market structure and conduct 
(although other variables may be equally important). The general 
pattern of price leadership within oligopolistic groups of wholesale 
baking companies has been shown to result in prices for wholesaler 
brands which are virtually uniform in a particular bread market. 
In the short run, price and quality of product are largely pre-
determined. Individual companies are therefore more concerned 
with varying costs and volume of sales. Under the protection of 
price leadership, firms focus competitive tactics on preserving their 
market shares. They struggle for sales volume by attempting to 
differentiate their products. This results in selling expenses which 
shift the firm's average total unit cost curve upwards. The public 
benefits from this kind of competition in markets characterized 
by inelastic demand can easily be exaggerated. 
The effects on consumer demand and on bread prices of such 
features of non price competition as advertising, product variation, 
special packaging, and servicing are clear enough. The evidence 
refutes the popular thesis that these non price methods of competi-
tion increase demand by informing or convincing potential buyers 
24. Hearings, ap. cit., p. 6593. 
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of the desirability of the product and the thesis that larger sales 
result in expanded output, which lowers cost through economies of 
scale, so consumers can buy at lower prices. If firm A's special selling 
effort is effective, sales and production presumably expand for firm 
A. But as a result of the inalterable fact of inelastic demand for 
bread, the increased sales of firm A mean that fewer people in the 
market are buying firm B's bread and its production decreases. 
Firm A's combined production and distribution costs may decline, 
but at least in the postwar years the consumer has seldom bene-
fited by paying a lower price for bread. In many cases, of course, 
depending on the strength of the contending non price promotion 
strategies within the market group, firm A has attracted enough sales 
away from firm B to force it to abandon the market. Some of firm 
A's larger revenues from expanded sales have paid for continued 
non price competition to maintain the firm's advantage over other 
firms C and D in the market, and price competition tends to be 
studiously avoided. The more general market conduct since World 
War II, however, has been for firm B to retaliate and adopt means 
of nonprice competition similar to those of firm A. If firm B is to 
avoid lower production volume with its higher costs, it is compelled 
by its market interdependence with firm A to increase its selling 
costs along with firm A. As the evidence in Chapter 5 indicates, 
most of these increased selling costs have been consistently passed 
on to the consumer in the form of higher bread prices. 
This type of market conduct is illustrated in Figure II. The 
situation shown in the figure is one of a wholesale market for stan-
dard wholesaler brands of bread. The demand curve DBDB shows 
the quantity of these brands that can be sold at varying prices in 
this market area. We assume, for purposes of illustration, that four 
wholesale baking companies are established in this market area. 
Three are small-scale, relatively high-cost firms and one is a larger-
scale relatively low-cost firm. The dominant firm A has bread sales 
of 280,000 pounds per week, which represents plant utilization of 
only about 48 hours per week. Assume that dominant firm A ini-
tiates a new promotion campaign (a net addition to A TUCa) cost-
ing $1,400 per week. This results in a shift in its short-run cost 
structure upwards as suggested by the dotted cost structure, A TUCa, 
shown in Figure II. 
Firms B, C, and D may either wait until they experience losses 
in volume or act immediately in anticipation of them. If they are 
eager to survive, they immediately adopt retaliatory tactics of non-
price competition (also costing $1,400 per week) which result in a 
(19.4) , 
\ATUCbl \ 
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FIG. H.-Average total unit costs and market price before and after introduc-
tion of a new selling cost into a bread market. 
shift in their short-run cost curves upward as suggested by dotted 
cost structure ATUCb, in Figure 11. The impact of the introduc-
tion of a given advertising budget on large and small plants and on 
market price is immediately apparent. In this illustration, the 
increase in firm A's average unit costs is one-half cent per pound 
and in those of firms B, C, and D is one cent per pound, or twice 
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that of firm A. Since total demand for the product is not increased, 
these increased selling costs must be passed on to the consumer in 
the form of higher prices unless one of the small-scale, high-cost 
firms is squeezed out. One of the high-cost firms may take the ini-
tiative as a price leader and raise the market price of wholesale 
brands from 16 cents to 17 cents per pound. Other firms follow, 
including the dominant large-scale firm, to keep most of the small-
scale firms in business and to avoid aggressive price cutting. 
The costs to the consumer of non price competition under an 
umbrella of price leadership are twofold. First, the structure and 
conduct features of bread markets have a direct cost-push effect 
on bread prices that is obvious in the upward shift of short-run 
average total unit cost curves. Table 26 shows in a general way the 
effects on costs of increased market services and sales promotion 
since 1940. Distribution costs rose from about 27 percent of whole-
sale baking company sales in 1940 to 29 percent in 1947, and to 
approximately 40 percent in 1958, the latest year for which data 
are available. 
TABLE 26 
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION COSTS OF WHOLESALE BAKING COMPANIES, UNITED STATES, 
1940, 1947, AND 1958' 
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SOURCE: The 1940 data, where available, are from reports of 82 companies with aggregate 
s!lles of $329.8. million, representinll' 37 percent whole.ale bread product sales of $904.2 mil-
hon reported m the 1939 census. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Distribution 
~etho~ and Costs, Part I, Important Food Products (Washington, D. C.; Government Print-
mg OffIce, 1943, p. 58. The 1947 and 1958 estimates are calculated from sources as reported 
in Chapter 4 . 
• Excludes retail margins. 
b 9ales value of wholesale bakery output reported as $1,765 million in 1947 and $2,808 
million in 1958. See Table !. 
C Primarily sales supervision, special in.tore promotion and miscellaneous sellinII' expenses. 
4 Advertising expense for 1958 is a composite of advertising expenditures reported for the 
four largest bakinll' companies of about 4 percent of sales, wholesale bakeries affiliated with 
the three larll'est management cooperatives of 4.4 percent of sales, unaffiliated wholesale 
bakeries of about 5.2 percent of sales. See Chapter 5 for these data and similar sources for 
1947. Other sellinII' cost estimates for 1947 and 1958 are composites of reported averall'e costs 
from the same sources. See Chapter 4. 
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In current dollars,· this represents an increase from less than 
one-quarter billion dollars in 1940 to more than one billion dollars 
in 1958. Much of this increase was due to the costs of various forms 
of non price competition in bread markets. The practice of massed 
display of products on grocery shelves is largely responsible for an 
increase in the cost of stale bread loss from $34 million in 1947 to 
about $138 million in 1958. About 5 percent of the value product 
of wholesale baking companies is wasted, or relegated to a lower 
value use such as animal feed, through stale-return loss. The prac-
tice of advertising to differentiate products and to create consumer 
preference for wholesaler brands over private label grocery brands 
has added substantially to bread costs. Advertising expenditures by 
wholesale baking companies increased from about $25 million in 
1940 to about $130 million in 1958. Despite this sizable advertising 
expenditure, per capita consumption of the industry'S products has 
continued to decline by about 1 percent per year, and it is doubtful 
whether society or the industry benefits appreciably from recent 
levels and types of bread advertising. Alleged product improve-
ments in the form of wrapper variation, loaf twisting, upside-down 
baking, and multiple loaf sizes have undoubtedly raised the cost of 
bread production with little or no enhancement of quality, or 
wider real choice among products by consumers.25 
Costs of these forms of non price competition are difficult to dis-
cover because they are hidden in broad ill-defined classifications in 
business operating statements, as are the costs of ins tore service and 
promotion practices of driver-salesmen. Combined costs of driver-
salesmen delivery, service, and other promotion costs (less direct 
advertising) increased from $316 million in 1947 to about $693 
million in 1958, or more than twice the immediate postwar costs. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, the sizable increase in driver-
salesman commission rates won by the Teamsters Union explains 
only about 40 percent of the expansion in these delivery and instore 
promotion costs. The rest is explained by the decline in average 
route volume to 70 percent of 1947 levels, as sales promotion time 
of drivers has increased. 
The second important cost to consumers of nonprice competi-
• Part of the increase noted is due to price inflation. 
25. Compare the average price of 52 serviced and unserviced foods including 
bread in three large chain stores, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1957. Roland 
G. Harris and Philip B. Dwoskin, "Convenience Food and Their Costs to Con-
sumers," The Marketing and Transportation Situation (July, 1958), pp. 27-33; 
also, Journal of Home Economics (November, 1957), pp. 717-719; and Baking 
Industry Magazine (August 6, 1960), p. 69. 
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tion is its effect on the efficiency of distribution and production. 
The use of any cost level above that of the least-cost organization of 
production and delivery as the basis for cost-barometric price leader-
ship reduces the pressure upon all firms to increase their efficiency 
and reduce their costs. The extent to which prices are permitted to 
exceed the costs of least-cost organization determines the pressure 
applied to the less efficient. Too little pressure means increasing 
divergence from optimum performance with respect to both distri-
bution and production efficiency. 
Under conditions of economically adequate performance of the 
wholesale driver-salesman route system, increases in volume per 
delivery and per route would result in a movement along the short-
run route cost curve, and the lower unit distribution cost of 
increased efficiency would result in lower bread prices to the con-
sumer. A sizable increase in the average sales of bread per grocery 
store in the postwar years provided the opportunity for the whole-
sale driver-salesman route system to realize increased efficiency asso-
ciated with economies of scale in delivery. In 1958, supermarkets 
(grocery stores with more than $375,000 annual sales) accounted for 
69 percent of total grocery store sales as compared with only 43 per-
cent in 1952. However, the best available evidence suggests the 
opportunities for greater efficiency in bread distribution have not 
been realized; quite the reverse has occurred. 
A representative sample of wholesale baking companies exper-
ienced a 30 percent decline in weekly wholesale route volume from 
6,746 pounds in 1947 to 4,714 pounds in 1958, and an 18 percent 
decline in weekly volume per customer from 135 pounds in 1947 
to llO pounds in 1958.26 Although the number of customers per 
route declined from 50 in 1947 to 43 in 1958, weekly miles traveled 
per customer increased from eight to ten miles. If we assume con-
stant 1958 factor prices for purposes of comparison, the route cost 
relationships presented in Chapter 4 suggest that delivery costs 
increased by 1.5-2.0 cents per pound as a result of these changes in 
route factors: a decrease in volume per route, a decrease in volume 
per delivery, and an increase in length of route. 
Although the driver-salesman system of bread distribution prob-
ably cannot be expected to equal the efficiency levels of the semi-
trailer dock delivery system, it clearly could have approached more 
adequate performance levels in recent years had it merely main-
tained the efficiency levels achieved in 1947. Instead, distribution 
26. Hearings, ap. cit., p. 6084. 
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of bread products has become more inefficient as the competing 
firms, under the cost protection of price leadership, focused com-
petition on nonprice tactics to maintain or gain market shares. 
Virtually all wholesale baking companies in an individual market 
attempt to sell bread in all retail grocery outlets within the area. 
Their market is shared on shelves within retail grocery outlets rather 
than store by store or areawise. Therefore, in competing to hold 
their share of shelf space, they deliver daily and often more fre-
quently than that. They also attend to the placing and arrange-
ment of bread on the grocery shelves. The result is that wholesale 
baking firms in general deliver to many stores with a small drop per 
store, making inefficient use of both distribution equipment and 
labor. Moreover, competitors extend distribution to stores at a 
greater distance from their plants. Even if they recognize that the 
most extended routes are inefficient, they are often compelled to 
continue them either to foreclose the invasion of their area or to 
retaliate against other firms. The result is that all wholesale baking 
companies that extend their routes experience an increase in distri-
bution cost, as shown above, without an offsetting gain in average 
route volume. 
Summary: Net Market Performance 
The analysis thus far has considered several important criteria 
of market performance which have a bearing on the general welfare. 
These criteria have been examined individually, including the price, 
profit, and product norms, the efficiency of production and distribu-
tion, and the costs of non price competition. The relative importance 
of these factors is continually changing. Some apply to one segment 
or area of the industry and some to others. The important considera-
tion remains to combine these criteria and establish within reason-
able limits an estimate of the net performance of bread markets. 
In other words, how well does the total market activity of baking 
companies contribute to the public welfare? 
It is often assumed by observers of industrial markets that 
changes in the product, price, and profit criteria of market per-
formance are of primary importance. If it can be shown that the 
available economic improvements in product quality have occurred, 
if prices have a reasonable relationship to average total unit costs, 
and profit levels are not higher than experienced in all manufac-
turing, then performance of an industry may be said to be adequate 
(although perhaps less than optimum), and contributing satisfac-
torily to the general material welfare. Indeed the evidence with 
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respect to bakery profits supports the assumption that average profit 
levels of wholesale baking companies are not appreciably higher 
than those in all manufacturing, and at 1958 levels, have little 
impact on the general material welfare. While bread prices have 
advanced rapidly since World War II, they are closely related to 
changes in average total unit costs, at least in large-city markets 
(70 percent of U.S. consumption). Moreover, consumers often have 
the opportunity to purchase alternative private label brands in 
grocery chains at lower prices than wholesale brands. While real 
improvements in product quality have been very limited, there 
is little or no evidence that quality has deteriorated since World 
War II. 
A consideration of these few performance criteria, however, is 
not sufficient to understand the performance of bread markets. In 
fact, the findings of this study lend support to the proposition that 
changes in the product and profit criteria may be secondary rather 
than primary determinants of performance in these markets. The 
conduct of firms in individual markets with respect to product 
quality seems to be largely predetermined, and prices of wholesaler 
brands are quite similar as profit levels tend to be protected by a 
pattern of price leadership. Individual companies are therefore more 
concerned with varying costs and output. 
This study finds that the performance of bread markets with 
respect to cost and output primarily reflect the market power of 
oligopoly groups and changes in technology. The oligopoly market 
structure in wholesale bread markets is associated with interde-
pendent conduct of enterprises with respect to pricing policies, non-
price practices and plant utilization as was shown in earlier chap-
ters. In large part, no individual firm can independently have a 
beneficial effect upon market performance without risking serious 
economic repercussions for itself or for the oligopoly market group 
in question. Yet, technical advance in bakery equipment, in the 
transport and handling of bakery products, and in food merchandis-
ing in general are dynamic variables tending to bring about eco-
nomic change in bread markets. 
The performance of bread markets with respect to the introduc-
tion of efficient equipment and techniques of production, while less 
than optimum, has probably approached adequacy. Yet in oligopo-
lis tic bread markets, consumers have thus far realized little or no 
benefit from the progressive adoption of more efficient bread pro-
duction technology. 
Moreover, there is a tendency toward chronic under-utilization 
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of capital equipment and failure to achieve economies of scale in 
the baking industry. The study has revealed important potential 
savings in bread production and distribution. The "efficiency gap" 
between actual and necessary costs (in relation to given input 
prices) to provide the consumer with bread products suggests the 
performance of wholesale bread markets in 1958 was adequate 
except for the average retail price of bread which, at 19.3 cents per 
pound, was about 50 percent higher than would be required to 
cover necessary costs. This measure between where the industry 
is and where it could be if the economy were to make full use of 
its resources without straining productive capacity is in part a 
measure of the aggregate costs of oligopoly. 
A comparison of the existing system with an optimum market 
organization suggests the direction of possible adjustment of unde-
sirable market conditions which annually cost the American public 
more than one billion dollars. The more than $520 million poten-
tial production cost reduction could be realized by long-run adjust-
ments in size of plant to 8,000 pounds per hour capacity, by adopt-
ing automatic continuous-mix machinery, and by operating the 
remaining plants at practical capacity levels (dependent in part on 
consumer willingness to benefit from early-week shopping). The esti-
mated $530 million potential distribution and selling cost reduc-
tions could be realized by reorganization of the wholesale driver-
salesman delivery system to semi-trailers and dock delivery. Some 
progress is being made toward achieving these potential economies, 
as noted throughout this report, but there are important institu-
tional barriers at work that seem to account for the sizable lag 
in bread market performance. 
While individual baking companies often have good economic 
reasons for technological adoption and plant expansion, such devel-
opments may be a mixed blessing for consumers, farmers, and some 
bakery companies. New output-increasing equipment and techniques 
of production have considerable potential for reducing costs as noted 
above. But levels of cost and output are not autonomous forces; in 
bread markets they are largely determined by the conduct of the 
industry itself. The alternatives open to bakery management include 
some variation of the following market conduct patterns: 
(1) price competition to force bread prices to cost levels consistent 
with the increased efficiencies of larger plants and with a 
decrease in the number of bakeries (perhaps his own included); 
or 
(2) price leadership which provides an "umbrella" covering pro-
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duction and distribution costs experienced by existing plants 
operating at considerably less than capacity. 
Empirical and logical bases have been developed in this study 
for the proposition that firms participating in oligopolistically struc-
tured markets generally have chosen the latter forms of market 
conduct. Firms tend to orient interfirm conduct around non price 
competition to increase their shares of bread markets. The resulting 
increase in seIling costs has little or no beneficial effect on consumers. 
Per capita demand for the industry's products has declined by 
about I percent per year, and whatever changes in market share 
distribution have occurred among the oligopoly market groups have 
not been associated with lower costs and prices. This is because if 
some firms in oligopoly-structured markets increase their efficiency 
or gain fuller utilization of capital equipment, their success tends 
to shift excess capacity among participants in the market whose 
costs are increased. It is also due to mutual interdependence of oli-
gopolists with respect to advertising, product variation, special pack-
aging and servicing. Immediate immitation or retaliation usually 
ocurs, with the result that seIling costs in bread markets increase 
with little or no beneficial shift in output between participants. 
The general pattern of price leadership within oligopolistic 
groups of wholesale baking companies is usually of the cost baro-
metric type, and is designed to keep market price comfortably above 
costs experienced by the group. IIIegal price collusion and discrim-
ination are seldom found in bread markets, for price leadership 
tends to protect the industry from destructive price competition and 
has the advantage of being legal. High cost firms have raised prices 
to cover costs of inefficient production and distribution with virtual 
certainty that other members of large-city market groups would 
follow, even though they may be more efficient. Price leadership 
has not usually provided the competitive discipline to drive out the 
higher-cost producers, or to force the remaining firms to operate 
at efficient levels of utilization of production and distribution facili-
ties. Quite the reverse tends to occur. The market power of oligipoly 
groups in large-city bread markets tend to shield inefficient baking 
companies and sustain inefficient market practices. 
The few exceptions to this practice are largely short run, inter-
segment, or a part of pricing tactics used by members of the oligop-
oly group in large-city markets to invade outlying areas of these 
markets. These modify but do not alleviate the more general price 
conduct and market performance pattern. As a result of increased 
plant capacity and grocery chain integration into baking, members 
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of the large-city oligopoly core have encroached upon outlying areas. 
Large-city bakers have practiced differential pricing and various 
nonprice share-gaining techniques in outlying areas beyond those 
practices common within the oligopoly core of large-city markets. 
The single-market firm in outlying areas is often unable to match 
these increased distribution and selling efforts, and usually dares not 
compete on price because of its vulnerability to price retaliation. 
Thus, there has been a gradual encroachment of the outlying market 
areas by the major wholesale bakers and an increase in concentra-
tion in the baking industry. 
We can expect continued adjustment to fewer and larger bak-
eries. Just how far this adjustment will go is not yet clear, but poten-
tial economies are sizable. Findings of this study suggest that com-
pany growth in markets already served would better approach 
optimum economies of scale in bread distribution than further 
geographic expansion into additional market areas. Although we 
have not attempted here an exhaustive study of the economies of 
large multi-plant and multi-market company organizations, we have 
demonstrated that as these firms meet in several individual markets 
their rivalry expressed through price competition tends to diminish. 
If company growth occurs in markets already served, con-
centration which often is already high may become higher, yet costs 
may decrease as aggressive non price competitive rivalry may dimin-
ish, a development which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for price reduction. It is our judgment that public policy toward 
maintaining competitive market structures through placing certain 
restraints on growth via merger should consider these different 
single- and multi-market effects. 
This is not a study of the performance of the grocery retailing 
industry, but it has found that grocery chains have achieved marked 
efficiencies in distribution and selling without, however, consistently 
passing these savings on to the consumer in the form of higher 
quality or lower price. We find that a degree of bilateral oligopoly 
behavior often develops between an oligopolistic group of wholesale 
baking companies and an oligopsonistic group of corporate and 
voluntary grocery chains in which the chains often follow in both 
price and quality. Certainly, the private label bread price differen-
tial in many bread markets more nearly reflects general grocery chain 
price policy than necessary bread production and distribution costs. 
This study opens a large area of legal-economic research. While 
it has dealt specifically with bread markets, the potential gains to 
the public from reorganization of bread market structure and con-
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duct may not be unique among food markets in the American econ-
omy. Other studies have demonstrated similar technological and 
organizational problems-for example, in milk marketing.27 These 
studies provide some of the information necessary to focus the 
forces of public opinion and of the law on the whole problem of 
attaining optimum market organization. 
27. Bressler, op. cit., p. 344-345; Clarke, op. cit. 
Appendix 
Date: February 1958 
CONTRACT AND SCALE REPORT 
a service of 
AMERICAN BAKERS ASSOCIATION 
Union: Teamsters #204 Market area: Omaha, Nebr. 
Contract Dates: 5/5/57 to 5/7 /60 Population: 250,000 
Opening permitted during term: No Barg. method: Joint 
Branch of industry: Wholesale Bread/Cake 
1. Occupational Wage Rates:' 
Salesmen-$74.752 base pay on 1st $275 in weekly sales &: 6% on sales between 
$275 &: $525 &: 7% on all sales over $525 weekly. Guaranteed $772 per week. 
Salesmen (exclusive cake &: sweet goods) $74.75" base pay on first $225 in 
wkly sales &: 6% on sales from $225 to $525, 7% on sales over $525 wkly, 
guar $77" wk. Salesmen on route before taking responsibility for it, $72" 
1st 4 months, $772 after 4 months. 
Eff. Eff. 
5/5/57 12/29/57 
Transport Drivers $2.13V3 $2.09Ys 
City store delivery 2.05 2.00 
Stockroom drivers 2.00 1.95 
Maintenance drivers 1.86 1.81 
Special delivery drivers 1.78 1.73 
2. Working time: 6-daywk. City 54 hrs., country 60 hrs (not inel check-in or 
lunch). City men off sts 3:30 P, country 5P (day bef dropout or hoI 1 hr 
addit). Exclus ck &: sweet goods off sts 5P. Non-commis dr guar 40 hrs in 
6 days exc transp 48 hrs. 
3. Principle changes in previous contract: Eff 5/5/57 sales base &: guar incr 
$4 wk &: hrly rated incr 10¢' hour. Eff 12/29/57 employer contrib $2 week to 
Pensions &: all rates dropped $2 week or 5¢' per hour. Eff 5/4/58 conditions 
changed as indicated in.' 
4. Shift differentials: no provision. 
5. Overtime provisions: Transport drivers, 1 Y2 time after 12 hours daily or 
51 hours weekly. Special delivery, city store drivers, stockroom and main-
tenance drivers, I Y2 time after 8 hours daily and 40 hours in 6 days and 
I Y2 time after 32 hours in holiday week. 
6. Vacations: I week after I year of service 
2 weeks after 3 years of service 
3 weeks after 12 years of service 
Vacation pay for salesmen based on earnings of route during vacation period. 
Hourly paid get regular weekly pay for vacation. If holiday in vacation period, 
, Wkly rated reported in item I will be incr. elf 5/4/58 by $4 wk, $2.25 of which may 
be applied to Teamsters Health Be WeI Fund at union's option Be 5/S/59 wkly rates iner $11 
wk, but $2 may be applied to Teams Pension Fund at union'. option. All other employees 
incr proportionately on the same dates. 
• Betw 5/5/57 Be 12/29/57 rate was $2 wk higher but on 12/29/57 base pay Be also guar, 
in case of salesmen, were reduced $2 wk Be the $2 was diverted to cover employer contribu· 
tion to Teamsters Pensioll Plan. 
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get $10 hoi pay & get extra day off or extra day's pay at management's option. 
7. Holidays: 6 holidays. Salesmen & extra salesmen $10 hoi pay if work wk 
in which hoi occurs. Transport drivers pd for time lost due to hoI. No. 
Sun or HoI deliv of baked goods to stores. Spec deliv to restaurants, hotels, 
hospitals, etc okay. No Xmas delivery. Hrly workers get 8 hrs pay for 
hoI. Ill:! time after 32 hours. 
8. Health and Welfare Or Pension plans: Eff 12/29/57 employer contrib $2 
wk per employee to Teamsters Pension Fund' and • 
9. Uniforms: If uniforms reqUired, selected by employer. Employer pay t2 
of cost, but it remains property of employee who must clean & maintain It. 
Unif shall bear union label & consist of cap, shirt, trousers, coat, sweater & 
anything else required by employer. 
10. Miscellaneous: No strike, no lockout cl. Checkoff clause. 
TABLE 27 
UTILIZATION OF WHEAT FOR FOOD IN THE UNITED STATES, BY INDUSTRY GROUPS, 
TOTAL POUNDS, AND PER CAPITA, 1947, 1954, AND 1958 
Industry Wheat Flour Utilization 
1947 1954 1958 
BreaUcroducts 
I, 0 pounds 8,273,500 8,656,077 9,175,452 
percent 41.7 43.3 45.3 
Retail bake Sh'dsS 
1,000 poun s 1,855,400 1,195,491 1,191,141 
percent 9.3 6.0 5.9 
Crackers and cookies 
1,000 pounds 1,428,800 1,723,161 1,962,652 
percent 7.2 8.6 9.7 
Macaroni products 
1,000 pounds 833,800 805,853 906,846 
percent 4.2 4.0 4.5 
Breakfast cereal 
1,000 pounds 362,618 363,345 372,969 
percent 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Flour mixes 
1,000 pounds 602,459 795,851 891,590 
percent 3.0 4.0 4.4 
Other· 
Per Capita Wheat 
Percent Flour Utilization 
Change (pounds) 
1947·58 1947 1954 1958 
10.9 57.9 54.6 52.7 
-35.8 13.0 7.5 6.8 
37.4 10.0 10.9 11.3 
8.8 5.8 5.1 5.2 
2.9 2.5 2.3 2.2 
47.9 4.2 5.0 5.1 
1,000 pounds 6,498,523 6,430,722 5,745,150 -11.6 45.5 40.6 33.0 
percent 32.7 32.2 28.4 
Total, U.S. 
1,000 pounds 19,854,900 19,970,500 20,245,800 1.9 139.0 126.0 116.3 
percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SoURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Census Of Manu-factures data . 
• Primarily household and restaurant consumption, but also includes smaIl amounts of 
miscellaneous food industry utilization. 
, Wltly rated reported in item I will be incr. elf 5/4/58 by $4 wk, $2.25 of which may 
be applied to Teamsters Health Be Wei Fund at union's option Be 5/3/59 wkly rates iner $3 
wk, but $2 may be applied to Teams Pension Fund at union's option. AlI other employees 
iner proponionately on the same dates. 
• Betw 5/5/57 Be 12/29/57 rate was $2 wk higher but on 12/29/57 base pay Be abo guar, 
in case of salesmen, were reduced $2 wk Be the $2 was diverted to cover employer contribu. 
tion to Teamsters Pension Plan. 
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TABLE 28 
FOOD WHEAT UTILIZATION INDUSTRIES, VALUE OF SHIPMENT, NUMBER OF COMPANIES, 
AND MARKET SHARE OF THE 4, 8, AND 20 LARGEST COMPANIES, WITH PERCENT 
CHANGE, UNITED STATES, 1947-1958 
4 Largest 8 Largest 20 Largest 
Value of Number of Com- Com- Com-
Census Industry Shipments Companies panies panies panies ($1,000) (number) (percent) (percent) (percent) 
Bread product industry 
5,985 16 26 36 1947 2,403,589 
1954 l!,O67,017 5,470 20 31 40 
1958 3,699,473 5,305 23 32 42 
Percent change 1947-58 53.9 -11.4 
Flour mix industry 
1947 78,442 115 41 60 78 
1954 254,136 123 73 82 92 
1958 262,720 112 75 86 94 
Percent change 1947-58 234.9 -2.67 
Flour industry 
1947 2,526,646 1,084 29 41 57 
1954 1,858,888 692 40 52 68 
1958 1,969,993 703 38 51 68 
Percent change 1917-58 -22.03 -35.15 
Cracker industry 
1947 540,222 249 72 77 85 
1954 757,193 262 71 78 85 
1958 915,760 280 65 72 82 
Percent change 1947-58 74.7 12.45 
Macaroni industry 
1947 112,094 219 23 35 56 
1954 149,656 226 26 37 58 
1958 167,510 205 25 41 64 
Percent change 1947-58 49.4 -6.39 
Breakfast cereal industry 
1947 284,320 55 79 91 98 
1954 345,843 37 88 95 99+ 
1958 432,974 23 83 95 99+ 
Percent change 1947-58 52.3 -58.18 
Retail bake shops 
1947 562,372 15,686 
1954 641,600 16,543 
1958 728,700 16,653 
Percent change 1947-58 29.6 6.16 
Total 
1947 6,507,685 23,393 
1954 7,074,333 23,353 
1958 8,205,133 23,281 
Percent change 1947-58 26.1 -4.79 
SoURCE: U.S. Census of Manufactures reports. 
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TABLE 29 
AVERAGE FAcroR COSTS OF PRODUcnON AND DISTRlBUnON, SELEcrED BAKERY 
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TABLE 30 
SELECfED PRODUcrrON COSTS' OF FOUR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH 
EQUIPMENT, UNITED STATES, 1959 
Model Plant Sizes 
Selected Cost Items 2000 4000 6000 
Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. 
Dollars Dollars Dollars 
Pans 15,000 25,000 35,000 
Pneumatic flour-handling 
48,000 60,000 72,000 equipment 
Fermentation room 
do-tros, and hoist 20,400 27,600 34,800 
Mixers and ingredient 
30.000 60,000 72,000 equipment 
Divided, rounder, overhead 
proofer, moulder-panner 36,000 45,600 66,000 
Proof box, monorail, 
and racks 24,000 36,000 48,000 
Oven 54,000 72,000 84,000 
Slicers and wrappers, conveyors 
to loading racks 21,600 48,000 72,000 
Total equipmentb 249,000 374,200 483,800 
Plant· 200,000 300,000 400,000 
Total plant and 
equipment 449,000 674,200 883,000 
Production labor 
Direct (per shift)d 1,220 1,391 1,819 
Indirect (fixed per week)· 1,400 1,400 2,600 
• Excluding variable costs which are shown in Tables 31 and 32. 


















• Total plant area divided 40 percent production, 30 percent material and ingredient stor-
age, and 30 percent shippinll". Plant ,·alued at $10 per foot. 
d Direct production labor based on engineering estimates of bakery equipment manufac-
turer. It was assumed that (a) the numbers of direct production workers per shift were 13 
for the 2000 lb./hr. plant, 15 for the 4000 lb./hr. plant, 20 for the 6000 lb./hr. plant, and 
23 for the 8000 lb./hr. plant; (b) all workers were guaranteed a minimum of 40 hours em-
ployment for the week they were employed at $2.00 per hour, with a six and one-half hour 
shift guarantee and time and one-half for over-time beyond ten hours; (c) all workers were 
employed for a five day week with swing men utilized to fill in on a rotation basis, to allow 
six day bakery production; (d) aU workers at each stage of the production process worked an 
amount of time equal to oven operating time; (e) all shifts induded one additional employee 
as superintendent at $2.50 per hour plus time and one-half for over-time; and (f) total labor 
costs were increased 7 percent for Social Security, Worker's Compensation, and vacation al-
lowance_ 
• Indirect production labor including janitor, maintenance, executive, and office salaries 
were derived from estimates by bakery consultants. Although this measure provides an ap-
proximation of the average level of administrative expenditure. relative to level of output 
and plant .ize, no data has been developed on optimum operations. 
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TABLE 31 
SELECfED PRODUCTION COSTS' OF FOUR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH AUTOMATIC 
EQUIPMENT, UNITED STATES, 1959 
Selected Cost Items Model Plant Sizes 
2000 4000 6000 
Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr. 
Dollars Dollars Dollars 
Pans 15,000 25,000 35,000 
Pneumatic flour 
handling equipment 48,000 60,000 72,000 
Continuous dough mix 150,000 150,000 300,000 
Automatic final 
proofer 78,000 90,000 102,000 
Oven 54,000 72,000 84,000 
Slicers and wrappers, 
conveyors to 
loading racks 21,600 48,000 72,000 
Depan-o-matic, pan 
16,800 19,200 21,600 return conveyor 
Cooler, conveyors 
78,000 90,000 to slicers 36,000 
Pan stacker and 
unstacker 19,200 20,400 21,600 
Total equipmentb 438,600 562,600 798,200 
Plant· 180,000 270,000 360,000 
Total ~lant and 
618,600 832,600 1,158,200 eqmpment 
Production labor 
Direct (per shift)d 449 535 621 
Indirect (fixed per week)· 1,400 1,400 2,600 
Total production labor 1,849 1,935 3,221 
a Excluding variable costs which are shown in Tables 33 and 34. 



















• Building size estimated at 10 percent less than for standard equipment due to continu-
ous dough mix floor space saving. Baker Process Co., a Division of Wallace and Tiernan, 
Inc., 25 Main Street, Belleville, N. J. 
d Direct production labor based on engineering estimates of bakery equipment manufac-
turer. It was assumed that (a) the numbers of direct production workers per shift were 
four for the 2000 lb./hr. plant, five for the 4000 lb./hr. plant, six for the 6000 lb./hr. plant, 
and eight for the 8000 lb./hr. plant; (b) all workers were guaranteed a minimum of 40 hours 
employment for the week they were employed at $2.00 per hour, with a six and one-half 
hour shift guarantee and time and one· half for over· time beyond ten hours; (c) all workers 
were employed for a five day week with swing men utilized to fill in on a rotation basis, to 
allow six day bakery production; (d) all workers at each stage of the production process 
worked an amount of time equal to oven operating time; (e) all shifts included one addi-
tional employee as superintendent at $2.50 per hour plus time and one-half for over· time, 
and (f) total labor costs were increased 7 percent for Social Security, Worker's Compensa-
tion and vacation allowance. 
e Indirect production labor including janitor, maintenance, executive, and office salaries 
were derived from estimates by bakery consultants. Although this measure provides an ap-
proximation of the average level of administrative expenditures relative to level of output 
and plant size, no data has been developed on optimum operations. 
TABLE S2 
AVERAGE FIXED AND VARIABLE UNIT CoSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH SrANDARD EQUIPMENT OPERATED UNDER CoNDITIONS OF 
AVERAGE DAILY VARIATION IN DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES, UNITED STATES 
FIXED COSTS VARIABLE CoSTS 
Ship-
ping Utili-
Invest- Indirect Direct Wrap- and ties and Total 
Type and Total Oven ment Return Produc- Total Produc- ping Misc_ Maint. Vari-
Size of Weekly Operating Depreci- on Invest- tion Fixed tion Ingred- Sup- Sup- Sup- able Total 
Plant Output- Time. ationb mente Labord Costs Labore ients f plies' plies' plies' Costs Costs 
Standard 
pounds/hr 
(Ibs.) (hours) (.............................................................................................. cents per pound 
capacity 
2000 
71,604 S6 .650 1.123 1.955 3.728 1.695 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.993 11.721 
107,406 54 .433 .748 1.304 I.7R5 1.609 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.909 10.394 
143,208 72 .325 .561 .978 1.864 1.693 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.993 9.857 
179,010 90 .260 .449 .782 1.491 1.541 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.841 9.332 
214,848 108 .216 .395 .652 1.263 1.609 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.909 9.172 
4000 
113,393 36 .621 1.101 1.235 2.957 1.234 4.90 1.02 _14 .24 7.534 10.491 
170,089 54 .414 .734 .823 1.971 1.172 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.452 9.443 
226,790 72 .310 .550 .617 1.477 1.234 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.534 9.011 
283,480 90 .248 .440 .494 1.182 1.123 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.423 8.605 
340,176 108 .207 .367 .412 .986 1.172 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.472 8.458 
6000 
214,848 36 .433 .760 .931 2.124 .869 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.169 9.293 
322,272 54 .287 .507 .621 1.415 .824 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.124 8.539 
429,696 72 .215 .380 .466 1.061 .869 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.169 8.230 
537,120 90 .173 .304 .372 .849 .791 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.091 7.940 ~ 644,544 108 .145 .253 .310 .708 .824 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.124 7.832 ~ 8000 
286,463 36 .400 .701 .977 2.078 .749 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.049 9.127 <1> ;:3 
429,694 54 .267 .467 .652 1.386 .710 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.010 8.396 ~ 
-. 572,926 72 .200 .350 .489 1.039 .749 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.049 8.088 ~ 
716,157 90 .161 .280 .391 .832 .681 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 6.981 7.81S 
859,392 108 .133 .233 .326 .692 .711 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.011 7.703 ""-
• See Table 16. ..... 
b Depreciation of plant and equipment is based on a 20·year schedule with the exception of pans which were depreciated on a six-year basi •. 0) 
• Return on investment (before taxes) is bud&eted at 10 percent per annum. ..... 
d See footnote e, Table 29 . 
• See footnote d. Table 29. 
f Based on averqe costs reported by an associated management group. 
TABLE 1I11 
AVEIlAGE FlXED AND VARIABLE UNlT COSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WlTH STANDARD EQUIPMENT OPEIlATED UNDER CONDlTlONS OF 
UNIFORM DAILY DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES, UNITED STATES 
-0'> 
FIXED COSTS VARIABLE CosTS 
N) 
S1!ip' 
Utili· ........ PIng 
Invest· Indirect Direct Wrap. and ties and Total 
Type and Total Oven ment Return Produc· Total Produc· ping Misc. Maint. Vari· "'i Size of Weekly Operating Depreci· on Invest· tion Fixed tion Ingred· Sup· Sup· Sup· able Total ;::s-o 
Plant Output Time ation ment Labor Costs Labor ients plies plies plies Costs Costs ~ 
Automatic (lbs.) (hours) ( ............................................................................................ cents per pound ........................................................................................... ) ~ 
pounds/hr 1:1 
capacity ;... 
-. 2000 ~ 
72,000 36 .646 1.116 1.944 1I.706 1.684 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.984 11.690 Otl 
96,000 48 .434 .837 1.458 2.779 1.516 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.816 10.595 ...... 
144,000 72 .323 .558 .972 1.8511 1.684 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.984 9.8117 ~ ~ 
192,000 96 .242 .419 .729 1.390 1.516 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.816 9.206 O! 
240,000 120 .194 .335 .583 1.112 1.516 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.816 8.928 '" 
288,000 144 .162 .279 .486 .927 1.516 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.816 8.7411 § 
4000 
144,000 36 .489 .867 . 972 2.328 .972 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.272 9.600 ...... '0 
192,000 48 .367 .650 .729 1.746 .874 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.174 8.920 -Il.. 
'4 288,000 72 .245 .433 .486 1.164 .972 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.272 8.436 J.. 384,000 96 .183 .325 .365 .87l1 .874 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.174 8.047 
'0 
480,000 120 .147 .260 .292 .699 .874 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.174 7.873 
'" 576,000 144 .122 .217 .243 .582 .874 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.174 7.756 00 
6000 
216,000 36 .430 .756 .926 2.112 .972 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.272 9.1I84 
288,000 48 .322 .567 .694 1.5811 .777 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.077 8.660 
432,000 72 .215 .378 .463 1.056 .864 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.164 8.220 
576,000 96 .162 .283 .347 .792 .777 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.077 7.869 
720,000 120 .129 .227 .278 .634 .777 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.077 7.711 
864,000 144 .107 .189 .232 .528 .777 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.077 7.605 
8000 
288,000 36 .398 .697 .972 2.067 .745 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.045 9.112 
284,000 48 .299 .523 .729 1.551 .670 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 6.970 8.521 
576,000 72 .199 .348 .486 1.033 .745 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 7.045 8.078 
768,000 96 .150 .261 .365 .776 .670 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 6.970 7.746 
960,000 120 .119 .209 .292 .620 .670 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 6.970 7.590 
1,152,000 144 .100 .174 .243 .517 .670 4.90 1.02 .14 .24 6.970 7.487 
fVl.1tD ....... • .'i:.!:t1nP 2e T2hl,. ~1. 
TABLE 34 
AVERAGE FIXED AND VARIABLE UNIT COSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT OPERATED UNDER CoNDITIONS OF 
AVERAGE DAILY VARIATION IN DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES, UNITED STATES 
FIXED CoSTS VARIABLE COSTS 
Ship· 
ping Utili· 
Invest· Indirect Direct Wrap· and ties and Total 
Type and Total Oven ment Return Produc· Total Produc· ping Misc. Main. Vari· 
Size of Weekly Operating Depreci· on Invest· tion Fixed tion Ingred· Sup. Sup· Sup· able Total 
Plant Output" Time· ationb mente Labor" Costs Labore ientst plies' plies' plies' Costs Costs 





71,604 36 .744 1.353 1.955 4.052 .508 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.168 10.220 
107,406 54 .496 .902 1.304 2.702 .483 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.143 8.845 
143,208 72 .372 .676 .978 2.026 .508 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.168 8.194 
179,010 90 .297 .541 .782 1.620 .463 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.123 7.743 
214,848 108 .247 .451 .652 l.350 .483 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.143 7.493 
4000 
113,393 36 .671 1.200 1.235 3.106 .472 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.132 9.238 
170,089 54 .447 .800 .823 2.070 .446 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.106 8.176 
226,790 72 .335 .600 .617 1.552 .472 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.132 7.684 
283,480 90 .267 .480 .494 1.241 .430 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.090 7.331 
340,176 108 .224 .400 .412 1.036 .448 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.108 7.144 
6000 
214,848 36 .556 .871 .931 2.358 .289 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.949 8.307 
322,272 54 .369 .581 .621 1.571 .274 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.934 7.505 
429,696 72 .278 .436 .466 1.180 .289 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.949 7.129 
537,120 90 .222 .348 .372 .942 .263 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.923 6.865 ~ 644,544 108 .185 .290 .310 .785 .274 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.934 6.719 ~ 
8000 ~ 
286,463 36 .447 .695 .977 2.119 .276 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.936 8.055 '" ;::s
429,694 54 .300 .463 .652 1.415 .263 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.923 7.338 ~ 
-. 572,926 72 .224 .347 .489 1.060 . 277 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.937 6.997 l< 
716,157 90 .180 .278 .391 .849 .252 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.912 6.761 
859,392 108 .150 .221 .326 .697 .263 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.923 6.620 ........ 
"See Table 16. 
-b Depreciation of plant and equipment is based on a 20·year schedule with the exception of pans which were depreciated on a six·year basi •. 0'> 
• Return on investment (before taxes) budgeted at 10 percent per annum. (.)0 
d See footnote e, Table 30. 
e See footnote d, Table 30. 
t Based on experimental engineering data prepared by E. S. Mack, American Baken Corporation, Inc., Teaneck, N. J . 
• Based on average costs reported by an auociated management group. 
TABLE 35 
AVERAGE FIXED AND VARIABLE UNIT COSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT OPERATED UNDER CONDmONS OF 








Invest· Indirect Direct Wrap. and ties and Total 
Type and Total Oven ment Return Produc· Total Produc· ping Misc. Maint. Vari· '""l 
Size of Weekly Operating Depreci· on Invest· tion Fixed tion Ingred· Sup. Sup· Sup· able Total ;:r-
Plant Output Time ation ment Labor Costs Labor ients plies plies plies Costs Costs C1> 
pounds/hr (lb •• ) (hours) ( ................................................................................ cents per pound .............................................................................................. ) b;j ~ capacity 
..... 
2000 -. ;:! 
72.000 36 .739 1.345 1.944 4.028 .506 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.166 10.194 O'q 
96.000 48 .554 1.009 1.458 3.021 .455 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.115 8.136 ...... 
144.000 72 .369 .673 .972 2.014 .506 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.166 8.080 ;:! ~ 
192.000 96 .277 .504 .729 1.510 .455 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.115 7.625 .:: 
240.000 120 .222 .404 .583 1.209 .455 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.115 7.324 '" 
288.000 144 .185 .336 .486 1.007 .455 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.115 7.122 9 
4000 
144.000 36 .528 .945 .972 2.445 .372 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.032 8.477 ...... 
192.000 48 .396 .709 .729 1.834 .335 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.995 7.829 ~ 
288.000 72 .264 .472 .486 1.222 .372 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 6.032 7.254 ~ 
.!... 384.000 96 .198 .354 .365 .917 .335 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.995 6.912 
'0 480.000 120 .159 .283 .292 .834 .335 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.995 6.829 
'" 576.000 144 .132 .236 .243 .611 .335 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.995 6.606 00 
6000 
216.000 36 .552 .867 .926 2.345 .287 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.947 8.292 
288.000 48 .414 .650 .694 1.758 .259 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.919 7.677 
432.000 72 .276 .433 .463 1.172 .287 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.947 7.119 
576.000 96 .207 .325 .347 .879 .259 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.919 6.798 
720.000 120 .166 .260 .278 .704 .259 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.919 6.623 
864.000 144 .188 .217 .232 .637 .259 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.919 6.556 
8000 
288.000 36 .445 .691 .972 2.108 .275 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.935 8.043 
384.000 48 .335 .518 .729 1.582 .248 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.908 7.490 
576.000 72 .223 .346 .486 1.055 .275 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.935 6.990 
768.000 96 .168 .259 .365 .792 .248 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.908 6.700 
960.000 120 .134 .207 .292 .633 .248 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.908 6.541 
1.152.000 144 .112 .173 .243 .528 .248 4.26 1.02 .14 .24 5.908 6.436 
SoURCE: Same as Table 88. 
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